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General Introduction
0.1 State of the art
0.1.1 Context
Cooperation - along competition - is a central ingredient in the evolution of certain
animal species and human societies. In their book, Aron and Passera (2009) describe the
example of lions. Among these animals, nearly 50% of the hunts are collective and food
is shared within the herd. Alone, lions are poor hunters - among other reasons because
males’ fur made them visible and because they have little stamina - but together, they
succeed to survive. In the animal kingdom, cooperation between individuals is often
exclusive to the same kin and to the same herd. Cooperation between two species is less
common (Clutton-Brock, 2009). Being part of a network is a crucial key of cooperation
both in the animal kingdom and in human societies. It allows (i) to have repeated
interactions with individuals and therefore to build a reputation and (ii) to create social
links with other individuals. For these two reasons, individuals may want and have an
interest in cooperating with their relatives and with their close friends.
Yet, in some situations, unrelated agents have to cooperate. Hardin (1968) presents in
his article the "Tragedy of Commons". This situation happens when agents compete
for scarce resources. This competition leads to an over-exploitation of the resources
that is detrimental to the whole community. One example lies on fish stocks. Fish
stocks are decreasing critically with modern fishing techniques that scale up bycatch,
1
the accidental capture of undesired marine life.1 The Tragedy of Commons concept
has become a central component of the ecological thinking. In order to overcome the
Tragedy of Commons, economists have either promoted solutions based on markets (e.g.
emissions trading) or based on government intervention (e.g. fishing quotas). Elinor
Ostrom has focused her work on how to solve the Tragedy of Commons. In her book,
Governing The Commons, Ostrom (1990) has offered an alternative solution in which
agents "govern themselves" - local communities implement institutions and rules, and
succeed to manage their resources (e.g. groundwater, forest) efficiently. Yet, in these
situations, agents have no interest to cooperate - by not over-exploiting the resources.
The first mention of the free-rider problem is made by Olson (1965) in The logic of collective
action. In his book, Olson highlights the fact that, in many situations, individuals’ interest
overrides collective interest. A rational and self-interested agent should not cooperate -
in other words, she should free-ride - in order to maximize her welfare.2 Yet, if all agents
cooperated, social welfare would be maximized. This kind of situation is therefore costly
for the society. The author illustrates his idea with the example of trade unions. Every
worker benefits from the union, however, contributing - by giving time or money - to
the union is costly. As a result, unions have few members and lose bargaining power.
The under-representation of workers in trade unions is costly to all workers.
Particular attention has been paid to these situations - called social dilemmas (Dawes,
1980). Do agents cooperate? Under what conditions do they cooperate? For what
reasons? How to improve cooperation? Social sciences have already given answers
to these questions. In this introduction, I will present the main responses found in
experimental and behavioural economics.
1The standard definition of bycatch concerns caught animals of the wrong species (i.e. untargeted), of
the wrong sex, or too young individuals from the targeted species. Using another definition, "bycatch is
catch that is either unused or unmanaged", Davies et al. (2009) estimate that bycatch represented 40.4% of
global marine catches between 1999 and 2004.
2By rational, economists mean that the agent is able to make the choice that maximizes her utility. By
self-interested, they mean that the agent is focused only on her own welfare.
2
0.1.2 Why study cooperation in the laboratory?
The objective of experimental economics is to study the decisions of economic agents
(mostly students) in a controlled environment.3 These environments are designed by
the experimenters to answer a research question. The environments designed are simple
and most often decontextualized in order to facilitate replications and to gather evidence.
Agents’ decisions are paid since the seminal work of Smith (1962), in order to reinforce
the stakes associated with each decision and thus to avoid the problem of hypothetical
bias - the difference between the choice declared by an agent and the choice she makes
when she has to make a decision that impacts her.
Noussair (2011) reports that, between 2001 and 2010, 13.1% of the papers published in top
journals in experimental economics (leaving aside field experiments and neuroeconomic
studies) were about social dilemmas. Controlled experiments provide a testbed to study
cooperation varying several aspects of the game. For instance, experimenters can study
the effect of repeated interactions: do agents act in the same way when they interact
once or when they interact repeatedly with the same group members? They are able
to determine the factors of cooperation. For instance, how an agent’s beliefs about
others’ cooperation behaviour correlate with her own cooperation behaviour? They are
able to test mechanisms that can lead to an increase in efficiency - i.e. a higher level of
cooperation. Are agents able to self govern? Under what conditions?
Additionally, in this environment, the cost of cooperation, the ability and the capacity
to cooperate, the productivity of the agents, and the return of cooperation are either
controlled or determined by the experimenters. Outside the laboratory, the cost of
cooperation may depend on the skills of the agents, agents may organize themselves to
cooperate, they may have different means (monetary, time available, network,. . . ), and
may benefit differently from cooperation. The laboratory makes it possible to isolate
and to manipulate the variable of interest in order to find results, all other things being
equal.
3Students generally have low income and are more sensitive to the monetary incentives associated with
each decision. Concerning the public good game, presented in Section 0.1.3, Belot et al. (2015) find that
non-student subjects act similarly than student subjects but are less likely to free-ride.
3
0.1.3 How to study cooperation in the laboratory?
In the laboratory, one way to study cooperation is to let agents play the linear public
good game (also known as the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism). The rules of the
game described below are common knowledge - known by every subject at the time of
the decision. In this game, N agents are part of a group. Each agent has the opportunity
to cooperate - by contributing a share of her endowment (e) to the public good. Each
monetary unit contributed to the public good (c) leads to an increase in the payoff (π) of
all agents by a value of αmonetary units - the Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR) of the
public good that can be interpreted as the return of the public good. Each uncontributed
monetary unit is stored in the agent’s personal account. Agent i’s payoff function can be
written as follows:
πi = (e− ci) + α
N
∑
k=1
ck (1)
The game is calibrated to create a social dilemma.4 An individual’s payoff is maximized
when she does not contribute to the public good because α <1 - in other words, the
return of the public good is lower than the return of the personal account. On the
other hand, social welfare is maximized when each individual contributes her whole
endowment to the public good - because N × α > 1.
There are variations of this game. The return of the public good can be a decreasing
function of individual contributions. In this case, one talks about a non-linear public
good game. The public good can be provided conditionally to a minimum amount of
contributions. If this amount of contributions is not reached, then the money contributed
is either returned or lost. In this case, one talks about a threshold public good game. In this
thesis, I will mainly focus on linear public good games.
4In most experiences, decisions about the amount to contribute are made simultaneously and privately.
It creates strategic uncertainty: agents ignore the choice made by their counterparts when they make their
contribution decision.
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0.1.4 Do subjects cooperate?
Any selfish and rational agent should not contribute to the public good in order to
maximize her income, regardless of the behaviour of the other group members. A
situation in which all agents behave like free-riders - by not contributing to the public
good - is therefore the unique Nash equilibrium. The set of strategies applies to a single
period game, but it is possible with backward induction to define this set of strategies
in a game with a finite number of repetitions. To do this, it is necessary to determine
the Nash Equilibrium in the last period and by backward induction to determine the
subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium.
Nevertheless, many experiments have shown that subjects contribute to the public good.
Ledyard (1995) conducts a literature review on public good games. His pioneering work
has highlighted the following results:
1. Agents contribute more than the amount predicted by the Nash Equilibrium when
the game is played only once or in the first periods when the game is finitely
repeated.
2. Contributions decrease over time when the game is finitely repeated.
3. In the final period, contributions are close to the Nash Equilibrium.
Additionally, in her meta-analysis, Zelmer (2003) finds that several factors affect con-
tributions to the public good. On one hand, a higher return of the public good (i.e.
MPCR) or repeated interactions with the same group members (also known as partner
matching protocols) lead to higher contributions to the public good. On the other hand,
she finds that experienced subjects and groups composed of subjects heterogeneous in
endowment are associated with lower contributions to the public good.
How to explain subjects’ contribution behaviour? Many behavioural explanations have
been mentioned.
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0.2 How to explain these standard results?
0.2.1 Other-regarding preferences
For a long time, economists assumed that agents were self-interested. In his article,
Becker (1974) relaxes this hypothesis and presents a formalization of the utility function
of an altruistic agent within a family. The utility of this agent increases when the welfare
- through consumption - of her family members increases. Suppose that agent i considers
the welfare of agent j in her utility function, then her utility function (Ui) can be written
as follows:
Ui = Vi(πi;πj) (2)
The Vi function is increasing in πi, i.e. the agent utility increases when her income
increases, but is also increasing in πj, i.e. the utility of agent i increases when the income
of agent j increases. It is then possible to calculate a marginal rate of substitution between
the payoff of agent i and the payoff of agent j - the quantity of money that agent i is
ready to give up to increase the payoff of agent j by one monetary unit. Under certain
conditions, an altruistic agent is therefore willing to contribute to the public good to
increase the payoff of the other group members.5
Several other-regarding preferences theories have been developed over time. Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) present in their article a utility function that describes the preferences
of an agent averse to inequalities. According to the authors, agents consider in their
utility function not only their payoff but also the difference between their payoff and the
payoff of the other members of the group. The utility function can be therefore written
as follows:
Ui(πi) = πi − βimax(πi − πj; 0)− αimax(πj − πi; 0) (3)
5Using this utility function, Buckley and Croson (2006) show that agents with a high endowment will
contribute more than agents with a low endowment in a public good game when agents within a group are
heterogeneous in endowment.
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Ui represents the utility function of agent i in the case of a two-player interaction. Ui
depends linearly on her payoff (πi) but also on the difference between her payoff and
the payoff of another agent j (πj). βi represents the disutility felt by agent i per monetary
unit she owns in addition to agent j. αi represents the disutility felt by agent i per
monetary unit she owns in less than agent j.
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that 1 > βi ≥ 0 and αi > βi. βi ≥ 0means that economic
agents (may) suffer when they are richer than the other group member. However, as
1 > βi, the model stipulates that no economic agents agree to give up one monetary unit
to increase the wealth of the other agent by one monetary unit. The second hypothesis
(i.e. αi > βi) can be interpreted as follows. An economic agent prefers to be richer by a
monetary unit than another agent rather than poorer by a monetary unit than the latter.
Under certain conditions recalled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), there is a multitude of
cooperative equilibria in the Public Good Game.
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) propose the ERC framework - Equity, Reciprocity and
Competition - in which agents may be inequality averse. The model differs slightly
from Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In this model, the utility (Ui) function can be written as
follows:
Ui = Vi
(
πi,
πi
Π
)
(4)
with πi equals to the payoff of agent i and Π the sum of payoffs within the group. Vi is
increasing in πi, and decreasing when the distance between πi and
πi
Π
increases. In other
words, (i) when the payoff of agent i increases, her utility increases; and (ii) if agent
i is inequality averse, when her payoff moves away from the average payoff within
the group, her utility decreases. In contrast to Fehr and Schmidt (1999), in this model,
agents are no longer more averse to disadvantageous inequalities than to advantageous
inequalities.6
6Using the ERC framework, Fischbacher et al. (2014) show that, among inequality averse agents, agents’
best responses are increasing as other group members average contributions increase.
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Other-regarding preferences may theoretically explain contributions to the public good.7
Have experimental economists measured some form of other-regarding preferences in
their experiments?
With an empirical approach, Fischbacher and Gachter (2010) classify agents depending
on their conditional behaviour. To do this, they elicit the conditional contributions of
each subject for every possible average value of other group members contribution.
Using these conditional contributions, agents are labelled in one of the four categories:
free-rider, conditional cooperator, triangular contributor or "unclassifiable". Thus, a
subject whose conditional contributions increase as the average contribution of other
group members increases is classified as a conditional cooperator. A subject who never
contributes to the public good even when the average contribution of other group
members increases is classified as a free-rider. Triangular contributors increase their
conditional contributions as other group members average contribution increases till a
certain amount, and then decrease their conditional contributions when the other group
members average contribution goes beyond this cut-off. Finally, a significant share of
agents contribute according to a scheme that is not explained by the typology proposed
above and are "unclassifiable". Fischbacher and Gachter (2010) identify in their study
55% of conditional cooperators, 23% of free-riders, 12% of triangular contributors, and
10% of subjects with other conditional contributions patterns. The number of free-riders
is relatively low in the population.8
This distribution is yet important. It can explain the patterns of cooperation in the public
good game highlighted by Ledyard (1995) and described above. In the first period,
subjects cooperate. Indeed, as free-riders are not predominant in the population, there is
a large share of subjects that contribute. Over time, and as free-riders’ behaviour does
7Reciprocity is another form of other-regarding preferences that may explain cooperation. Theoretical
articles such as Rabin (1993); Charness and Rabin (2002); Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004); Falk and
Fischbacher (2006) assume that, when agents anticipate others’ behaviour, or in repeated interactions, some
agents will respond to actions considered as altruistic by playing altruistically and will respond selfishly to
actions considered as selfish.
8Other methods have been developed to classify subjects according to their contributions behaviour. See
Kurzban and Houser (2005) and Burlando and Guala (2005).
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not change, cooperation decays. Conditional cooperators reduce their contribution to
the public good so that in the final period, the public good is no longer provided.
Other-regarding preferences may theoretically and empirically explain contributions
to the public good. There are potential cooperation equilibria in the public good game
under certain conditions. However, is it the only way to explain contributions to the
public good? If not, what share of contributions can be explained by other-regarding
preferences?
0.2.2 Other reasons raised to explain the standard results
Confusion
Before thinking about social preferences, economists have long suspected that a non-
trivial share of contributions to the public good was due to confusion. Confusion could
come from two aspects. In a first case, confusion would be due to methodological errors:
for example, instructions would not be clear enough, which would prevent agents from
determining the dominant strategy of the public good game. In a second case, confusion
would come from the agents: despite clear instructions, it is possible to imagine that
agents make errors of reasoning in their decision-making process. Andreoni (1995)
shows that confusion does not explain all the results found in the literature. According
to him, neutralizing confusion is extremely important. It allows (i) to think about new
models of learning, and (ii) it gives a greater value to the experimental results found
before his paper. If subjects only contribute by mistake, then it is difficult to learn
anything from the literature using the public good game. He distinguishes two reasons
that may explain contributions: kindness and confusion. Of the 75% of agents who
cooperate, half agents do so because they have not understood the game, while the other
half do so for other reasons involving kindness. The downward trend in contributions
would be explained by the frustration of the kind agents, which would increase over time
as their efforts of kindness would not be rewarded. Houser and Kurzban (2002) have
developed an innovative experimental strategy to determine the extent of confusion. In
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their experience, a subject is assigned with 3 virtual agents (i.e. computers). These virtual
agents make random contribution decisions - independent of the subject’s contribution
choice. This information is common knowledge. Provided that subjects are not altruistic
towards the experimenter, they have no reason to contribute to the public good. Houser
and Kurzban (2002) finally find the same proportion of contributions due to confusion as
Andreoni (1995) - i.e. 50%. For Houser and Kurzban (2002), the decrease in contributions
over time can be explained by a greater understanding of the game as periods pass.
Reputation building
Another reason that comes to mind to explain the contributions observed in the public
good game is that agents want to build a reputation. Agents contribute in the early
periods to encourage long-term contributions. However, cooperation cannot be ex-
plained only by reputation building, otherwise there would not be a positive level of
contributions (i) when agents play a one-period game, or (ii) when agents play over
several periods but each time with different partners (also known as stranger matching
protocols) (e.g. Andreoni, 1988).
Warm-glow giving
Economic agents do not always contribute to the public good for pure altruistic reasons.
In his article, Andreoni (1990) proposes a model of "impure altruism". According to
Andreoni, agents can contribute for different reasons: guilt, sympathy, a desire for
social recognition, or the welfare associated with the contribution (also called warm-glow
giving). Warm-glow giving is different from pure altruism. Indeed, any increase in the
welfare of agent j leads to an increase in the utility of agent iwhen agent i is altruistic,
regardless of the origin of the increase. An agent feels a sense of warm-glow giving
when she benefits more from an increase in agent j welfare when she is at the origin of it.
Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) have set up an experiment that uses the variation of the
return from the public good (i.e. MPCR) to distinguish four reasons for contributing
to the public good: (i) altruism, (ii) warm-glow giving, (iii) reputation building and
(iv) confusion. Their results indicate that, in a Public Good Game, altruism plays an
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insignificant role in agents’ decision-making in contrast to warm-glow giving and to
confusion.
0.3 How to sustain cooperation over time?
Experimental economists have found that (i) the public good is underprovisioned - i.e.
is not fully provided - but that (ii) a non trivial share of subjects want to cooperate. The
underprovision of the public good is at the origin of a loss in social welfare. Yet, it is
possible to rely on cooperators to encourage contributions to the public good over time.
In order to improve efficiency in such situations, economists have designed mechanisms.
Several types of mechanisms have been implemented (for a review of literature on
mechanisms, see Chaudhuri, 2011). Two types of mechanisms can be distinguished: the
centralized ones and the decentralized ones. In the former, an institution is generally
able to observe the contributions of each agent and act according to a rule publicly
known ex ante. In the latter, the management of the group depends on its members.
Mechanisms used in the laboratory can be classified in three categories: the ones which
use monetary incentives, the ones which use image concerns, and the one which use
information.
In the first category, good behaviour - beneficial to the community - is rewarded either
by peers (e.g. Rand et al., 2009; Sutter et al., 2010) or by a central authority (e.g Dickinson
and Isaac, 1998) when bad behaviour is punished (e.g. through taxes (e.g. Falkinger et al.,
2000), exclusions (e.g. Croson et al., 2015), or peer punishments (e.g. Ostrom et al., 1992;
Fehr and Gachter, 2000)). Take the example of peer punishment. In Fehr and Gachter
(2000), subjects play a two-stage game. The rules of the two stages are publicly known
before subjects make their decisions. In the first stage, subjects play the standard Public
Good Game. In the second stage, they have the opportunity to punish any groupmember
at a cost. Each punishment point leads to a decrease in payoff by 10% of the targeted
agent. The game is repeated 10 periods. The authors find that punishment is associated
with significantly higher contributions to the public good in both stranger and partner
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matching protocols. Many authors have manipulated this mechanism to highlight
several findings. First, the mechanism is likely to be efficient - in other words, the
aggregated cost of punishment is lower than the aggregated benefit due to the increase
in contributions - when the VCM is repeated a large number of times. In Gächter et al.
(2008), the game is either repeated 10 periods or 50 periods depending on the treatment.
The authors find that contributions in the last period are higher (and almost fit the Pareto
dominant situation) when the game lasts 50 periods and that the level of punishment is
almost 0 in this period. This is not the case when the game lasts only 10 periods. In the
same vein, Walker and Halloran (2004) find that punishment does not increase efficiency
when VCM is played only once. Second, results depend on the cost-efficiency ratio of the
punishment mechanism (Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008). When the cost-efficiency ratio
of the mechanism is lower than 1:3 (punishment costs one monetary unit and decreases
the payoff of the targeted agent by three monetary units), cooperation is not sustained.
The standard decay of contributions happens and the social cost of punishment is larger
than the social benefit due to the increase in contributions. Worst, punishment may lead
to detrimental effects. Anti-social punishments - punishments against high contributors
- are likely to happen when feedback is available (Nikiforakis, 2008).9 This phenomenon
is not rare and may emerge for potential cultural reasons (Herrmann et al., 2008). In
the worst-case scenario, punishment can lead to feuds and to a total destruction of the
social welfare when the cost of punishment is almost null and when subjects have the
possibility to counter-punish (Nikiforakis et al., 2012).
In the second category, agents contribute to preserve a good image. For instance,
communication through disapproval points (Masclet et al., 2003) or pictures of the top
(or bottom) contributors (e.g. Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Jacquet et al., 2011; Samek
and Sheremeta, 2014) are mechanisms based on self and social image that can lead to
an increase in contributions to the public good. In this kind of mechanisms, agents
contribute for different reasons: they may contribute to avoid shame or to get honoured
9Note that Ertan et al. (2009) propose a solution to tackle this problem.
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(Jacquet et al., 2011), or they may contribute to be the "good example", knowing that
subjects use social-comparison as a reference point (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004).
Finally, the last kind of mechanisms rely on beliefs, information or feedback. Regarding
information, subjects can in some experiments communicate (e.g. Ostrom et al., 1992;
Bochet et al., 2006; Bochet and Putterman, 2009). Communication through cheap talk
allows subject to coordinate on a strategy and may potentially affect beliefs about other
group members average contribution. Communication generally leads to an increase
in contributions (e.g. Ostrom et al., 1992; Bochet et al., 2006; Bochet and Putterman,
2009). Regarding beliefs, subjects can have advice given by former participants (e.g.
Chaudhuri et al., 2006). In this experiment, the authors argue that the advice transmit-
ted lead to optimistic beliefs about other group members average contribution and to
higher contributions. Finally, regarding feedback, in Nikiforakis (2010), subjects in one
treatment have a detailed feedback about every group member’s earnings. In another
treatment, they have a detailed feedback about every group member’s contribution.
Nikiforakis (2010) finds that subjects tend to be less cooperative when they have infor-
mation about earnings with respect to the situation in which they have information
about contributions.
0.4 Research Question
In the laboratory, cooperation has been carefully studied over the last 40 years. However,
experimental economists have to make a trade-off between control and external validity.
Bymaximizing control, they ensure that external factors (e.g. cultural or social influences)
do not affect their results. They conduct experiments that are easy to replicate and
that allow them to isolate the effects of their treatment through an incentive scheme.
By favouring control over external validity, experimental economists choose simple
environments that may be unrealistic.
In the case of public goods, they have chosen an environment in which agents are homo-
geneous in endowment and in which the return on the public good is certain, known in
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advance by all agents, and homogeneous within a group. Most of the results described
in this introduction have been found in this environment. Yet, these assumptions are
strong: economic agents do not always know with certainty the return of the public
good (e.g. the return of a scientific collaboration), it is likely to vary over the course of
a lifetime (e.g. the return of public infrastructures), and both the return of the public
good and income are rarely identical between agents in the population (e.g. agents
may differ in income or in preferences for public goods). Moreover, uncertainty and
heterogeneity (which implies inequalities) are likely to impact contribution behaviours.
Agents are, most often, risk averse and are sensible to inequalities. When the return of
the public good is risky, or when there is heterogeneity within a group, it may change
the contribution behaviour with respect to the standard game. One of the purpose
of this thesis is to study cooperation when one or several of the standard hypotheses
(i.e. homogeneity and certainty in returns, homogeneity in endowment) are relaxed.
Research has already been carried out in this direction and Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are
further steps.
The goal of these two chapters is to see if the standard patterns of cooperation hold in
a more complex and more realistic environment. Precisely, in Chapter 1, I investigate
the effects of heterogeneity in endowment and heterogeneity in return on contributions
in a linear Public Good Game. In Chapter 2 (co-written with Adam Zylbersztejn), we
investigate the effects of environmental risk on contributions to the public good. These
two chapters offer variations of the standard game that may affect the contribution
behaviour of subjects. To predict and explain agents’ contribution behaviour, I will apply
other-regarding theories to these contexts. What do these theories predict when agents
are heterogeneous in endowment or when the return of the public good is risky? Are
these models adapted to predict behaviour in a more complex environment? To give an
example, in Chapter 2, agents have the opportunity to cooperate in a risky environment.
Two theories can be relevant to draw predictions: other-regarding preferences, and
risk preferences. No theory mixing risk preferences and other-regarding preferences is
unanimously accepted. We have chosen to privilege other-regarding preferences over
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risk preferences rather than proposing a new model (which is not the objective of this
thesis).
Do theoretical predictions fit with what is observed in the laboratory either by our exper-
iment or by previous studies? In Chapter 1, I survey the literature and summarise the
main results found in experimental economics. In Chapter 2, we run a new experiment
with a systematic analysis of environmental risk. This experiment allows to gather more
data and to enrich the understanding of why and how people contribute to provide
public goods.
Chapter 3 is slightly different. The aim of Chapter 3 is to improve public goods provision
through a mechanism based on within-group competition. Competition alleviates the
tension between individual and collective interest. To test this mechanism, I run an
experiment in which agents compete for a better access to the public good (i.e. a higher
MPCR). Ex ante agents do not know the return of the public good. In this chapter, to
give theoretical predictions, I use an extension of the model applied in Chapter 2.
This thesis as a whole offers new insights on cooperation. Understanding cooperation
can be useful to the decision maker, especially in resource management issues. Outside
the political world, companies often use teamwork for their employees. A better under-
standing of the determinants of cooperation, finding solutions to tackle the free-riding
the problem, and finding an incentive system that promotes full cooperation is likely to
interest private companies.
0.5 Overview of the different chapters
0.5.1 Chapter 1
In this chapter, I offer the first survey of the literature focusing on the impacts of agents’
heterogeneity in linear public good games. I distinguish two types of heterogeneity:
agents either differ in endowment or in the return they obtain from the public good (i.e.
MPCR).
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Despite excellent literature surveys (for examples, Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011), little
attention has been paid to agents’ heterogeneity. Yet, agents’ heterogeneity is likely to
exacerbate the normative conflict inherent to social dilemmas. Normative conflict exists
when agents do not share the same view about how to behave. Broadly speaking, agents
can be classified in three categories: the ones who favour equality in contributions, the
ones who favour equality in payoffs, and those who favour contributions proportional to
the return of the public good. Agents who differ in endowment or in MPCR are likely to
differ on how they think agents should contribute in a Public Good Game. My starting
assumption is that (i) heterogeneity strengthens the normative conflict and (ii) that this
normative conflict leads to lower efficiency (i.e. a lower provision of the public good).
Empirical studies - both using lab-in-the-field and natural data - find that heterogeneity
or ethnic diversity lead to a lower provision of public goods (e.g. Alesina et al., 1999;
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Cardenas, 2003; Miguel, 2004; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005;
Algan et al., 2016). However, outside the laboratory, heterogeneity may me multiple
and it is complicated to isolate the effects of heterogeneity in income or the effects
of heterogeneity in return from the public good ceteris paribus. Surveying laboratory
experiments allows me (i) to study the effects of heterogeneity found in a controlled
environment and (ii) to study if heterogeneous agents are able to use mechanisms to
overcome the underprovision of public goods - in other words, if they are able to "govern
themselves". For instance, giving them the opportunity to punish may backfire if they
do not succeed to agree on a contribution behaviour.
In addition to the normative conflict, heterogeneity is also intertwined with inequalities.
Heterogeneity in endowment leads to ex ante income inequalities between agents. Het-
erogeneity in MPCR leads to a situation of efficiency characterized by ex post inequalities
in payoffs. Using the theoretical framework of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and of Becker
(1974), Buckley and Croson (2006) show that heterogeneity in endowment should trigger
larger contributions from high endowed agents while, using the theoretical framework
of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Fischbacher et al. (2014) show that heterogeneity in
MPCR should trigger larger contributions from high MPCR agents.
16
In fact, agents’ heterogeneity does not seem to affect the patterns of cooperation usually
observed when agents are homogeneous. Contributions are significant in the first
periods but decrease over time and reach a level of almost zero in the last period.
Despite a normative conflict exacerbated, in 9 articles out of 12, contributions are not
significantly lower in heterogeneous groups than in homogeneous ones. Agents with a
high endowment do not contribute more than agents with a low endowment. Agents
with a high MPCR contribute more than agents with a low MPCR.
After observing the underprovision of public goods, I study the papers that offer so-
lutions to counter this phenomenon. Punishment is as efficient in groups composed
of agents heterogeneous in endowment as it is in groups composed of homogeneous
agents. It leads to an improvement in social welfare. The results are more mitigated in a
public good game with agents heterogeneous in MPCR. Punishment is less efficient in
this context than in homogeneous groups. When agents are heterogeneous in MPCR,
punishment often does not improve social welfare. Worst, it can lead to feuds - a total
destruction of welfare - when agents have the opportunity to counter-punish. Voting and
implementing institutions can improve social welfare when agents are heterogeneous
in MPCR but less efficiently than in a homogeneous population. When agents within
a group differ in MPCR, the efficiency situation is accompanied by inequalities that
are not accepted by all group members. Gangadharan et al. (2017) offer a solution to
this problem by giving to the agents the opportunity to communicate and to transfer
money once the public good has been provided. Unfortunately, agents heterogeneous in
MPCR are unable to coordinate on the usage of this mechanism. They fail to maximize
efficiency under the constraint of equal payoffs.
This chapter suggests that heterogeneous agents are able to cooperate. Agents heteroge-
neous in endowment are even able to govern themselves while there is a need for more
research to push agents heterogeneous in MPCR to reach efficiency.
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0.5.2 Chapter 2
In this chapter, Adam Zylbersztejn and I are interested in the effects of environmental
risk on the level of contributions to the public good. Our baseline is the standard setting
in which the personal return from the public good is deterministic, homogeneous, and
publicly known. Our experimental treatments alter this classic design by making the
marginal per capita return from the public good probabilistic. When agents make their
decision, they do not know the value of the return of the public good but they know
its distribution. The MPCR can take two values - a high value or a low value - both
values being equiprobable. In the Homogeneous Risk Treatment (HomR) the random
draw is made for the whole group, while in the heterogeneous risk treatment (HetR)
this happens independently for each group member. Each of the treatment consists in
two parts. In a first part, subjects play the game only once. Additionally, in this part, we
measure beliefs about other group members average contribution and other-regarding
preferences (using Fischbacher’s method (Fischbacher et al., 2001)). In a second part,
the game is repeated for 10 periods with the same group. Subjects do not know that the
game would be repeated when they make their decision for the first part.
Theoretically, we know that economic agents incorporate two categories of justice in
their decision-making: procedural justice and distributive justice. Procedural justice
concerns the opportunity; in other words, the (ex ante) expected payoff. Distributive
justice concerns the actual payoffs applied ex post - after that all agents have made their
decision and after that the return of the public good has been determined. In our three
treatments, the expected gain is the same. In this way, we eliminate all considerations
associated with procedural justice. However, our treatments are such that, for the same
set of contributions within a group, payoffs inequalities may be different in the three
treatments.
To study agent behaviour, we use the inequality aversion model presented by Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000). We simulate the best response function for each treatment for
three profiles of agents: agents with a low inequality aversion, agents with a moderate
inequality aversion, and agents with a high inequality aversion. These simulations lead
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us to our research hypothesis: the level of contributions should be higher in HomR than
in HetR and the level of contributions in the baseline treatment should be between these
two treatments.
Our results do not go in that direction. The level of contributions is the same in all
three treatments in the first part. Neither other-regarding preferences nor beliefs about
other group members average contribution seem to be different in the three treatments.
The correlation between beliefs and contributions is not significantly different in the
three treatments. In the second part, the contributions seem to be higher in the HomR
treatment. However, this result is explained by the fact that agents contribute more only
in the first periods in this treatment. The effect quickly fades away.
These results indicate that the public good game in its standard environment allows for
a robust and conservative measure of cooperation. Environmental risk, as long as not
competitive (i.e. as long as it does not impose inequalities between agents), does not
lead to a decrease in contributions.
0.5.3 Chapter 3
In this chapter, I study the effects of within-group competition on public goods provision.
Social dilemmas are marked by an asymmetry between individual and collective inter-
ests. This conflict of interest leads to an underprovision of public goods and therefore
to a situation of inefficiency. The objective of this chapter is to revisit the incentive
system in order to align individual and collective interest. To do this, in the mechanism
that I implement, there are privileged accesses to the highest contributors. Privileged
accesses result in higher MPCRs. Two types of competition with incentives are studied.
In the Multiple Prize Rank Order Tournament (MP-ROT), four agents compete for four
different MPCRs. In the Single Prize Rank Order Tournament (SP-ROT), four agents
are in competition but only the top contributor gets a privileged access. These two
treatments make it possible to study the risk/benefit trade-off and to manipulate the
potential ex-post inequalities.
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These two treatments are compared to a treatment with a tournament without incentives
(NP-ROT). In this treatment, agents are ranked according to their contribution but their
rank does not give them a privileged access. The agent with the highest contribution is
ranked 1 but has the same MPCR as the others. This treatment is close to the standard
way to provide public goods. I consider however a tournament in order to control for
the non monetary effect of competition - the desire to be ranked first. Does a monetary
competition lead to a higher provision of the public good than the standard mechanism?
Finally, the two treatments with competition and incentives are also compared to two
treatments in which the same MPCRs are randomly assigned (MP-CTL and SP-CTL).
The objective is to verify that agents play differently when the MPCR depends on the
level of contribution chosen and is not randomly attributed.
From a theoretical point of view, I show that selfish and rational agents are likely to
contribute more to the public good when there is competition for privileged accesses
(namely in MP-ROT and SP-ROT). To do this, I simulate the average best response
function of a self-interested agent for every set of contributions. In both incentivized
treatments, the average best response depends on the other group members sum of
contributions and on the contribution of each agent. In all other treatments (namely
in NP-ROT, MP-CTL and SP-CTL), the best response function is a constant equal to 0.
When I look at the best response of an agent who is inequality averse, the predictions
are less clear. Indeed, for an agent averse to inequalities, it is costly to behave like a
free-rider in a treatment without incentives. Inequality averse agents cannot tolerate
being richer than other agents in the group. On the other hand, contributing a large
amount in SP-ROT treatment leads to inequalities that are not accepted by agents who
are highly inequality averse. Competition with incentives can backfire for inequality
averse agents.
Finally, I find that Incentivized Rank Order Tournaments lead to an increase in con-
tributions with respect to NP-ROT. This increase is significant only when there are
multiple prizes. Altogether, my results suggest that SP-ROT is less efficient because of
the inequalities driven by the treatment. Indeed, the GINI Index is significantly higher
20
in this treatment and, together with my theoretical predictions, it is one way to explain
the lower efficiency associated to this treatment with respect to MP-ROT.
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Chapter 1
Heterogeneity in Public Good
Games: a survey1
Social dilemmas emphasize the conflict between individual and community interest
common in numerous human interactions. This conflict may lead to inefficiency: a
situation in which social welfare is not maximized. In order to study social dilemmas in
the laboratory, experimental economists have implemented different games. The public
good game (hereafter PGG) has been investigated extensively over the last 40 years.2 In
this game, agents have the possibility either to cooperate - by contributing to a public
good - or to free-ride - by keeping their money. Social welfare is maximized when every
agent cooperates but each agent’s best response is to free-ride.
Ledyard (1995) and Chaudhuri (2011) have written two important surveys for the un-
derstanding of the PGG. Ledyard (1995) points out regular patterns of contributions in
standard settings. Agents do cooperate more than predicted by the Nash Equilibrium
1This chapter is single-authored.
2Public good games may take different forms. Linear public good games are defined by a constant
Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR) of the public good - in other words the return from the public good is
constant. In non-linear public good games, the MPCR decreases as individual contributions increase. In
threshold public good games, public goods are provided if and only if the sum of contributions is above a
threshold. If the threshold is not reached, money is either given back to the group members or is lost. In
this survey, I will focus on linear public good games such as presented in Section 1.1.1
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both in one-shot and in repeated interactions.3 However, cooperation tends to decay
over time when the game is repeated. In the last period, contributions to the public
good are close to the best response. These two phenomena are observed both when
agents interact with the same group members - in partner matching protocols - or when
they interact with different group members over time - in stranger matching protocols.
Chaudhuri (2011) focuses on the ways to sustain cooperation and to maximize social
welfare (considered as the sum of payoffs within a group in the laboratory) over time.
Several mechanisms (e.g. punishment or rewards) lead to high and sustainable contribu-
tions over time under certain conditions. For instance, when the cost of punishment is
low, Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) show that punishment can improve social welfare.
One reason that explains the underprovision of public goods observed in the PGG lies
in the heterogeneity in other-regarding preferences within a group. Fischbacher and
Gachter (2010) use the Fischbacher method (2001) to classify agents’ behaviour. In their
experiment, subjects are asked to choose their conditional level of contribution to the
public good for every potential other group members’ average contribution. Using
these conditional contributions, agents are labelled in one of four categories: free-riders,
conditional cooperators, triangular contributors or "unclassifiable". Free-riders do not
contribute to the public good whatever the level of contribution of the other group
members. Conditional cooperators increase their conditional contribution as other group
members average contribution increases. Triangular contributors increase their condi-
tional contributions as other group members average contribution increases till a certain
amount and then decrease their conditional contributions beyond this cutoff. Condi-
tional contributions that do not respond to these patterns are labelled as "unclassifiable".
In their study, Fischbacher and Gachter (2010) find that 55% of subjects are classified
as conditional cooperators, 23% as free-riders, 12% as triangular contributors and 10%
3Economists have offered several explanations of this phenomenon. Other-regarding preferences
theories (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) assume that an agent considers the
payoff of her counterparts in her utility function. Theories based on reciprocity (e.g. Rabin, 1993; Charness
and Rabin, 2002; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) assume that agents are willing to reciprocate kindly to kind
actions. Agents may also experience joy or satisfaction when cooperating (warm-glow giving in Andreoni
(1995)). Agents may suffer from confusion when making their decisions (Houser and Kurzban, 2002) or
make errors in their decision process (Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997).
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are "unclassifiable".4 This result explains both the non-null contributions observed in
the first period and the decay in contributions in the repeated game. A non-marginal
share of agents contribute to the public good in the first period. When the game is
repeated, and as free-riders keep not contributing, conditional cooperators decrease
their contributions.
So far, little attention has been dedicated to a crucial aspect of the game: what happens
when heterogeneous (either in endowment or in MPCR) agents play the game? In
most experiments, participants playing the PGG have the same endowment and benefit
from the same return of the public good. This choice allows experimental economists
to maximize control on data, to replicate experiments and to gather evidence. Yet,
heterogeneity is likely to strengthen the normative conflict, make coordination harder
and therefore to reduce cooperation. Additionally to the standard heterogeneity in
other-regarding preferences presented above, subjects now differ in parameters. In the
standard public good gamewith homogeneous agents, equal contributions among group
members lead to equal payoffs. When heterogeneous agents - whether in endowment
or in MPCR - play the game, this statement is no longer true. Do heterogeneous agents
agree on the contribution behaviour the group should adopt? Do subjects manage to
provide public goods?
Empirical studies - both using lab-in-the-field and natural data - find that heterogeneity
leads to lower provision of public goods (e.g. Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara,
2000; Cardenas, 2003; Miguel, 2004; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Algan et al., 2016).
Alesina et al. (1999); Miguel (2004); Miguel and Gugerty (2005); Algan et al. (2016) show
that higher ethnic diversity leads to lower spending in public goods. In a lab-in-the-field
experiment, Cardenas (2003) shows that participants’ wealth and inequalities within a
group reduce cooperation. Among the explanations raised, agents may prefer (taste)
to interact with people of the same kind - in group favouritism (Alesina and La Ferrara,
2000); agents may have lower level of trust when they play with agents different from
4See Kurzban and Houser (2005) and Burlando and Guala (2005) for other studies on the same topic.
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them (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Cardenas, 2003) or agents may differ in preferences
(Alesina et al., 1999).
Outside the laboratory, agents’ heterogeneity may be multiple: they may differ simulta-
neously in culture, in identity, in income and in return from the public good. It is difficult
to observe an unbiased causal effect in such a rich environment. Studying the effects of
heterogeneity in the laboratory allows experimenters to vary and to control for the nature
of heterogeneity. Additionally, they can investigate if standard efficiency-enhancing
mechanisms work as efficiently when agents within a group are heterogeneous in en-
dowment/MPCR. Indeed, if agents do not agree on the contribution behaviour that the
group members should adopt, giving them the opportunity to punish may not solve
the underprovision problem and may even lead to anti-social behaviours - for instance,
punishment towards contributors.
Evidence observed in the lab so far seems to indicate a negative effect of heterogene-
ity on contributions. In his seminal survey, Ledyard (1995) presents six articles with
heterogeneous agents (Bagnoli and McKee, 1991; Brookshire et al., 1993; Fisher et al.,
1995; Marwell and Ames, 1979, 1980; Rapoport and Suleiman, 1993) and finds a negative
effect of heterogeneity on contributions. Yet, he does not distinguish the nature of the
environment (matching protocol, information, type of public good) and the type of
heterogeneity (endowment in Rapoport and Suleiman (1993), MPCR in Fisher et al.
(1995)). Zelmer (2003), 8 years later, reports in her meta-analysis a negative effect of
heterogeneity in endowment and no effect of heterogeneity in MPCR on contributions
in linear PGGs.
Since the publication of these twoworks, articles investigating the effects of heterogeneity
in PGGs have flourished. This study serves two purposes. First, I survey the post
Ledyard articles on the effects of heterogeneity - either in endowment or in MPCR - on
public goods provision. This first part allows me to collect and present every result
observed and to crosscheck if the effects found in Ledyard (1995) and in Zelmer (2003)
hold in the recent literature using linear PGGs. Second, after having observed substantial
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underprovision of public goods, I survey articles that implement mechanisms to tackle
this underprovision.
I find that both kinds of heterogeneity exacerbate the normative conflict. However,
most articles on heterogeneity in endowment (5 articles out of 7) and on heterogeneity
in MPCR (4 articles out of 5) do not find a significantly lower level of aggregated
contributions with respect to the PGG with homogeneous groups. When the game is
repeated, contributions tend to decrease over time. At the individual level, subjects with
a high endowment generally do not contribute higher amounts than subjects with a low
endowment. Subjects with a high MPCR tend to contribute more than subjects with a
low MPCR. The normative conflict, caused by the presence of heterogeneity within a
group, do not lead to a decrease in efficiency. Introducing mechanisms leads to different
effects depending on the heterogeneity type. The good news is that punishment is as
efficient in groups with heterogeneity in endowment as in homogeneous ones. The bad
news is that mechanisms do not perfectly overcome the underprovision problem in
groups with heterogeneity in MPCR. In this situation, the efficiency strategy is associated
with inequalities in ex post payoffs that are not accepted by low MPCR agents.
1.1 Game and behavioural assumptions
1.1.1 Game
N agents are in a group and have to decide individually and privately which part (c) of
their endowment (e) they want to contribute to a public good. Every token contributed
to the public good yields αk token to every agent k in the group (∀k ∈ [|1;N|]).5 Every
token not contributed to the public good by agent i is kept for her private consumption
5There are two main ways to design a public good game. In one case, αi is considered as the return
of agent i from the public good. In this case, each token contributed to the public good - whoever the
agent that contributes - yields αi token to agent i. In the second case, αi represents the productivity of
agent i to the public good. In this case, each token contributed to the public good by agent i increases the
payoff of every agent in the group by αi token. In this case, the payoff function can be written as follows:
πi(ci) = βi(ei − ci) + ∑
N
k=1 αkck. In a homogeneous linear PGG, both cases are equivalent.
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and increases her payoff by βi token. Contribution decisions are made simultaneously
and privately. The payoff function of agent i (πi) in a period is computed as follows:
πi(ci) = βi(ei − ci) + αi
N
∑
k=1
ck (1.1)
In this survey, I focus on games in which agents within a group are heterogeneous in
parameters. Two forms of heterogeneity are of special interest. Agents may differ in
endowment (i.e. agents with different e within a group), or in MPCR (i.e. agents with
different α within a group).
1.1.2 Heterogeneity and other-regarding preferences
In a linear public good game, the return of the private account, is, most times, higher
than the return of the public good (mathematically, αi < βi), such as contributing to the
public good is costly (∀ci ∈ [|0; ei|],
∂πi
∂ci
< 0).6 A rational and self-interested agent should
not contribute to the public good. Consequently, the Nash equilibrium corresponds to a
situation in which no agents contribute to the public good. On contrary, social welfare is
maximized when every agent contributes her whole endowment. It is a consequence of
the calibration: ∑Nk=1 αk > 1.
Yet, one knows that subjects do contribute to the public good. Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
consider that it is possible to explain past results observed in PGGs (among other games)
with agents’ inequality aversion. According to them, agents’ utility depends not only
on their absolute payoff but also on the difference in absolute payoffs between group
members. The utility function suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) can be written as
follows:
Ui(πi) = πi − bimax(πi − πj; 0)− aimax(πj − πi; 0) (1.2)
6In some case, the MPCR of an agent may be smaller than 0. In this kind of situations, the public good
can be seen as a "Not in my backyard" case. The standard example is the construction of an airport which
increases the welfare of most inhabitants but which is poorly accepted by people who live close. See Dekel
et al. (2017) for a recent paper on this topic.
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with 0 < bi < ai. bi represents, for agent i, the loss in utility due to advantageous
inequality while ai represents her loss in utility due to disadvantageous inequality. An
agent prefers to be one dollar richer than one dollar poorer relatively to another agent.
Under certain conditions detailed in their seminal paper, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show
that there exist potential cooperation equilibria in a homogeneous environment. What
happens when a group is composed of agents heterogeneous either in endowment or
in MPCR? Some articles dealing with heterogeneity (e.g. Buckley and Croson, 2006;
Fischbacher et al., 2014; Kube et al., 2015) have chosen to incorporate their work in Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) framework.
Whatever the kind of heterogeneity, agents with a high type (i.e. a high MPCR or a high
endowment) should contribute a bigger share of their endowment and consequently a
bigger amount than agents with a low type to decrease inequalities within the group
(see the version of the proofs I propose in Appendix A.1). Consequently, if one considers
Fehr and Schmidt utility function in a context with heterogeneity in endowment/MPCR,
inequality averse agents with a high type should contribute a bigger share of their
endowment in order to maximize their utility.7
Hypothesis about individual contribution behaviour - Inequality aversion:Agents with
a high type should contribute a bigger share of their endowment than agents with a low
type, and consequently a bigger amount.
1.1.3 Normative Conflict
Another aspect exacerbated by heterogeneity, and studied for instance by Nikiforakis
et al. (2012), Reuben and Riedl (2013), or by Gangadharan et al. (2017), lies in normative
conflict.8 A social norm is defined as a behavioural rule that must fulfil several conditions.
7A proof in the case of heterogeneity in endowment is available in Buckley and Croson (2006). Simula-
tions of an agent’s best responses using Fehr and Schmidt utility function in the case of heterogeneity in
MPCR are available in Fischbacher et al. (2014).
8Also studied by Kingsley (2016) in a non-linear PGG, by Brick et al. (2016) in a game when agents differ
in abatement costs (i.e. when both α and β are different within a group) and discussed in Kachelmeier and
Shehata (1997) with natural social norms that differ depending on the culture of the agent.
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A social norm exists when a sufficiently large number of agents know the rule, approve
it and are ready to conform to the norm under the conditions that others (i) do follow
the rule and (ii) expect other group members to follow the rule. Otherwise, it may
exist when enough agents are ready to sacrifice a part of their payoff (for example, by
punishing) to enforce the application of this rule. A social norm depends on the beliefs
about what others consider as a "fair" behaviour and on the beliefs about the applicability
of this rule of behaviour. In the literature about heterogeneity in PGGs, economists often
mention normative conflict because subjects within a group share different views about
the norm of contribution that must be followed. There are in general three different
norms that summarize subjects’ view: equality of payoffs, equality of contributions, and
contributions proportional to productivity/return. In a standard and homogeneous
PGG, these three norms are equivalent. In the heterogeneous case, equal contributions
do not lead to payoffs equality (neither when agents differ in endowment nor when
they differ in MPCR). Consequently, there may be a normative conflict between agents
in favour of equality of contributions within a group (input) and agents in favour of
equality of payoffs (output). The social norm based on "fairness" is often self-serving.
Agents with a low type (low MPCR or low endowment) find "fair" that agents with a
high type contribute more than them. Agents with a high type find "fair" that every
agent equally contributes to the public good. Both of them want to maximize their own
payoff.
1.2 Effects of heterogeneity on cooperation
In this part, the objective is to study the effects of heterogeneity in a PGG when no
mechanism is implemented to enhance cooperation. The aim of this part is (i) to see if
heterogeneity leads to a normative conflict and (ii) to make an inventory of the results
already observed. Results will be separated in two sections depending on the type of
heterogeneity.
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1.2.1 Heterogeneity in endowment
Observation 0: Heterogeneity in endowment strengthens the normative conflict.
Reuben and Riedl (2013) focus their work on normative conflict. To elicit norms, they
examine the online answers of "third parties" who do not play the game. Having at their
disposal the instructions, third parties are asked to answer the question "what is the fair
amount that each of the group members should contribute to the group project?" and
to choose contributions conditional to certain situations. The authors show that third
parties do not agree on the contribution behaviours that agents should adopt when they
differ in endowment. 12% of third parties favour equality of contributions, 36% of them
favour contributions proportional to endowment (different from the efficient strategy),
26% of them favour equality of earnings, 2% of them favour efficiency and 24% of them
favour another contribution behaviour. When third parties are asked to choose what
kind of contribution behaviour is fair when agents within a group are homogeneous in
endowment, 74% of them favour equality of contributions (different from the efficient
strategy), 13% of them favour efficiency and 13% of them favour other contribution
behaviours. As expected, heterogeneity strengthens the normative conflict. Does this
normative conflict reduce cooperation?
Observation 1: 5 articles out of 7 do not find lower aggregated contributions (and
therefore lower efficiency) when agents within a group are heterogeneous in endowment.
Two strategies have been deployed to study the effects of heterogeneity in endowment
on aggregated contributions.9 One way to do this (e.g. Cherry et al., 2005; Prediger,
2011; Heap et al., 2016) is to compare agents with the same endowment in two different
environments: a homogeneous one and a heterogeneous one. One advantage of this
method is that there is no individual wealth effect when comparing individual contri-
bution across environments. Consequently, it is possible to isolate the pure effect of
heterogeneity in endowment on contributions. This method leads to mixed evidence.
9The calibration and the principal results of every cited article in this section are presented in Figure 1.1.
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On one hand, Cherry et al. (2005) and Heap et al. (2016) find that aggregated contribu-
tions are significantly lower when agents within a group differ in endowment. On the
other hand, Georgantzis and Proestakis (2011) find a positive effect of heterogeneity on
aggregated contributions. One aspect of this method is that the aggregated levels of
wealth - the sum of endowments before contribution decisions - differ across treatments.
Beliefs about other group members’ average contribution may be affected by this change.
On one side, in a heterogeneous group, an agent with a low endowment is matched
with agents with a higher endowment. Consequently, she may expect high contributions
from her counterparts, and contributes a high amount. On the other side, in a hetero-
geneous group, an agent with a high endowment is matched with agents with a lower
endowment. Consequently, she may expect low contributions from her counterparts,
and contributes a low amount. Cherry et al. (2005) and Heap et al. (2016) show that the
agents with the higher endowment contribute more in a homogeneous environment
than in a heterogeneous one while the other agents do not contribute differently in the
two environments.
Another way to study the effects of heterogeneity in endowment on aggregated contri-
butions is to compare two groups with the same aggregated wealth. Agents in these
groups are not endowed with the same amount. Using this method Hofmeyr et al. (2007),
find no effects of heterogeneity in endowment on aggregated contributions. The same
result is observed in Keser et al. (2013) in a treatment with low inequalities.10 In two
field experiments taking place in Africa, Prediger (2011) and Burns and Visser (2006)
find a positive and significant effect of heterogeneity in endowment on aggregated
contributions.
Observation 2: Contributions tend to decrease over time when agents are heterogeneous
in endowment.
10These results are in line with what theory predicts. Warr (1983) and Bergstrom et al. (1986) have
respectively developed and generalized the theorem of neutrality that states that a redistribution of income
within a society does not lead to a decrease in the provision of public goods as long as the set of contributors
does not change.
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Burns and Visser (2006); Buckley and Croson (2006); Heap et al. (2016); Keser et al. (2013);
Reuben and Riedl (2013) find a negative and significant effect of time on contributions
in the treatment with heterogeneity in endowment. Hofmeyr et al. (2007) and Prediger
(2011) find no effect of time neither in the homogeneous baseline treatment, nor in the
treatment with heterogeneity in endowment. As these two articles also find no effect of
time in the homogeneous treatment - which is not common -, such a null effect result
may be due to the pool of subjects.
Observation 3: In most articles (5 out of 7), agents with a high endowment do not
contribute larger amounts than agents with a low endowment.
Building their experiment on Fehr and Schmidt (1999) inequality aversion theory and
Becker (1974) altruism theory, Buckley and Croson (2006) find that, in contrast to what
both theories predict, agents with a high endowment do not contribute significantly
more than agents with a low endowment. This result has been replicated in several
experiments (e.g Reuben and Riedl, 2013; Keser et al., 2013; Georgantzis and Proestakis,
2011). Consequently, agents with a high endowment do not contribute a higher share
of their endowment. Prediger (2011) even finds that agents with a low endowment
contribute a higher share of their endowment to the public good. Two exceptions are
found by Van Dijk and Wilke (1994) and by Hofmeyr et al. (2007). Van Dijk and Wilke
(1994) show that agents with a high endowment contribute more than agents with a low
endowment. According to them, this is due to status. Agents with a high endowment
think that they are expected to contribute more money to the public good ("Noblesse
oblige").11 Two reasons can explain their result. First, in their experiment, choices are
not incentivized. Subjects are paid a fixed amount of 10 Dutch guilders for participating
in their experiment. Second, the game is played only once. As no specific analysis of
period one is realized in Buckley and Croson (2006); Reuben and Riedl (2013); Keser et al.
(2013); Georgantzis and Proestakis (2011), this effect may exist in period one and fade
away over time. In Hofmeyr et al. (2007) high endowed agents contribute significantly
11This result is also in line with what other-regarding preferences theories predict.
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more than low endowed ones. Two articles highlight what they call a "fair share". In
Buckley and Croson (2006), subjects’ contribution represents around one fourth of the
sum of contributions of every group member. In Hofmeyr et al. (2007), subjects tend
to contribute another kind of "fair share". This "fair share" is a contribution relative to
the ex ante share of wealth. Subjects with a low endowment have initially 19% of the
aggregated wealth while subjects with a high endowment have 31% of the aggregated
wealth. Low endowed subjects average contribution is close to 21% of the total group
contribution when high endowed subjects average contribution is close to 29% of the
total group contribution.
Observation 4: The origin of the endowment - either earned or randomly attributed -
leads to mixed evidence.
Van Dijk and Wilke (1994) build their research hypothesis on the Equity Theory. Ac-
cording to this theory, agents may think that when ex ante levels of effort (input) are
different between group members, ex post payoffs (output) should be different. In one
treatment, individual endowment is windfallen (randomly attributed) - in other words,
the level of effort provided ex ante is identical between high endowed and low endowed
group members. In another treatment, endowment depends on the ex ante level of effort
provided. The authors show that when subjects earn their endowment, they tend to
contribute less to the public good than when endowments come from pure randomness.
In another experiment, Cherry et al. (2005) test the same research hypothesis and find
no significant differences between contributions behaviours of agents who earn their
endowment through a quiz and contributions behaviours of agents who randomly get
their endowment.
Observation 5: To the best of my knowledge, only one article focuses on the strength of
the inequalities (Keser et al., 2013).12 They find a negative effect of inequalities.
12By inequalities, I mean the difference in initial endowment within a group. Inequalities can be measured
with GINI coefficient.
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Keser et al. (2013) study the aggregated and individual levels of contributions of group
members in three environments: a homogeneous treatment, a treatment with low in-
equalities, and a treatment with high inequalities. The aggregated level of wealth is
the same in the three treatments. In the homogeneous treatment, four subjects have the
same endowment (15 ECU). In the treatment with low inequalities, one subject has 10
ECU, two subjects have 15 ECU and the last subject has 20 ECU. In the treatment with
high inequalities, 3 subjects have 8 ECU while the last one has 36 ECU. Average and
median contributions are not significantly different in the homogeneous treatment and
in the treatment with low inequalities. Average and median contributions are signifi-
cantly lower in the treatment with high inequalities in comparison to the homogeneous
treatment, and (weakly) significantly lower in comparison to the treatment with low
inequalities. High endowed subjects do not contribute more than low endowed ones
even in the environment with high inequalities.
The authors argue that it is a consequence of the calibration of the game. Subjects with
36 ECU obtain a payoff of 36 ECU when every subject within a group plays the Nash
Equilibrium. In contrast, when all subjects contribute their full endowment, they have
a final payoff of 30 ECU. It explains why high endowed subjects have no interest to
contribute more than the endowment of the low endowed subjects: 8 ECU.
Despite a normative conflict strengthened when agents within a group are heteroge-
neous in endowment, the standard patterns of cooperation are observed. Contributions
are not lower (5 articles out of 7) in a heterogeneous environment with respect to the ho-
mogeneous one and decrease over time. Regarding individual contribution behaviours,
in contrast to what Fehr and Schmidt (1999) predict, agents with a high endowment
do not contribute more than agents with a low endowment. Agents opt for equality
of contributions over equality of earnings. This leads to substantial underprovision of
public goods.
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Articles N Periods Parameters of heterogeneity Results
Heterogeneity in endowment
Van Dijk and Wilke (1994) High endowed subjects contribute more than low endowed ones.
4 1 e1 = e2 = 25 and e3 = e4 = 50 The effect is weakened when subjects earn their endowment.
No comparison with a homogeneous treatment.
Cherry et al. (2005) e1 = 10 Comparison between same endowment levels within homogeneous and
e2 = 20 heterogeneous population.
4 1 e3 = 30 Contributions are lower in the heterogeneous treatment.
e4 = 40 No effect of endowment origin.
Buckley and Croson (2006) High endowed subjects contribute the same amount as low endowed one.
4 10 e1 = e2 = 25 and e3 = e4 = 50 Lower share of endowment contributed for high endowed subjects.
(partner-matching protocol) Contributions decrease over time.
Hofmeyr et al. (2007) e1 = e2 = 30 and e3 = e4 = 50 Both types of agents contribute the same share to the PG.
4 6 and No effect of heterogeneity on efficiency.
(partner-matching protocol) ∀i, ei = 40 Agents seem to contribute a "fair share".
Burns and Visser (2006) e1 = e2 = 30 and e3 = e4 = 50 Heterogeneity increases contributions.
4 6 and
(partner-matching protocol) ∀i, ei = 40 Pool of subjects: Subjects are fishers from South Africa.
Heap et al. (2016) e1 = 20, e3 = 50 Agents with an endowment of 20 ECU or 50 ECU contribute the same
3 20 and amount in both treatments.
(partner-matching protocol) e3 = 80 Lower contributions of the richest agent in the heterogeneity treatment.
Keser et al. (2013) ∀i, ei = 15 Contributions decrease over time.
4 25 e1 = 10, e2 = e3 = 15, e4 = 20 No difference between low inequalities and homogeneity.
(partner-matching protocol) e1 = e2 = e3 = 8 and e4 = 36 High inequalities are associated with lower contributions.
Reuben and Riedl (2013) e1 = e2 = 20 and e3 = 40
3 10 No difference between high endowed and low endowed subjects.
(partner-matching protocol) ∀i, ei = 20
Georgantzis and Proestakis (2011) e1 = e2 = 10 and e3 = e4 = 20 High endowed subjects contribute more in absolute terms than low endowed ones.
4 1 ∀i, ei = 10 Heterogeneity leads to higher contributions.
∀i, ei = 20 Public Information leads to lower cooperation.
Prediger (2011) e1 = e2 = 20 and e3 = e4 = 40 Heterogeneity increases contributions.
4 6 and Low endowed subjects contribute more than high endowed ones.
(partner matching protocol) ∀i, ei = 30 Pool of subjects: Subjects are rural dwellers from southern Namibia.
Figure 1.1 – Calibration and results: heterogeneity in endowment
1.2.2 Heterogeneity in MPCR
Two remarks have to be done at the beginning of this section.13 First, I choose to focus
on PGGs with heterogeneity in MPCR and I let the "productivity" approach aside.14
Second, in this section, I distinguish two kinds of heterogeneous groups: (i) groups with
heterogeneity in MPCR but with MPCR lower than one for all group members, and (ii)
privileged groups in which one group member has a MPCR higher than one such as her
best response is to contribute her full endowment.
1.2.2.1 Heterogeneity in MPCR with no privileged groups
Observation 0: Heterogeneity in MPCR strengthens the normative conflict.
Reuben and Riedl (2013) observe a large heterogeneity in third parties’ responses about
the contribution behaviour subjects should adopt when agents are heterogeneous in
MPCR. 16% of third parties favour equality of contributions, 24% of them favour con-
tributions proportional to MPCR, 29% of them favour equality of earnings and 31% of
them favour another rule of contributions (different from efficiency). Efficiency is not
chosen for groups of agents heterogeneous in MPCR because it generates inequalities
that do not exist ex ante. Additionally, Nikiforakis et al. (2012) and Gangadharan et al.
(2017) show that high MPCR agents favour equality in contributions while low MPCR
agents favour equality in earnings.
Observation 1: 4 articles out of 5 do not find lower aggregated contributions when
agents within a group are heterogeneous in MPCR.
The first paper that investigates the effects of heterogeneity in MPCR on contributions
was realized by Fisher et al. (1995). In this paper, in the heterogeneous treatment,
groups are composed of two agents who have a high MPCR and two agents who have a
low MPCR. They run two homogeneous control treatments in which every agent has
13The calibration and the principal results of every cited article in this section are presented in Figure 1.2.
14For related articles on PGGs with heterogeneity in productivity or in abatement cost, read Tan (2008),
Noussair and Tan (2011), McGinty and Milam (2013) and Brick et al. (2016).
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either the low MPCR or the high MPCR. They consider three possibilities. First case,
heterogeneity in MPCR is associated with no effect. Second case, there is a positive effect
of heterogeneity on aggregated contributions due to "seeding". Subjects with a high
MPCR contribute more and, in order to reciprocate, subjects with a low MPCR increase
their contributions. Third case, there is a negative effect of heterogeneity on aggregated
contributions due to "poisoning of the wealth". Subjects with a low MPCR contribute
less, and, in order to reciprocate, subjects with a high MPCR decrease their contributions.
They find that the aggregated level of contributions in the heterogeneous treatment is
bounded by the two homogeneous treatments. Recently, other studies (Kube et al., 2015;
Molis et al., 2016; Gangadharan et al., 2017) have found no differences in aggregated
contributions when comparing heterogeneous groups and homogeneous ones.
To the best of my knowledge, only Fischbacher et al. (2014) find that heterogeneity in
MPCR is associated with lower unconditional contributions. In their study, Fischbacher
et al. (2014) focus both on conditional and unconditional contributions in situations in
which agents within a group can be either homogeneous or heterogeneous in MPCR.
Regarding conditional contributions, the authors find that subjects with a high MPCR
contribute more than subjects in the baseline treatment (in which the MPCR is equal to
the mean value between low and high MPCR), and subjects with a lowMPCR contribute
less than them. Average conditional contributions are not significantly different in the
heterogeneous treatment with respect to the homogeneous one. Additionally, the au-
thors find that the effects of heterogeneity on conditional contributions are very different
across subjects’ type. Free-riders do not change their conditional contributions behaviour
across treatments. However, the effect of heterogeneity on conditional cooperators is
much more complex. If one third of the conditional cooperators do not change their con-
ditional contributions behaviour when heterogeneity is implemented, the others choose
to play differently. 17% of them increase their conditional contributions when they have
a high MPCR and decrease their conditional contributions when they have a low MPCR.
The others react only when they cope with one of the two situations. For example, a
conditional cooperator may be insensitive to an increase in MPCR but may reduce her
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conditional contributions when she copes with a low MPCR. Two types of conditional
cooperators decrease their contributions in the heterogeneous case: the ones who dislike
heterogeneity, and the ones who compare their payoff only with high MPCR agents. The
authors conclude that the lower unconditional contributions observed in their paper
are not due to different other-regarding preferences across treatments but to pessimistic
beliefs about other group members’ average contribution. Agents may believe that other
group members’ contributions are likely to be lower in the heterogeneous treatment and
consequently decrease their own contributions. Another reason raised by the authors lies
in the normative approach. As a norm of contribution is not straightforward (because
of the normative conflict), agents may have difficulty to coordinate on a contribution
behaviour.
Observation 2: Contributions decrease over time.
In every article with repeated PGG, the authors that investigate the relation between
time and contributions find a decrease in contributions over time (Molis et al., 2016;
Reuben and Riedl, 2013; Kube et al., 2015; Gangadharan et al., 2017).
Observation 3: Agents with a high MPCR contribute more than agents with a low
MPCR.
Isaac and Walker (1988) first find that in homogeneous groups, even in a one-shot game,
agents are affected by the value of the MPCR and contribute more when the MPCR is
high. This result has been replicated in heterogeneous environments by Fisher et al.
(1995); Reuben and Riedl (2013); Fischbacher et al. (2014); Kube et al. (2015); Molis et al.
(2016); Gangadharan et al. (2017). Furthermore, Fisher et al. (1995) give evidence that
high MPCR agents tend to contribute more in a homogeneous treatment than in a het-
erogeneous one and that low MPCR agents tend to contribute less in a homogeneous
treatment with respect to a heterogeneous one.
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At this stage, I find (i) that heterogeneity in MPCR within a group strengthens normative
conflict and (ii) that aggregated results are similar when agents differ in endowment and
when agents differ in MPCR. The main difference occurs at the individual level: agents
with a high MPCR contribute more than agents with a low MPCR. Both situations are
characterized by a significant underprovision of the public goods.
1.2.2.2 Heterogeneity in MPCR with privileged groups
At first glance, aggregated contributions to the public good are not impacted by het-
erogeneity in MPCR. However, what happens when one agent within the group is
privileged (i.e. has a MPCR higher than one)? This situation potentially toughens even
more the normative conflict. Do privileged agents except other group members to
contribute the same amount than them? In order to answer this question, I review below
three articles in details.
Glöckner et al. (2011) compare the contributions in two PGGs with heterogeneity. In
one treatment, groups are heterogeneous in MPCR but every agent has a MPCR lower
than one. In the other treatment, agents are in a privileged group: one group member
has a MPCR higher than one. The authors show that high MPCR subjects contribute
significantly more in the privileged groups. However, the sum of contributions within
groups is not significantly different in the two treatments. This result is explained by
low MPCR subjects who contribute significantly more in groups with no privileged
agents. In the treatment with no privileged groups, low MPCR subjects reciprocate to
the contribution of the high MPCR agent. For each token contributed by the high MPCR
subject to the public good, low MPCR subjects increase their own contributions in this
treatment. In contrast, every token contributed by the high MPCR subject leads to a
decrease in contributions of low MPCR subjects in the treatment with privileged groups.
This result is not observed in the entire literature. In their experiments, Reuben and
Riedl (2009) compare two treatments. In the first treatment, agents are in privileged
groups: two agents benefit from a low MPCR and the other agent benefits from a MPCR
higher than one. In the second treatment, agents are homogeneous and every agent
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benefits from the same MPCR (the low one). Reuben and Riedl (2009) find that (i)
aggregated contributions are higher in privileged groups than in homogeneous ones and
(ii) that subjects with a low MPCR contribute the same amounts in the two treatments.
Interestingly, contributions of the high MPCR subjects are positively correlated with
the contributions of the low MPCR subjects in the previous round. Consequently,
high MPCR subjects do not always contribute their full endowment even when it is
their best response to do so. High MPCR subjects seem to reciprocate to low MPCR
subjects’ contributions and may lower their contributions to "punish" them in case of
low contributions.
In Kölle (2015), the author compares a situation of homogeneity in a PGG with two situa-
tions of heterogeneity with privileged groups: heterogeneity in MPCR and heterogeneity
in productivity. In the homogeneous treatment and in the treatment with heterogeneity
in MPCR, contributions tend to decrease over time and are not significantly different.
However, in the treatment with heterogeneity in productivity, contributions do not
decrease over time and are significantly higher than in the two other treatments. The
difference in contributions observed is mainly explained by the behaviour of low type
subjects that contribute more in the treatment with heterogeneity in productivity than
in the treatment with heterogeneity in MPCR. It may be explained by the fact that (i)
in the treatment with heterogeneity in productivity, low type subjects do not increase
inequalities when they contribute to the public good, and (ii) because they benefit a lot
more from "High Type" agent’s contribution and contribute to reciprocate. Indeed, while
low type subjects contribute an amount on average equals only to 33% of high type sub-
jects’ contributions in the heterogeneity in MPCR treatment, they contribute an amount
on average equals to 78% of high type subjects’ contributions in the heterogeneity in
productivity treatment.15
15It is hard to compare aggregated contributions in the homogeneous treatment and the aggregated
contributions in the heterogeneous ones because of the difference in efficiency. For instance, in Kölle (2015),
in the homogeneous one, the full cooperation situation leads to an aggregate wealth equals to 90 ECU,
while in the heterogeneous ones, it leads to an aggregate wealth equals to 150 ECU. A concern for efficiency
may explain the differences observed in aggregated contributions.
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Articles N Periods Parameters of heterogeneity Results
Heterogeneity in MPCR: No privileged groups
Fisher et al. (1995) α1 = α2 = α3 = α4 = 0.3 In the heterogeneous treatment, contributions are bounded by the two
4 2x10 α1 = α2 = 0.3 and α3 = α4 = 0.75 homogeneous treatments.
(partner-matching protocol) α1 = α2 = α3 = α4 = 0.75 High MPCR agents contribute more than low MPCR agents.
Molis et al. (2016) α1 = α2 = α3 = α4 = 0.5 The higher the MPCR, the higher the contributions.
4 10 α1 = α2 = α3 = α4 = 0.75 Heterogeneity is not associated with lower contributions.
(partner-matching protocol) α1 = α2 = 0.5 and α3 = α4 = 0.75 Contributions decrease over time.
Kube et al. (2015) α1 = α2 = α3 = 23 Heterogeneity is not associated with lower contributions.
3 20 High MPCR agents contribute more than low MPCR agents.
(partner-matching protocol) α1 = 0.5, α2 = α3 = 0.75 Contributions decrease over time.
Gangadharan et al. (2017) α1 = α2 = α3 = 0.2, α4 = α5 = α6 = 0.4 Heterogeneity is not associated with lower contributions.
6 20 High MPCR agents contribute more than low MPCR agents.
(partner-matching protocol) α1 = α2 = α3 = α4 = α5 = α6 = 0.3 Contributions decrease over time.
Fischbacher et al. (2014) α1 = α2 = α3 = α4 = 0.4 Heterogeneity is associated with lower unconditional contributions.
4 6 repeated one-shot or
α1 = α2 = 0.3 and α3 = α4 = 0.5 Heterogeneity is not associated with lower conditional contributions.
Reuben and Riedl (2013) α1 = α2 = α3 = 0.5 High MPCR agents contribute more than low MPCR agents.
4 25
(partner-matching protocol) α1 = α2 = 0.5 and α3 = 0.5 Contributions decrease over time.
Heterogeneity in MPCR: Privileged groups
Glöckner et al. (2011) α1 = α2 = α3 = 0.4, α4 = 0.9 Same efficiency in both treatments.
4 20 High MPCR agents contribute more when they have a MPCR equals to 1.4.
(partner-matching protocol) α1 = α2 = α3 = 0.4, α4 = 1.4 Low MPCR agents are more reciprocal when high type agent’s MPCR < 1.
Reuben and Riedl (2009) α1 = α2 = 0.5, α3 = 1.5 Contributions are higher within the privileged groups.
3 10 Low MPCR agents contribute the same amount in the two treatments.
(partner-matching protocol) α1 = α2 = α3 = 0.5 Contributions of high MPCR agents are correlated with others’ contributions.
Kölle (2015) α1 = α2 = α3 = α4 = 0.5 Heterogeneity in MPCR is not associated with lower contributions.
3 10 High MPCR agents contribute more than low MPCR agents.
(partner-matching protocol) α1 = α2 = α3 = 0.5, α4 = 1.5 Contributions decrease over time.
Figure 1.2 – Calibration and results: Heterogeneity in MPCR
1.3 Effects of efficiency-enhancingmechanisms on cooperation
in PGGs with a heterogeneous population
So far, I have found that even if heterogeneity does not lead to a decrease in efficiency
with respect to the homogeneous baseline, there is a large underprovision of public goods.
Some mechanisms have been proven to be efficient to overcome the underprovision
observed in PGGs with homogeneous agents (Chaudhuri, 2011). Do these mechanisms
allow groups with heterogeneous agents to reach efficiency when these agents do not
agree on the contribution rule they should adopt? This is the question I tackle in this
part.
1.3.1 Heterogeneity in endowment and mechanisms
Observation 1: Punishment seems to be at least as efficient within groups composed of
agents heterogeneous in endowment as within groups composed of agents homogeneous
in endowment.
Using field experiments in developing countries, Burns and Visser (2006) and Prediger
(2011) study the effects of punishment on contributions in PGGs .16 Within fishing
communities in South Africa, Burns and Visser (2006) test the effects of punishment in
two treatments. In the first treatment, groups are composed of agents homogeneous in
endowment. In the second treatment, groups are composed of agents heterogeneous
in endowment. They find that punishment is more efficient to increase contributions
in the heterogeneous treatment than in the homogeneous one. Social welfare is also
significantly higher in the heterogeneous treatment than in the homogeneous one. Worst,
punishment decreases social welfare in the homogeneous treatment. In heterogeneous
groups, subjects with a low endowment (i) contribute a higher share of their endowment
than subjects with a high endowment, (ii) punish with the same amount of tokens than
subjects with a high endowment (even if their relative cost is larger because they have
16For an article with a threshold public good game, heterogeneity in endowment and punishment, see
Robbins (2015).
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not the same capacity to punish). Finally, when agents differ in endowment, punishment
leads to a society with lower inequalities. Initially, low endowed subjects are 40% poorer
than high endowed ones. After the punishment round, they are only 16.7% poorer than
high endowed subjects.
Prediger (2011) finds that, surprisingly, punishment does not increase aggregated contri-
butions neither in the homogeneous treatment nor in the heterogeneous one. However,
both pro-social punishment - punishment against free-riders - and anti-social punish-
ments - punishment against contributors - happenmore frequently andmore vehemently
in the homogeneous treatment. In the homogeneous treatment, revenge emerges and
leads to counter punishment while it does not in the heterogeneous treatment. Conse-
quently, social welfare is significantly higher in the heterogeneous treatment than in
the homogeneous one when punishment is introduced. There is no difference in the
intensity of punishment between subjects with a low endowment and subjects with a
high endowment. The author concludes that punishment is not accepted among a non
marginal part of the subjects - rural dwellers from Southern Namibia.
The two articles above indicate that punishment leads to a higher social welfare when
agents are heterogeneous in endowment. However, this promising result has been
found in two very specific environments. Other articles have tried to study the effects
of punishment in a more standard setting. First, there are Reuben and Riedl (2013),
who focus on normative conflict. They study three different treatments.17 In the first
treatment, agents within a group are homogeneous in endowment. In the second
treatment, agents within a group differ in endowment. In the third treatment, agents
differ in endowment (with the same calibration than in the second treatment), but have
the same capacity to contribute to the public good (equals to the low endowment).
Implementing punishment leads to an increase in contributions. In both heterogeneous
treatments, 4 groups out of 11 reach the Pareto dominant situation during at least 5
periods (out of 10). Punishment allows groups to overcome the standard decrease
17In the final treatment, agents differ in MPCR. Results about this treatment will be presented in Section
1.3.2.
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of contributions over time. Interestingly, in the treatment with heterogeneous agents
who have no capacity constraints, it seems normal for subjects that those with twice as
much endowment contribute twice as much as others. It is however not the case in the
heterogeneous treatment with capacity constraints. Reuben and Riedl (2013) explain that
most often, subjects favour efficiency over equality. Even if it was possible to let the high
endowed agent contributes twice as much as other subjects, the "loss" in efficiency would
have been too important. Unfortunately, in this article, it is not possible to compare
the heterogeneous treatments with the homogeneous one because aggregated wealth
changes across conditions.18
Finally, Weng and Carlsson (2015) study the interaction between identity and pun-
ishment within both homogeneous groups and heterogeneous ones. Subjects fulfil a
questionnaire which determines their endowment level. In the treatments with neither
punishment nor identity, heterogeneous agents contribute 31% of their endowment
whereas homogeneous agents contribute 49% of their endowment.19 While inducing
identity does not increase contributions in homogeneous groups, it increases contribu-
tions, going from 31% to 46% of endowment, in heterogeneous groups. In other words,
the good news is that "identity" can counter the detrimental effects of heterogeneity
observed in this game at almost null cost. What about punishment? Punishment is
equally efficient in situations with weak or strong identity and increases contributions
to an average of around 70% of total endowment. Building a strong identity is useful
only when agents have no possibility to punish.
18Note that a simple calculation leads to these results: contributions are equal to 81.1% of the total
endowment available in the homogeneous treatment, to 73.86% of the total endowment available in the
heterogeneous treatment with no capacity constraints, and to 77.8% of the total endowment available in the
heterogeneous treatment with capacity constraints.
19I do not report this article in Section 1.2.1 because no statistical test is done regarding these two values.
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1.3.2 Heterogeneity in MPCR and mechanisms
1.3.2.1 Mechanisms and heterogeneity in MPCR with no privileged groups
Observation 1: Punishment seems to be less efficient within groups composed of agents
heterogeneous in MPCR than within groups composed of homogeneous agents.
Reuben and Riedl (2013) find that although the quantity of punishment is not different
across treatments, contributions seem to be lower in the treatment with heterogeneity in
MPCR (contributions level: 65%). Efficiency is associated with ex post inequalities that are
not accepted by low MPCR agents. Yet, even if the normative conflict is important, 40%
of groups succeed to reach the Pareto dominant strategy in at least 5 periods. When they
consider the whole game, the difference in contributions between high MPCR subjects
and low MPCR subjects is not significant. The low efficient groups are characterized
by low MPCR subjects that try to implement an equality-of-earnings norm when high
MPCR subjects try to implement an equality-of-contributions norm. This pattern may
be explained by the self-serving approach of the norm: agents try to enforce the norm
that maximizes their own earnings.
By comparing a PGG with homogeneous agents and a PGG with agents heterogeneous
in MPCR, Nikiforakis et al. (2012) want to observe if normative conflicts are likely to
encourage feuds - a situation in which social welfare is destroyed. In order to signal
their disagreement about the contributions chosen by other group members, subjects
have the possibility to punish at almost a null cost (1 token allows subjects to punish as
much as they want). Moreover, subjects have the possibility to counter punish as long as
they want and as long as other subjects have a positive payoff. The authors finally show
(i) that subjects generally value more equality in ex post payoffs than equality in contribu-
tions, (ii) that heterogeneity in MPCR leads to three times more feuds than homogeneity
in MPCR, and (iii) that although punishment leads to an increase in contributions in the
heterogeneous treatment, it does not lead to an increase in social welfare because of the
money destroyed by punishment. Additionally, the authors observe that high MPCR
subjects contribute significantly more than low MPCR subjects. Consequently, subjects
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with a high MPCR punish subjects with a low MPCR and this is often the origin of feuds.
This article highlights the difficulty to encourage self-governance in communities with
heterogeneity in MPCR.
Observation 2: Vote leads to an increase in efficiency less important within groups with
agents heterogeneous in MPCR than within groups with agents homogeneous in MPCR.
After observing underprovision of public goods in a standard environment, Kube et al.
(2015) investigate the effects of vote and institutions formation in a PGG. According to
the authors, one way to overcome underprovision is to align individual interest with
collective interest. In order to do this, it is possible to implement an institution through
vote. In their article, an institution takes the form of a rule of contribution. As the
vote is binding, if no group members go against the decision, then agents may secure a
better payoff than the one associated to Nash Equilibrium. Of course, agents may be
opposed to the vote, because it has a binding nature that reduces the set of possible
choices. Do groups accept to vote, and succeed to implement a rule of contributions?
Two kind of groups are compared: one in which agents are homogeneous in MPCR
and another in which they are heterogeneous in MPCR. In principle, it is easier to have
unanimity in homogeneous groups, in which efficiency leads to equality in payoff. In
the case of heterogeneous groups, the authors wonder which rule will be preferred
and chosen. Will they accept a rule based on efficiency even if it generates inequalities,
or will they prefer to vote for a rule that guarantees equality in earnings at the cost
of a loss in efficiency? The two populations are compared in three treatments (2x3
design): a standard PGG, and two treatments with vote. Treatments are implemented in
a between subjects manner. In the first treatment with vote, subjects have the possibility
to vote to contribute their whole endowment to the public good (VOTE-SYM). This
institution maximizes efficiency but triggers inequalities within the heterogeneous
groups. Consequently, the authors show, using Fehr and Schmidt (1999) framework, that
inequality averse agents may vote against the implementation of this institution when
there is heterogeneity in MPCR within the group. In the second treatment with vote,
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subjects have the possibility to implement an institution in which two group members
know that they will contribute their whole endowment when the third subject will
contribute only a part of her endowment (VOTE-ASYM). This treatment guarantees
equality of earnings within the groups with heterogeneity in MPCR. The institution
is binding and is implemented only if there is unanimity in votes. If the institution is
not unanimously accepted, a standard PGG is played in a second stage. The authors
find that, in the homogeneous treatment, subjects agree to vote for the institution that
enforces efficient contributions. The institution is implemented in 86.6% of the periods.
Consequently, VOTE-SYM leads to an increase in efficiency with respect to the standard
PGG with no vote possibility when groups are composed of agents homogeneous in
MPCR. Within heterogeneous groups, as predicted theoretically, the institution that
maximizes social welfare is less frequently implemented (56.3% of the time). This low
rate of implementation is explained by low MPCR subjects that vote for this institution
only 59.7% of the time. VOTE-SYM is less efficient when subjects are heterogeneous
in MPCR than when subjects are homogeneous, but is still more efficient than when
heterogeneous groups have no possibility to vote. VOTE-ASYM is more popular in
heterogeneous groups since the institution is implemented in 77.2% of the periods. If
high MPCR subjects significantly prefer to vote for VOTE-SYM, they still are numerous
to vote for vote VOTE-ASYM when it is possible (95.9% vs 89.5%). Although VOTE-
ASYM is chosen more frequently, the institution leads to the same level of efficiency that
VOTE-SYM for heterogeneous groups.20 Naturally, VOTE-ASYM is only implemented
in 27.6% of the periods in homogeneous groups. Indeed, in this case, the institution is not
only inefficient but also triggers inequalities. For homogeneous groups, VOTE-ASYM
does not increase efficiency in comparison to the standard PGG. To conclude, groups
who do not succeed to reach a unanimous agreement do not play differently in the
second stage in comparison to the baseline treatment when they have no vote possibility.
The only exception happens when homogeneous subjects do not reach an agreement
20This is in part due to the mechanical loss of efficiency in VOTE-ASYM due to lower contributions of the
low MPCR agent.
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in VOTE-SYM. In this case, subjects contribute significantly less in the second stage in
comparison to the baseline treatment.
Altogether, these results suggest that heterogeneous agents are able to implement in-
stitutions. They privilege equality of payoffs over efficiency but still find their way to
increase social welfare when they have the opportunity to vote. Nonetheless, the authors
highlight the fact that groups are only composed of three members. Unanimity is much
more complicated to reach, and therefore, the implementation of institutions is less likely
to be observed when the number of agents increases within a group.
Observation 3: Even when agents have the opportunity to privilege efficiency and no
inequalities they do not succeed to reach this strategy.
In Gangadharan et al. (2017), the authors study the effects of communication added
to rewards on contributions in PGGs. While the Pareto dominant strategy leads to
inequalities that will not be accepted by the whole group when agents within a group
differ in MPCR, the authors offer the possibility to communicate through a chat box and
to transfer money. If agents are inequality averse, it is possible for them to contribute
an amount that leads to a situation close to the Pareto dominant situation, and then
to transfer money from the richer agents to the poorer ones. This mechanism gives
opportunities to fight inequalities at a minimal cost in social welfare - a new aspect of
this mechanism in comparison to the standard punishment and to the vote. The authors
find mixed results. First, the good news is that communication leads to an increase
in contributions by 101% in heterogeneous groups. However, communication does
not allow to reach the Pareto dominant situation in heterogeneous groups whereas it
is the case in homogeneous ones. Starting at the same level of contributions with no
communication opportunity, communication increases contributions by 265% in homo-
geneous groups. The implementation of communication leads to an increase by 80%
in final payoffs for homogeneous groups whereas payoffs only increase by 46% within
heterogeneous groups. Can it be explained by the fact that subjects in heterogeneous
groups cannot agree on a contribution rule? Evidence does not go into that direction. 15
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groups out of 17 have a stable pattern of contributions over time. Only 4 groups choose
to privilege efficiency over equality in payoff. Rewards are significantly less used in
the heterogeneous treatment, and consequently, subjects do not take advantage of this
opportunity to decrease inequalities.
Altogether, the 3 observations suggest that efficiency is rarely chosen by subjects in
groups with heterogeneity in MPCR. The normative conflict between high MPCR sub-
jects and low MPCR subjects is too strong. Efficiency is intertwined with inequalities
that low MPCR subjects do not accept. Even, when agents have the opportunity to
maximize efficiency with no inequalities they do not take this opportunity.
1.3.2.2 Mechanisms and heterogeneity in MPCR with privileged groups
Observation 1: Within privileged groups, punishment is not efficient at increasing social
welfare when agents differ in MPCR. However, when agents differ in productivity,
punishment leads to an increase in social welfare.
In PGGs with privileged groups, Reuben and Riedl (2009) show that punishment may
have counterproductive effects. Punishment level is not significantly different in the
standard PGG with homogeneous groups and in the PGG with privileged groups.
Subjects punish their counterparts that contribute less than them. Most often, a positive
deviation compared to the subject’s contribution - i.e. when other group members
contribute more than the subject - is associated with a lower level of punishment in
non privileged groups. It is not the case with PGGs with privileged groups. In other
words, the privileged agent, who is most often the top contributor, is punished despite
her large contributions. Subjects with a low MPCR who free-ride and who are the
target of punishment increase their contributions in both treatments. Yet, the increase
in contributions is higher in non privileged groups. Finally, at the aggregate level,
punishment increases social welfare only in the non privileged groups. Moreover,
although punishment does not increase social welfare in privileged groups, it does
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increase inequalities. For a low MPCR agent, it is better to be in a homogeneous group
when punishment is introduced.
In Kölle (2015), the effects of punishment depend on the type of heterogeneity. If the
mechanism is efficient in the treatment with heterogeneity in productivity, it is less
efficient in the treatment with heterogeneity in MPCR. Indeed, while the level of contri-
butions was identical in the treatment with heterogeneity in MPCR and in the treatment
with homogeneity in MPCR before that punishment was implemented, the level of
contributions becomes lower in the treatment with heterogeneity in MPCR once pun-
ishment is implemented. While in the two other treatments, contributions increase
significantly when punishment is available, it is not the case in the treatment with
heterogeneity in MPCR. How do agents punish in the three treatments? First of all,
the level of punishment is not statistically different across treatments. However, the
pattern of punishment seems to vary in the different treatments. Negative deviation in
comparison to own’s contribution is punished in 57%, 22% and 73% of the case respec-
tively in the baseline treatment, in the treatment with heterogeneity in MPCR and in the
treatment with heterogeneity in productivity. Consequently, negative deviation from
own’s contribution is more severely and systematically punished in the treatment with
heterogeneity in productivity. High productivity subjects punish more low productivity
subjects in the treatment with heterogeneity in productivity while low MPCR subjects
punish more high MPCR subjects in the treatment with heterogeneity in MPCR - even
when she contributes more than them. Mostly, it can be explained by the fact that the
high MPCR subject generates inequalities when she contributes and one way to decrease
inequalities for low MPCR subjects is to punish her. It can also explain why high MPCR
subjects do not punish low MPCR subjects because it would increase inequalities. Fi-
nally, punishment does not increase social welfare in the baseline treatment and in the
treatment with homogeneity in MPCR while punishment increases social welfare in the
treatment with heterogeneity in productivity. Punishment increases inequalities in the
treatment with heterogeneity in MPCR while it decreases inequalities in the treatment
with heterogeneity in productivity.
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1.4 Conclusion
In this article, I survey articles which focus on heterogeneity in linear PGGs. The topic
has been carefully studied these recent years. As a first remark, heterogeneity can take
different forms, and I first distinguish two classes of heterogeneity: heterogeneity in
endowment and heterogeneity in MPCR. These two classes of heterogeneity are likely to
exist in real world in which agents may differ in income or in return (young adults are
likely to benefit more from the education system while the older ones are likely to benefit
more from the health system). These differences in heterogeneity were likely to trigger
different results due to different reactions. The first approach was logically to separate
these two kinds of heterogeneity and to see how heterogeneous agents contribute to the
PGG, depending on the nature of the heterogeneity.
What I learn can be summarized in a simple way. Heterogeneity exacerbates the nor-
mative conflict but does not change the standard results observed in the PGG with
homogeneous agents. Agents contribute positive amounts to the public good, equal or
close to the amounts contributed when agents are homogeneous. Their contributions
tend do diminish over time such as at the end of the game, they are close to zero. Often,
high type agents contribute more than the low type ones at the beginning of the game,
but this phenomenon disappears over time for agents with a high endowment. Obvi-
ously, these results are not enough. As economists, we want to increase efficiency, and
we know some mechanisms that are successful to do this with homogeneous groups.
How do these mechanisms perform when agents are heterogeneous and do not agree
about the contribution behaviour that the group members should adopt?
I find mixed results. When agents are heterogeneous in endowment, punishment tends
to be effective. It increases contributions and social welfare and often performs as
well as with homogeneous groups. When it comes to heterogeneity in MPCR, results
are less conclusive. If Reuben and Riedl (2013) find that punishment increases slightly
welfare, Nikiforakis et al. (2012) show that it is less efficient than in homogeneous groups.
Worst, in the latter article, it may even lead to feuds and to a total destruction of social
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welfare. When it comes to other kinds of mechanism, results are still less satisfying.
Vote and communication + rewards increase contributions but not as efficiently as
in homogeneous groups. It is certainly due to the normative conflict. When in the
heterogeneity in endowment treatment, efficiency leads to equality in payoffs, it is
not the case in the heterogeneity in MPCR treatment. Subjects often disagree to have
ex post inequalities, such as it generates lower contributions. Even when they have
the opportunity to neutralize inequalities through communication + rewards, as in
Gangadharan et al. (2017), they do not reach the maximum theoretical efficiency with no
inequality. There is a need for more research about mechanisms that can be useful to
help agents heterogeneous in MPCR to reach full contributions.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Proof 1 - Heterogeneity in endowment and absolute contribution
Let’s assume the existence of two agents with endowment such as ei > ej. Let’s show
that in order to equalize payoff of both members, we need to have ci > cj.
πi(ci) = πj(cj)
β(ei − ci) + α
N
∑
k=1
ck = β(ej − cj) + α
N
∑
k=1
ck
(ei − ci) = (ej − cj)
(ei − ej) = (ci − cj)
As ei > ej, we have ci > cj.
Proof 2 - Heterogeneity in endowment and relative contribution
Let’s assume the existence of two agents with endowment such as ei > ej. Let’s show
that in order to equalize payoff of both members, we need to have pi > pj where pk =
ck
ek
.
πi(pi) = πj(pj)
β(ei − pi × ei) + α
N
∑
k=1
ck = β(ej − pj × ej) + α
N
∑
k=1
ck
(ei − pi × ei) = (ej − pj × ej)
(1− pi)× ei − (1− pj)× ej = 0
As ei > ej, we have (1− pi) < (1− pj)
(1− pi) < (1− pj)
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−pi < −pj
pi > pj
Proof 3 - Heterogeneity in MPCR and absolute contribution
Let’s assume the existence of two agents with endowment such as αi > αj. Let’s show
that in order to equalize payoff of both members, we need to have ci > cj.
πi(ci) = πj(cj)
β(e− ci) + αi
N
∑
k=1
ck = β(e− cj) + αj
N
∑
k=1
ck
αi
N
∑
k=1
ck − αj
N
∑
k=1
ck = β(e− cj)− β(e− ci)
(αi − αj)
N
∑
k=1
ck = β(ci − cj)
As (αi − αj)∑Nk=1 ck > 0, we have ci > cj
Proof 4 - Heterogeneity in MPCR and relative contribution
Let’s assume the existence of two agents with endowment such as αi > αj. Let’s show
that in order to equalize payoff of both members, we need to have pi > pj.
πi(ci) = πj(cj)
β(e− pi × e) + αi
N
∑
k=1
ck = β(e− pj × e) + αj
N
∑
k=1
ck
αi
N
∑
k=1
ck − αj
N
∑
k=1
ck = β(e− pj × e)− β(e− pi × e)
(αi − αj)
N
∑
k=1
ck = β.e× (pi − pj)
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As (αi − αj)∑Nk=1 ck > 0, we have pi > pj
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Chapter 2
Cooperation in a risky world1
2.1 Introduction
Many economic interactions create tension between individual and collective interests.
For this reason, human cooperation has become one of the central topics in behavioral
economics. Since the pioneering work of Isaac et al. (1985), numerous economists have
studied cooperation using the Voluntary ContributionMechanism (VCM in short).2 Over
time, VCM has become a widely accepted experimental testbed for studying various
environmental and institutional aspects of cooperation (Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri,
2011).
Strikingly, what has once evolved to become the “gold standard” in experimental
economics – that is, a version of VCM based on a deterministic, homogeneous and
publicly known personal returns from the public good – seems far off as compared not
only to the seminal work by Isaac et al. (1985), but also to many real world situations.
Isaac et al. (1985) use heterogeneous returns from the public good which are entirely
private knowledge, a design that certainly adds realism to the experimental game.3
1This chapter is a joint work with Adam Zylbersztejn published in Journal of Public Economic Theory.
2According to another early study by Isaac et al. (1984), this seminal work dates back to 1980. Ledyard
(1995) lists the study by Isaac et al. (1985) as the first economic experimental work on public goods, along
Kim and Walker (1984) (who conducted their experiments two months later).
3Of course, using the standard design has major advantages. First, it reduces the degree of unwarranted
uncertainty in the decision-making environment, thus improving the experimenter’s control over subjects’
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For instance, the benefits that the individuals derive from establishing public facilities
for health care, education or social security are likely to be heterogeneous, private
knowledge, and furthermore subject to randomness and variation over time.
Yet, relatively little is still known about how the patterns of cooperation change once the
decision-making environment shifts away from the “gold standard” paradigm. Address-
ing this issue seems important in terms of both the internal and the external validity of
laboratory experiments. First, the data from alternative settings can be informative about
the robustness and the limitations of the large body of experimental findings based on
the standard VCM setup. Second, as recently documented in a carefully crafted lab-in-
the-field experiment by Stoop et al. (2012), the usual patterns of cooperation observed in
the standard VCMmay not prevail in analogous (yet involving more complexity and
uncertainty) real world environments.4 Explaining such discrepancies and rendering
the findings from lab experiments applicable to naturally occurring settings calls for a
greater care for the ecological validity of laboratory experiments. Our experimental is a
step in that direction.
Herein, we tweak the standard VCM by incorporating two kinds of environmental risk
which may occur either at the individual or at the group level. In both cases, the personal
return from the public good is not deterministic, but probabilistic – either higher or lower
than the riskless one. Both outcomes are equiprobable, become known ex post (i.e., only
after the contribution decisions have been made), and the lottery is mean-preserving
with respect to the standard VCM scenario. In the homogeneous risk treatment, the random
draw is made in each round for the whole group. In the heterogeneous risk treatment,
in turn, this happens in each round independently for each group member. Thus, our
decisions. Second, it makes the outcomes of different experiments easier to compare and replicate, thus
fostering the accumulation of empirical knowledge.
4They have conducted an experiment among recreational fishermen at a private pond. There are two
variations of a VCM game: a framed field game and a standard lab game. In both tasks, fishermen decide
how many fish they want to catch. Abstaining from catching a fish (and thus reducing one’s own welfare)
generates positive externalities (which exceed that individual welfare loss) for other fishermen. They report
that the usual patterns of cooperation observed in the lab game fade away in the analogous field game.
They also test (and refute) a number of possible explanations behind this difference. However, one factor
which they do not test is related to environmental uncertainty – in the lab VCM game, participants simply
choose the number of fish, while in the field VCM game played around a fishing pond the final catch can
never be certain.
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experimental paradigm provides a simple way to capture the distinction between local
and global environmental risks that is important in various real world public good
settings.5 Our experiment complements the previous work by Lévy-Garboua et al. (2017)
who study cooperation in building a common insurance pool. In their design, agents
face the risk of losing their resources and ex antemay voluntarily fund a group insurance
scheme to help the needy members recover their losses. Herein, the risk is related to the
ex post capacity to benefit from a common resource.
Our experiment consists of two incentivized VCM-based tasks. In the first part, we elicit
players’ conditional contributions to the public good, their unconditional contribution in
a one-shot interaction, as well as their beliefs about other group members’ contributions.
In the second part, the participants play a finitely repeated VCM game under partner
matching. We implement the environmental risk treatments in a between-subject manner.
Given the proper randomization of social and risk preferences across experimental
conditions, our investigation provides causal evidence on the effect of environmental
risk on different layers of human cooperation.
Our theory builds on the insight from Krawczyk and Le Lec (2010) that social inter-
actions in risky environments are affected by both distributive fairness (i.e., ex post
outcomes) and procedural fairness (i.e., ex ante opportunities). Here, our intuition is that
although different kinds of environmental risk preserve the expected value of MCPR
(which should mute any concerns regarding procedural fairness), randomMPCR may
affect behavior through the differences in the ex post group inequalities (which may
trigger a behavioral reaction due to distributive fairness). This hypothesis finds a rather
weak support in the data. Neither the conditional contributions, nor the unconditional
contributions, nor the beliefs about other group members’ contributions in the one shot
5Going back to our previous example, one’s utility from public health services may depend on idiosyn-
cratic health hazards (such as non-infectious diseases related to one’s genes, profession, or lifestyle), but
also on the population-wide hazards (such as large outbreaks of infectious diseases). In a similar vein,
one’s benefit from public education facilities may depend on one’s current educational needs or aspirations,
but also on global labor market fluctuations that may render education as a whole (or at least its certain
types) either beneficial or redundant. Finally, the benefits a worker derives from social security system may
depend on individual risks (such as an accident at work), but also on collective risks (such as industrial
restructuring resulting in large-scale lay-offs).
67
game vary due to environmental risk. Furthermore, the correlation between players’
unconditional contributions and their beliefs about others’ behavior remains stable
across experimental treatments. Regarding the repeated VCM game, in all experimental
conditions we observe the typical patterns of behavior: relatively high contributions in
the initial round of the game, and their gradual decay over time. Heterogeneous risk
has no effect on cooperation relative to the riskless control condition at any stage of the
repeated game. Homogeneous risk improves cooperation relative to both remaining
conditions (which stands in line with our initial hypothesis), but only in the early rounds
after which this positive effect quickly fades away. Altogether, these findings suggest
that standard experimental methodology provides a robust yet conservative measure of
human cooperation.
2.2 Related literature
In this section, we review the economic literature which experimentally investigates how
deviations from the “gold standard” design – in which the marginal per capita return
(MPCR) from the public good ought to be deterministic, homogeneous and publicly
known – affect cooperation in the voluntary contribution mechanism. We refer to those
settings as non-standard VCM settings. Typically, a non-standard setting is achieved by
adding some sort of randomness to the process that transforms decisions into outcomes.
Whenever such randomness is lottery-like, i.e. it involves a finite set of outcomes with
publicly known probabilities (which is the case of the present experiment), we classify it
as environmental risk. Otherwise, a non-standard setting is said to involve environmental
uncertainty. All these studies use a VCM game that is being repeated over multiple
periods, with the exception of Fischbacher et al. (2014) who use a sequence of one-shot
VCM games with varying MPCR schemes, and Björk et al. (2016) who combine these
two setups just as we do in the present study6.
6We have come across the working paper by Björk et al. (2016) – who use an approach similar to ours
to investigate the effects of risk and uncertainty (through a binary MPCR lottery with either known or
unknown probabilities) on cooperation – while finishing the present manuscript.
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Our literature review suggests that the earliest experiment based on the VCM paradigm
by Isaac et al. (1985) does not meet the “gold standard” criteria: even though in their
experiment the MPCR is deterministic, it is also heterogeneous among players and
remains privately know (which, in turn, is public knowledge). However, the most
prominent studies following Isaac et al. (1985) are already based on the “gold standard”
approach (see, for instance, Kim and Walker, 1984; Andreoni, 1988; Isaac and Walker,
1988a,b).
To the best of our knowledge, Fisher et al. (1995) are the first to experimentally compare
standard and non-standard VCM settings. They build two control conditions based on
the the standard design which only differ in the value of MPCR (which can be either
high or low). In their main experimental treatment, MPCR comes with environmental
uncertainty: it is heterogeneous and has an unknown distribution (even though players
are aware of their own MPCR). Their main finding is that behavior is sensitive to the
variations in one’s own MPCR, but not to the presence of the environmental uncertainty
about other players’ MPCRs.7 In a similar vein, Boulu-Reshef et al. (2017) propose
an experiment in which environmental uncertainty about MPCR takes the form of an
individual random draw from a uniform distribution, so that neither personal MPCR
nor other players’ MPCRs are known to any individual at the time of decision-making.
They also report that cooperation is neutral to the presence of environmental uncertainty.
Finally, in Gangadharan and Nemes (2009) the environmental uncertainty is related to
whether players obtain the return from the public good or not (the probabilities of which
remain unknown to players). This form of environmental uncertainty is found to hurt
cooperation as compared to the analogous “gold standard” setting. Moreover, this result
also prevails in a risky environment where the probability of not benefiting from the
public good is publicly known (Dickinson, 1998; Gangadharan and Nemes, 2009).
Other implementations of environmental risk yield mixed conclusions. Like our study,
these experiments usually compare standard design with its non-standard equivalent
7This finding complements an earlier result from Isaac and Walker (1988b) that higher MPCR induces
higher contributions in a standard VCM setting.
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in which MPCR is a realization of a mean-preserving-spread lottery. Studies by Levati
et al. (2009); Levati and Morone (2013) suggest that there might be a large and negative
effect of what we call a homogeneous environmental risk (i.e., MPCR is randomly
determined for all group members) on cooperation, but its occurrence depends on the
way in which the MPCR lottery is calibrated. In Levati et al. (2009), the risky version
of VCM is a social dilemma solely in expected terms: conditional on the realization of
the MPCR, it is either individually and socially efficient to contribute nothing (if MPCR
is low), or individually and socially efficient to contribute the whole endowment (if
MPCR is high). They report a negative effect of environmental risk on cooperation. In
Levati and Morone (2013), in turn, the risky environment preserves the social dilemma
nature of VCM regardless of the realization of MPCR. In this context, moving from the
standard setting to environmental risk to environmental uncertainty (by making the
probabilities unknown to players) does not affect cooperation. Similar phenomenon has
been recently documented by Björk et al. (2016) in both one-shot and repeated games.
On the other hand, a lab-in-the-field experiment conducted in small rural communities
by Cárdenas et al. (2017) reveals a negative effect of what we call heterogeneous risk (i.e.,
each player’s MPCR is random and independently determined) on cooperation. Finally,
Fischbacher et al. (2014) introduce another type of environmental risk by allowing
MPCR to vary within a group according to a publicly known distribution. Hence, the
environmental risk in their experiment is competitive: the misfortune of some means
benefits to others. In their one-shot, strategy-method VCM setting they observe that this
form of environmental risk has a negative effect on both conditional and unconditional
contributions.8
2.2.1 Our study
Altogether, we draw the following conclusions from these accumulated findings. First,
deviating from the “gold standard” design may, if anything, have a negative effect on
8Other related studies include Stoddard (2013); Stoddard et al. (2014); Dannenberg et al. (2015); Vesely
and Wengström (2017).
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cooperation, regardless of whether such deviation is due to environmental uncertainty
or environmental risk. However, given that this literature is relatively small and dis-
persed, it seems well-founded to call for a systematic replication of the existing findings
and an exploration of new non-standard VCM settings. Second, the existing findings
are quite mixed and it remains unclear why negative effects arise in some particular
decision-making contexts (for instance, heterogeneous environmental risk, or competi-
tive environmental risk) but not in others (for instance, homogeneous environmental
risk). This, in turn, calls for a tighter control of the channels through which such behav-
ioral differences may arise. Our experiment is designed to serve both of these purposes.
We build on, and extend, the study of Fischbacher et al. (2014). Like them, we study the
effect of environmental risk in a 4-person VCM game and use their calibration of deter-
ministic and risky MPCR. However, there are two important features that distinguish
our study from theirs: the nature of environmental risk (which is competitive in their
setting, and non-competitive in ours), and the design of experimental measurements.
Our experiment varies the level at which the environmental risk arises: it can be ei-
ther agent-specific (heterogeneous risk treatment) or group-specific (homogeneous risk
treatment). Thus, unlike Fischbacher et al. (2014), we focus on non-competitive forms
of environmental risk: the realizations of risky MPCR within a group of players can
be either perfectly correlated, or perfectly independent. As documented by previous
economic experiments, whether environmental risk is competitive or not may have
behavioral consequences. In a recent article, Krawczyk and Le Lec (2010) study competi-
tive and non-competitive (anologous to our heterougeneous risk) environmental risk
in the dictator game. They report that people tend to be less selfish if the realization
of outcomes comes under a non-competitive risk; however, both types of risk decrease
transfers as compared to the standard, deterministic dictator game.9 Thus, our variation
of the experimental setup used by Fischbacher et al. (2014) is informative for the experi-
mental research on the provision of public goods and, even more generally, on social
9See also Brock et al. (2013); Krawczyk and Lec (2016).
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interactions under environmental risk. We discuss the implications of our study for this
recent strand of economic literature in the concluding section of the paper.
Our theoretical analysis (presented in Section 2.3.3) builds on the intuition that although
the expected payoffs (conditional on a given set of group members’ contributions) are
identical across all experimental conditions (which makes them equivalent in terms of
procedural fairness), different treatments may affect the expected payoff inequalities
(and thus differ in terms of distributive fairness). Following this intuition, we draw upon
the classic model of inequality aversion by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and establish the
following prediction: homogeneous risk may foster cooperation relative to heterogenous
risk, while cooperation levels in the riskless baseline condition should be bounded by
those observed in our two environmental risk treatments.
We empirically test our research hypothesis using a controlled lab setting which differs
from the one used by Fischbacher et al. (2014) in several ways. They use a within-subject
design and elicit players’ conditional contributions to the public good, as well as their
unconditional one-shot contributions, in a series of VCM games. Our experimental
treatments are implemented in a between-subject manner. Like Fischbacher et al. (2014),
we observe conditional and unconditional decisions in a static setting. Moreover, fol-
lowing Fischbacher et al. (2012), we enrich this design by adding belief elicitation and a
finitely repeated VCM interaction. This refinement allows us to measure how individual
beliefs are formed, to establish their link with behavior, and to trace the evolution of
cooperation under various environmental risks. To enhance the experimental control, we
also collect background information on risk preferences and other-regarding preferences
in our experimental sample.
2.3 Experimental design
2.3.1 Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
In the classic voluntary contribution mechanisms, a group of N individuals (each en-
dowedwith a certain number of tokens e on their private accounts) funds the public good
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in the following manner. Each individual privately decides on his level of contribution
to the public good c (with c ≤ e) and keeps any tokens which have not been contributed.
The public good is defined as a sum of individual contributions, and the marginal per
capita return from the public good is α < 1. Thus, the payoff of the individual i in this
game (denoted πi) is given as:
πi = ei − ci + α×
N
∑
j=1
cj (2.1)
In this experiment, we are interested in two classic cases: one in which the game is played
once, and another in which it is finitely repeated (so that the number of repetitions is
public knowledge) in constant groups. In both cases, standard theory (which assumes
that all players are self-interested payoff maximizers) suggests that having 1N < α < 1
generates a social dilemma. Although the group welfare is maximized when all players
make full contributions, the dominant strategy of each individual is to contribute nothing
(which leads to the unique Nash equilibrium in a one-shot game, and the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium in a finitely repeated game).
Following the standard design used in numerous VCM experiments, in our baseline
condition the value of α is deterministic, homogeneous and publicly known. In our
environmental risk treatments (either homogeneous - HomR, or heterogeneous - HetR),
MPCR is generated through a mean-preserving lottery. Both αHomR and αHetR are drawn
from a binary set {α, α¯} such that Pr(α) = Pr(α¯) = 0.5 and E(αHomR) = E(αHetR) = α.
The rules of this lottery are public knowledge, but its outcome remains unknown in
the decision-making stage of the game. Thus, the timing of the events is as follows:
first, each player decides about his contribution to the public good; then, the lottery
determines his MPCR. The key difference between the two treatments is that αHomR is
being drawn for the entire group, whereas αHetR is being drawn independently for each
group member. Finally, we set 1N < α < α < α¯ < 1 which guarantees that the social
dilemma nature of the game is maintained for all the possible values of MPCR, so that
the standard predictions extend to the game played under environmental risk.
73
2.3.2 Calibration of the experimental games
In the laboratory experiment, players form groups of four. Each player is endowed with
10 Experimental Currency Units (ECU) which he allocates (in integer values) between
his private account and the public good. In the baseline treatment, each ECU invested in
the public good yields the return of 0.4 ECU to every player (which is public knowledge).
In the HomR and HetR treatments, each ECU invested in the public good yields either
0.3 ECU or 0.5 ECU to each player, both outcomes being equally likely. Such calibration
of the MPCR lottery is based on the study by Fischbacher et al. (2014) who observe a
negative effect of random MPCR on contributions.10 We also note that, in the light of
the previous experiments, the size of the spread between the different realizations of
random MPCR does not seem to drive per se the observed behavior. For instance, Levati
and Morone (2013) and Björk et al. (2016) report a null result based on a larger spread
than the one adopted herein (0.6 vs. 0.9, and 0.3 vs. 0.9, respectively; MPCR in the
riskless condition is always mean-preserving). Boulu-Reshef et al. (2017) also report a
null result based on an experiment in which MPCR is drawn from a continuous uniform
distribution ranging from 0.3 to 0.75. However, it does matter whether calibration of
the MPCR lottery is such that the social dilemma nature of the game is maintained for
any realization or not. Levati et al. (2009); Levati and Morone (2013) jointly report lower
contributions to the public good in a game in which the social dilemma only occurs
in expectancy, but the dominant strategy may switch from null to full contribution
depending on the realization of MPCR (0.4 vs. 1.1).
2.3.3 Theoretical prediction
In this section, we establish a theoretical prediction for our experimental games. We
would like to emphasize that the existing literature lacks a common consensus on how
10In a set of within-subject, strategy-method treatments with fixed MPCR (either 0.3 with group hetero-
geneity, 0.4 without group heterogeneity, or 0.5 with group heterogeneity), they show that lower (higher)
returns induce a significant decrease (a weakly significant increase) of contributions when MPCR is hetero-
geneous. Thus, their data suggest that the positive effect of the value of the MPCR (previously documented
by Isaac and Walker, 1988b) may interact with the negative effect of heterogeneous (and competitive)
MPCR.
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to model strategic choices in social dilemmas with environmental risk. Previously,
researchers have applied either models solely based on risk preferences (e.g. Levati et al.,
2009), or (like we do here) on other-regarding preferences (e.g. Fischbacher et al., 2014).
As pointed out in a recent study by (Cettolin et al., 2017, p. 97), the existing theoretical
developments fall short of combining risk preferences and other-regarding preferences
in a canonical way.
Furthermore, Saito (2013) studies distributive (and thus non-strategic) choices under
environmental risk and builds a model based on two criteria: the ex ante equality of
opportunities (procedural fairness), and the ex post equality of outcomes (distributive
fairness).11 Saito’s theory is further supported by the experiment by Krawczyk and
Le Lec (2010). Our experiment has been designed to mute any concerns for procedural
fairness: given the linearity of the VCM payoff function, and since the MPCR lotteries
in both HetR and HomR are mean-preserving as compared to the baseline treatment,
an agent’s expected payoff is constant across all conditions for any given set of group
contributions. However, distributive fairness concerns may still be important, since
random realizations of MPCR may affect the distribution of agents’ payoffs on top of
their contributions to the public good. Ceteris paribus, different forms of environmental
risk may differently affect the ex post inequalities in the final distribution of payoffs.
Following this intuition, we build a model to address the following question: how does
the behavior of an expected utility maximizer with inequality concerns vary across our
three experimental conditions?
We nest our analysis in the classic model of inequality aversion by Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000). This approach enables us to address our question in a traceable manner within
a standard behavioral model, and to generate a testable prediction for our experiment.
Our approach has two main advantages. First, it is parsimonious: other-regarding con-
cerns are captured by a single parameter in the utility function. Second, its behavioral
11See also related studies by Bolton et al. (2005); Trautmann (2009); Krawczyk (2011). To capture other-
regarding preferences, those studies commonly apply different theories of inequality aversion: either Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). In this study, we opted for the latter. See also Rabin
(1993); Charness and Rabin (2002); Falk and Fischbacher (2006) for alternative theories of other-regarding
preferences.
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prediction meshes well with the existing empirical data on cooperation under different
types of environmental risk. Although our experiment offers the first direct investi-
gation of cooperation under different environmental risks, an indirect inference from
the existing data suggests that HomR may yield higher contribution levels than HetR.
Recent results from Levati and Morone (2013); Björk et al. (2016); Cárdenas et al. (2017)
jointly suggest that homogeneous (hetereogeneous) risk does not change contributions
(undercuts contributions) as compared to the standard VCM game (see Section 2.2).
In the general framework of the Equity, Reciprocity and Competition (ERC) theory
proposed by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), decisions are driven by personal payoff
maximization and an aversion to inequality. Agent i’s utility function in an N-person
game is:
Ui = Ui
(
pi,
pi
P
)
(2.2)
with pi denoting agent i’s personal payoff, and P =
N
∑
j=1
pj is the sum of all players’
payoffs. This function is such that, ceteris paribus, agent’s utility increases in the first
parameter (own payoff), and decreases symmetrically as the value of the second param-
eter (relative standing) moves away from the reference value of 1N ; see their paper for a
complete discussion of the analytical assumptions and properties of this utility function.
Building on Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Fischbacher et al. (2014) propose the following
additively separable form of the utility function (2.2) in the context of a 4-person VCM
game:
Ui(πi) = πi − νi ×
(
πi
πi + ∑j 6=i πj
−
1
4
)2
(2.3)
with πi and πj defined as in equation (2.1), and the parameter νi ≥ 0 measuring the
strength of agent’s inequality aversion.12
12For ν < 150, agents behave in a self-interested manner and their best response is to contribute nothing
regardless of what others do.
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The decision-maker is an expected utility maximizer who furthermore expects each
player in his group to contribute an amount c¯−i.13 The utility function (2.3) can be
plugged into a simulation exercise that traces an agent’s behavior conditional on c¯−i
under different forms of environmental risk. For the riskless baseline treatment, we can
easily derive a utility maximizer’s best response function, i.e. the utility-maximizing
contribution level ci as a function of c¯−i. In the HomR treatment, the expected utility
maximization must also take into account the randomness of α (either high or low for
the whole group, both outcomes are equiprobable). Finally, in the HetR treatment we
account for two possible values of the agent’s α (either high or low MPCR, with equal
probabilities) and all the possible combinations of the other players’ α. Further details
on this procedure are provided in Appendix A.1.
Figures 2.1a-c present the individual best response functions for different treatments and
values of νi. This exercise yields several insights. First, we note that for all conditions
the best response function converges towards the 45 degree line as νi increases. Second,
throughout this process of convergence the best responses observed in HomR may be
greater than those observed in HetR, although this gap is more pronounced for relatively
small values of νi (Figure 2.1a) than for the relatively large ones (Figure 2.1c). Finally, the
best response function for the riskless baseline condition is bounded by those generated
by HetR and HomR conditions. These observations allow us to rank the contribution
levels under different experimental conditions so as to state our research hypothesis:
Research hypothesis. Ceteris paribus, the contribution levels in the HomR treatment
dominate those from the HetR treatment. The contribution levels in the riskless baseline
condition are bounded by those observed in the HetR and HomR treatments.
13The latter assumption implies that other group members are expected to be of the same “type”. It is a
simple way to account for the presence of strategic uncertainty due to incomplete information in the game.
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Figure 2.1 – Simulated best response functions
(a) νi = 250 (b) νi = 2500 (c) νi = 25000
2.4 Experimental procedures
212 students (49.53% males, average age 21.5) were recruited using hroot (Bock et al.,
2014). We had 72 participants (in 18 groups) in both the baseline and the HomR treat-
ments, and 68 participants (in 17 groups) in the HetR treatment. We run a total of
10 experimental sessions in June, September and October 2016 in the GATE-LAB, the
experimental laboratory of the GATE Lyon-Saint-Etienne research institute in France.
All sessions were computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The usual length of an
experimental session was one hour. In addition, each session was preceded by a series
of online tasks that were sent to all the registered participants one week in advance, and
had to be completed at least 24 hours before the start of the laboratory session.14 We
chose this method to minimize the contamination between the two sets of observations.
The average payoff was 14.70 Euros; this amount includes the gains from online tasks,
as well as the payoffs earned in the laboratory experiment.
14Out of 251 subjects who registered for the experiment and completed the online questionnaire, 222
showed up for the subsequent session in the lab (out of which 10 could not participate due to session
overbooking). Thus, the attrition rate between the two parts is modest – less than 12%.
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2.4.1 Oneweek before the experiment: risk preferences and other-regarding
preferences
One week before the experimental session, all registered participants received an email
with a personal code and a link to two online tasks – the risk preferences test by Gneezy
and Potters (1997) and the Social Value Orientation (SVO) Slider Measure by Murphy
et al. (2011) – to be completed at least 24 hours before the laboratory session. These tests
were followed by an unrelated psychological questionnaire – a 17-item Spitefulness Scale
by Marcus et al. (2014) – so as to cloud the expectations that the participants could have
formed about the tasks in the experimental session.15 These tasks were incentivized and
presented in random order. All payoffs were expressed in Experimental Currency Units
(ECU), with 100 ECU being worth 2.50 Euros. Subjects received no immediate feedback
about the outcomes, and were paid for each of them at the end of the experimental
session in the laboratory.
In the risk preferences test by Gneezy and Potters (1997), a decision-maker is endowed
with 100 ECU, some (or all) of which he can invest in the following lottery: 50% chance
of multiplying the investment by the factor of 2.5 times, and 50% chance of losing
the invested amount. Any decision-maker who does not invest the whole amount is
considered as being risk averse, and the invested amount is used as a measure of risk
aversion.16
In the Social Value Orientation (SVO) test by Murphy et al. (2011), a decision-maker
chooses an allocation of money for himself and for another person amongst 9 possible
allocations in 6 different distributional tasks. Then, these choices are transformed into an
15Subjects were paid a flat fee of 2 Euros for completing this part. The full questionnaire is provided in
the Appendix A.3. For the sake of illustration, one of the questions looks as follows: If I was one of the last
students in a classroom taking an exam and I noticed that the instructor looked impatient, I would be sure to take my
time finishing the exam just to irritate him or her. Participants provided responses for each item using scales
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). We find similar distributions of scores (around 20
on average) in all experimental conditions (p = 0.667, Kruskal-Wallis test).
16A potential shortcoming of this method is that it cannot serve to distinguish between risk-neutral and
risk-seeking agents, since both types should invest their whole endowment. However, this does not seem
to be a concern in the light of the existing empirical evidence: the fraction of people who invest their whole
endowment is fairly small. This is also the case in our experimental sample. See Charness et al. (2013) for a
related discussion.
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Table 2.1 – Risk preferences and other-regarding preferences across experimental conditions
Average outcome
Measure: Baseline HetR HomR p
Gneezy-Potters test score 56.74 50.90 53.14 0.479 (F-test)
SVO profile:
Competitive 0 1 0
Individualistic 39 40 48 0.308 (Fisher’s exact test)
Prosocial 33 27 24
individual score that determines the SVO profile (altruistic, competitive, individualistic,
prosocial). We use the original set of distributional tasks (all the amounts are expressed
in ECU) and the strategy method to elicit responses in the role of the decision-maker. We
collect choices in the role of the decision-maker from all the participants. We also inform
them that they will be randomly and anonymously matched in pairs at the end of the
experiment, that in each pair one person will be randomly chosen as the decision-maker,
and that both players’ payoffs from this task will correspond to the decision-maker’s
choice in a randomly selected task.
Based on our measures of risk preferences and other-regarding preferences, we find that
participants are properly randomized with respect to both characteristics.17
2.4.2 Experimental session: VCM games
The in situ stage of the experiment consists of two parts. In each part, we implement a 4-
player VCM game, and groups remain constant throughout the experiment (all of which
is public knowledge). We use neutral framing: each player can invest a certain amount
in a common group project. The common procedures for each part are as follows. The
participants are informed that there there will be two parts of the experiment, and paper
instructions are distributed and read aloud at the beginning of each part (such that the
participants are unaware of the content of part 2 while acting in part 1).18 In the baseline
17 Additional non-parametric results are provided in the Appendix A.5.
18These instructions, translated from French to English, are provided in the Appendix A.2.
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treatment, subjects are also provided with a table that summarizes the individual payoff
generated through different combinations of personal and group contributions. In each
of the risk treatment, a separate table is provided for both possible values of MPCR.
Finally, the participants are asked to take a short quiz of comprehension. After answering
any remaining questions, the experimental game begins.
In the first part of the experiment, subjects are endowed with 10 ECU (equivalent of 3
Euros) and their contribution may be any integer value between 0 and 10 ECU. They
play the following one-shot VCM game. First, they are asked to make one unconditional
contribution without knowing anything about other players’ behavior. Then, they
provide eleven consecutive conditional contributions, each of them being a response to
a possible value of the average contribution from the other group members (which are
also integers between 0 and 10 ECU). Following the classic experiment by Fischbacher
et al. (2001), the rules of the one-shot game guarantee that all choices are incentivized.
At the end of the game, one player is selected at random. For the non-selected players,
we take into account their unconditional contributions. For the selected player, we take
into account his conditional contribution that corresponds to the average unconditional
contribution of the remaining players. Then, we also elicit each players’ beliefs about
the average contribution to the public good of the remaining group members: they can
earn 5 ECU for a correct guess (with a 1 ECU margin of error). No feedback (either on
the outcome of the MPCR lottery or about other players’ behavior) is provided at that
point in order to avoid contamination of observations in the second part.19
In the second part of the experiment, subjects play a VCM game for 10 rounds in constant
groups that have not changed since the previous part (all of which is public knowledge).
The renewable endowment in each round is 10 ECU. We provide round-to-round feed-
back on the individual contribution, the sum of all group members’ contributions, the
19Both parts of the experiment are always presented in the same order. Fischbacher et al. (2012) report an
absence of order effects in such design.
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individual return from the group project, the individual return from the private account,
and the individual gain. 20 One round is drawn for payoff at the end of the experiment.
2.5 Results
In this section, we summarize our main empirical results from the one-shot and finitely
repeated VCM games. Altogether, we find very limited support for the research hypoth-
esis put forth in Section 2.3.3. All outcomes remain fairly stable across our experimental
conditions, and echo the standard patterns of behavior previously documented in nu-
merous experiments using the standard VCM setting.
2.5.1 Conditional and unconditional contributions in the one-shot VCM
Result 1. The patterns of conditional contributions do not vary significantly across our
three experimental conditions.
Support. Figure 2.2a summarizes the patterns of average conditional contributions in
our experimental treatments. In all three treatments, conditional contributions follow
a standard pattern: they tend to increase in the value of the other group members’
average contribution, but are far from reaching it. Moreover, F-test does not reject the
null hypothesis that the average conditional contributions are the same in all three
treatments for almost every value of other group members’ average contribution. The
sole exceptions are the values of 2 (p = 0.048) and 4 (p = 0.031); however, these results do
not survive the Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Therefore, we conclude
that conditional contributions do not vary significantly across our treatments.21
20An alternative design would consist in revealing how other groupmembers benefited from the common
project in every round. This feature seems relevant for the HetR condition (in which MPCRmay vary within
a group), but not for the HomR condition (in which MPCR is constant within a group). Here, we opted for
providing no information about other players’ benefits from the common project. The main reason behind
this design choice is the external validity argument put forth in the opening section of the paper – as we
believe, in real life it is unlikely that one perfectly observes how other people benefit from a public good.
21Additional non-parametric results are provided in the Appendix A.6.
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Figure 2.2 – Distribution of players according to their actions
(a) Whole sample (b) Free-riders excluded
Furthermore, in all treatments we find a similar scope of pure free-riding (that is, con-
tributing zero regardless of what others do): 27.78% in the baseline treatment, 19.12% in
HetR and 33.33% in HomR. χ2 test does not reject the null hypothesis that these outcomes
come from the same distribution (p = 0.162). The mean conditional contribution curves
after excluding those players (Figure 2.2b) remain similar across our three experimental
conditions.22 
Result 2. Neither the unconditional contributions, nor the beliefs about other players’
behavior, nor the correlation between these two outcomes vary significantly across our
experimental conditions.
22Once again, we do not detect any significant differences between the mean outcomes observed in the
three treatments. The mean conditional contribution associated with the other group members’ average
contribution of 2 and 4 are (weakly) significantly different (p = 0.058 and p = 0.037, respectively), but these
results do not survive the application of the Bonferroni correction.
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Support. Table 2.2 summarizes the average unconditional contributions and the beliefs
about other players’ behavior in each experimental treatment. F-test does not reject the
null hypothesis that the average unconditional contributions are the same in all experi-
mental conditions. We report the same outcome when testing for the symmetry of beliefs
across treatments. Furthermore, in a series of pairwise between-treatment comparisons
based on two-sided t-tests we do not reject the null hypothesis of equal means either for
unconditional contributions or for beliefs, with all p ≥ 0.232. Nonparametric ranksum
tests point to similar conclusions. At this point, it seems important to discuss a limitation
of our analysis related to its statistical power. Upon a visual inspection, most differences
observed across our experimental conditions are not pronounced in purely economic
terms, and the effect sizes (measured by Cohen’s d, that is the difference between two
means divided by the standard deviation calculated from the sample) observed in our
data are small (0.2 or less). For our sample size of around 70 subjects per treatment
(which is commonplace in economic experiments run in the lab), attaining the reference
power of 0.8 (and the significance level of 0.05) would require at least a medium (d = 0.5)
effect size. In addition, a post hoc power analysis suggests that achieving a statistical
power of 0.8 (and the significance level of 0.05) for d = 0.2 would require extremely large
samples (400 subjects per treatment) that are not feasible in our standard laboratory
setting. For these reasons, like many other null results observed in the lab, ours should
be taken with caution. Finally, in all treatments we find a strong and positive correlation
between unconditional contributions and beliefs: all correlation coefficients are found to
be statistically significant at the 1% level. Jennrich’s test for a joint equality of the three
correlation coefficients yields p = 0.117. Additional non-parametric results are provided
in the Appendix A.7. 
Our Result 2 echoes the previous findings from VCM experiments (see, for instance,
Weimann, 1994; Croson, 1996; Neugebauer et al., 2009; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010)
that (i) the beliefs about others’ contributions tend to be above the individual contri-
bution levels, and that (ii) these two variables are positively correlated. Importantly,
neither the data on conditional contributions presented in Figures 2.2a and b, nor the
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Table 2.2 – Unconditional contributions and beliefs across experimental conditions
Average
Measure: Baseline HetR HomR p
Unconditional contribution 3.60 4.06 4.26 0.445
Beliefs about others 4.40 4.74 4.48 0.584
Pearson’s r 0.448 0.557 0.684 0.117
Note. p-values correspond to F-test for the equality of means scores (lines 1 and 2), or to Jennrich’s test for correlation
coefficients (line 3; all coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1% level).
data on unconditional contributions summarized in Table 2.2, corroborate the direction
of treatment effects outlined in the research hypothesis in Section 2.3.3.
In addition, regression models summarized in Table 2.3 investigate the link between the
outcomes reported in Table 2.2 and the individual characteristics reported in Section
2.4.1. Individual characteristics are described by two variables, 1[Prosocial] (either
prosocial or not, based on the SVO slider measure), and GP score (the Gneezy-Potters
test score). We estimate two sets of linear regression models, separately for each of the
experimental conditions. In the first set of models, we regress the dependent variable
of interest – either one’s beliefs about other group members’ average contribution to
the public good (models M1-M3), or one’s unconditional contribution (M4-M6) – on the
explanatory variables described above. In the second set of models (M7-M9), we take
one’s unconditional contribution as dependent variable, and include one’s beliefs about
other groupmembers’ average contribution to the public good as an explanatory variable,
alongside the individual characteristics dummies. Two main results prevail across
all conditions. First, individual characteristics related to other-regarded preferences
and risk preferences play a marginal role in explaining the variation in unconditional
contributions or the variation in beliefs about other players’ contributions to the public
good. Second, the beliefs one holds about other people’s behavior are an important
predictor of individual contributions (echoing the data reported in Table 2.2) once we
control for individual characteristics.
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Table 2.3 –Unconditional contributions, beliefs and individual characteristics: regression analysis
Dep. variable: Beliefs Unconditional contribution
Model: M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9
Treatment: Base HetR HomR Base HetR HomR Base HetR HomR
Intercept 4.364a 3.733a 4.305a 2.049b 2.644a 3.060a -1.319 -0.367 -1.811b
(0.519) (0.534) (0.566) (0.871) (0.814) (0.915) (1.108) (0.921) (0.894)
Beliefs — — — — — — 0.772a 0.807a 1.132a
(0.181) (0.162) (0.140)
1[Prosocial] -0.014 0.320 -0.025 1.077 0.337 1.540c 1.087 0.080 1.569b
(0.435) (0.474) (0.538) (0.731) (0.722) (0.870) (0.654) (0.619) (0.626)
GP score 0.001 0.017c 0.004 0.019 0.025c 0.013 0.018 0.011 0.009
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
N 72 68 72 72 68 72 72 68 72
R2 0.000 0.063 0.003 0.058 0.056 0.052 0.257 0.320 0.515
Prob > F 0.993 0.121 0.916 0.128 0.160 0.160 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note. a/b/c indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Dependent variables are: player’s beliefs about
other groupmembers’ average contribution to the public good (M1-M3), and player’s unconditional contribution to the
public good (M4-M9). In all the models, the set of explanatory variables includes individual characteristics: 1[Prosocial]
(dummy variable set to 1 if an individual’s type in the SVO task is prosocial, and 0 otherwise), and the Gneezy-Potters
test score (GP score). In addition, models M7-M9 also include individual’s beliefs about other group members’ average
contribution to the public good as an independent variable.
2.5.2 Cooperation in the repeated VCM
So far, we have presented systematic evidence suggesting that the environmental risk
does not affect the patterns of contributions observed in the static VCM. In this part, we
turn to an investigation of the effects of environmental risk in the dynamic setting of a
finitely repeated VCM.
Result 3. Players’ choices in the first round of the repeated VCM game are consistent
with their unconditional contributions in the static VCM game.
Support. For all treatments, two-sided paired t-test does not reject the null hypothesis
that the mean difference between the two contributions equals zero. The results are as
follows. Baseline treatment: mean unconditional one-shot contribution of 3.60 vs. mean
round 1 contribution of 3.60 (p = 1.000); HetR: 4.06 vs. 3.81 (p = 0.534); HomR: 4.26 vs.
4.44 (p = 0.634).23 
23Non-parametric signed-rank test yields consistent results.
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Figure 2.3 – Dynamics of cooperation across treatments: mean contributions
Figure 2.3 depicts the dynamics of mean contributions in the repeated VCM games.
Once again, we observe standard patterns of behavior. In all three treatments, the initial
contributions are relatively high (around 40% of the endowment on average), and then
collapse, reaching similar levels (around 10% of the endowment on average) in the
final (tenth) round of the game. The curves from the baseline treatment and the HetR
treatment have similar slopes and run closely to each other in a standard manner. In both
cases, we observe a steady fall of contributions over time. The evolution of cooperation
in the HomR treatment is slightly different: players manage to maintain cooperation
in the first three rounds of the game, but then it collapses exactly as in the remaining
treatments. Due to this early-stage gap, the average contribution in that treatment is
found to be higher than elsewhere. Importantly, this effect nicely meshes with our initial
research hypothesis. However, we remain cautious about this result and do not overstate
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its magnitude, given that it only stems from an early and fugitive deviation from the
usual dynamics of cooperation.
Below, we summarize these findings and provide their statistical support. The statistical
analysis is based on the regression models presented in Table 2.4.24 In models M1-M3,
we regress individual contributions on treatment dummies (one for HomR and one
for HetR) using different sets of observations: round 1 observations (M1), round 10
observations (M2), or all observations (M3). Model M4 extends M3 by additionally
incorporating round dummies (representing rounds 2-3, 4-5, 6-7, 8-9, and 10) as well as
their interactions with the treatment dummies. To account for the potential within-group
correlation of observations due to repeated interactions, the residuals are clustered
at the group level in models M2-M4 (there are 53 clusters in total).25 Moreover, the
delete-one-jackknife resampling procedure is applied to estimate standard errors so as
to account for the potential small sample bias.26
Result 4. We find no differences across treatments either in the first round or in the final
round average contributions in the repeated VCM game.
Support. This result stems from the regression models M1 and M2 summarized in the
first two columns of Table 2.4. In both models, treatment dummies are neither individu-
ally nor jointly significant at the conventional level of 5%. 
Result 5. The overall average contribution is higher in the HomR treatment than in
the remaining experimental conditions. However, this difference is mostly driven by
a transient variation at an early stage of the game: players in the HomR treatment
24Additional non-parametric results are provided in the Appendix A.8 and A.9. Furthermore, double-
censored tobit regressions yield equivalent results. These additional estimates are provided in the Appendix
A.10.
25In the context of session effects in the lab, Fréchette (2012) notes that repetition may give rise to dynamic
effects the form of which is unknown to the experimenter, and suggests clustering of residuals as a possible
remedy against the resulting misspecification of the variance-covariance matrix in a regression model.
26Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn (2014) provide a detailed description of the econometric procedure used in
our analysis.
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Table 2.4 – The patterns of cooperation over time and across treatments: regression analysis
Dep. variable: contribution in round t
Model: M1 M2 M3 M4
Observations: t = 1 t = 10 t ∈ [1; 10] t ∈ [1; 10]
Intercept (β0) 3.597a 1.014a 1.989a 3.597a
(0.376) (0.325) (0.275) (0.342)
1[HomR] (β1) 0.847 0.347 1.497a 0.847
(0.532) (0.518) (0.519) (0.528)
1[HetR] (β2) 0.212 0.016 0.429 0.212
(0.540) (0.477) (0.398) (0.438)
1[round2− 3] (β3) -0.861b
(0.356)
1[round4− 5] (β4) -1.431a
(0.355)
1[round6− 7] (β5) -2.049a
(0.374)
1[round8− 9] (β6) -2.410a
(0.399)
1[round10] (β7) -2.583a
(0.437)
1[round2− 3]× 1[HomR] (β8) 1.160b
(0.480)
1[round4− 5]× 1[HomR] (β9) 0.917
(0.636)
1[round6− 7]× 1[HomR] (β10) 0.986
(0.690)
1[round8− 9]× 1[HomR] (β11) 0.438
(0.684)
1[round10]× 1[HomR] (β12) -0.500
(0.681)
1[round2− 3]× 1[HetR] (β13) 0.243
(0.446)
1[round4− 5]× 1[HetR] (β14) 0.291
(0.498)
1[round6− 7]× 1[HetR] (β15) 0.416
(0.538)
1[round8− 9]× 1[HetR] (β16) 0.233
(0.519)
1[round10]× 1[HetR] (β17) -0.196
(0.534)
N 212 212 2120 2120
R2 0.013 0.004 0.041 0.122
Prob > F 0.256 0.769 0.021 0.000
Note. a/b/c indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. In all models, the set of explanatory variables
includes treatment dummies. In M4, it also includes (pairwise) round dummies and their interactions with treatment
dummies. In M2-M4, residuals are clustered at the group level (53 clusters), standard errors are computed using the
leave-one-out jackknife procedure.
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manage to maintain cooperation in the first three rounds of the game, while the decay of
cooperation is triggered instantaneously in other conditions.
Support. This result stems from the regression models M3 and M4 summarized in
columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.4. Model M3 suggests that the aggregate average contribution
in HomR is significantly different than in the baseline treatment (p = 0.006) and in
the HetR treatment (p = 0.047). However, model M4 indicates that these differences
are mainly driven by different dynamics in rounds 1 to 3. First, the model confirms
that contributions in the baseline treatment decrease over time in a monotone way: the
coefficients β3 to β7 are all significant and we strongly reject the null hypothesis of their
equality (p < 0.001). The insignificance of coefficients β13 to β17, in turn, suggests that
this pattern is preserved in the HetR treatment. However, the same cannot be said about
the HomR treatment. The significance and the size of coefficient β8, coupled with the
insignificance of coefficients β9 to β12, points to the conclusion that the treatment effect
reported in model M3 is merely due to the fact that the decay of cooperation in the
HomR treatment is delayed by two rounds relative to the baseline and HetR treatment.27

2.5.3 Past randomness and present behavior
In the last set of regressions, we investigate the link between the exposure to random
realizations of MPCR in the past and present contribution decisions. Clearly, a rational
decision-maker should not condition his future choices on any random outcomes ob-
served in the past. However, an important body of behavioral research has documented
that in many contexts (such as lotteries or sports betting) people may misperceive ran-
27One might suspect that this short-lived bloom of cooperation in HomR may be driven by “lucky”
outcomes of the MPCR lottery. However, descriptive statistics from rounds 1 and 2 do not support the
hypothesis that “lucky” groups feel more encouraged to cooperate than the “unlucky” ones. To see this, let
us compare the evolution of contributions between rounds 1 and 2 in those groups that experienced α¯ in
t = 1 (12 groups, 48 subjects) with those that experienced α in t = 1 (6 groups, 24 subjects). Not surprisingly,
in both groups we observe similar average contributions in t = 1 (4.563 and 4.208, respectively) in which
decisions are made before the first MPCR lottery takes place. Then, these contribution levels are maintained
in t = 2 regardless of the the value of α drawn for those groups in the previous round (4.958 and 4.250,
respectively). Therefore, groups do not seem to condition their behavior in t = 2 on the realization of α in
t = 1. Related evidence is provided in Table 2.5.
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domness and make biased choices, for instance by following the “law of small numbers”
(see Rabin, 2002). In this part, we argue that our results are not driven by this kind of
misperception of randomness in the game. This evidence is summarized in Table 2.5.
For each treatment, we estimate a regression model that explains individual contribution
at time t with the following set of variables. To integrate information about one’s
past experience with random MPCR, in models M1 and M3 we include a dummy
variable indicating whether the realization MPCR in t − 1 was high (1[α¯t−1] = 1) or
low (1[α¯t−1] = 0). Then, in models M2 and M4 we also take into account the relative
frequency of high MPCR in all rounds preceding t− 1 (variable Freq(α¯)(1;t−2)), as well as
an interaction between these two variables. Finally, we account for the general decay of
contributions over time by adding round dummies, as well as individual characteristics:
1[Prosocial] (SVO profile, either prosocial or not) and GP score (the Gneezy-Potters
test score). These models are estimated separately for each of the environmental risk
treatments using the econometric procedure outlined in the previous section. The results
of this exercise are presented in Table 2.5. Across all the models, none of the coefficients
γ1 to γ3 is found to be significant at the conventional level of 5%. This suggests that
players’ decisions are not biased by the past realizations of random MPCR. These
models also yield some (yet limited) evidence on the role of individual characteristics
in a repeated game played under environmental risk. Models M1 and M2 suggest that
players with prosocial profile in the SVO slider measure tend to contribute significantly
more than others under heterogeneous risk. However, as shown in models M3 and
M4, this result does not extend to the homogeneous risk treatment. Furthermore, our
econometric exercise detects no effect of differences in risk aversion on contributions in
either treatment.28
28The estimates from an analogous exercise performed on the data from the repeated baseline game
(hence excluding the variables related to the coefficients γ1 to γ3) is provided in the Appendix A.11.
Controlling for a negative time trend, our regression analysis suggests that players with 1[Prosocial] = 1
on average tend to contribute significantly more than others (p = 0.043). However, a robustness check
based on a double-censored tobit regression only points to a weak (10% level) statistical significance of this
outcome (p = 0.057). Like elsewhere, we also report that the Gneezy-Potters test score does not happen to
be a statistically significant predictor of players’ behavior.
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Table 2.5 – Present contributions and randomMPCR in the past: regression analysis
Dep. variable: contribution in round t
Model: M1 M2 M3 M4
Treatment: HetR HetR HomR HomR
Intercept (γ0) 2.441a 1.954a 4.064a 3.823b
(0.390) (0.662) (0.872) (1.417)
1[α¯t−1] (γ1) 0.236 0.147 -0.246 -0.557
(0.195) (0.440) (0.517) (0.779)
Freq(α¯)(1;t−2) (γ2) — 0.156 — 0.603
(0.667) (1.371)
1[α¯t−1]× Freq(α¯)(1;t−2) (γ3) — 0.395 — 0.232
(0.847) (1.673)
Round (dummy variables):
3 (γ4) -0.389 – 0.001 –
(0.352) (0.380)
4 (γ5) -0.611c -0.214 -0.514 -0.442
(0.344) (0.309) (0.468) (0.440)
5 (γ6) -0.809b -0.418 -1.124c -1.085c
(0.382) (0.290) (0.556) (0.590)
6 (γ7) -1.101b -0.697 -1.152b -1.106c
(0.429) (0.447) (0.496) (0.603)
7 (γ8) -1.293b -0.898c -1.666a -1.602b
(0.493) (0.491) (0.539) (0.703)
8 (γ9) -1.762a -1.359a -1.971a -1.869b
(0.509) (0.467) (0.482) (0.650)
9 (γ10) -1.703a -1.292a -2.624a -2.510a
(0.384) (0.261) (0.570) (0.782)
10 (γ11) -2.346a -1.941a -3.406a -3.295a
(0.361) (0.270) (0.537) (0.748)
1[Prosocial] (γ12) 1.656a 1.562a 0.887 0.870
(0.359) (0.393) (0.804) (0.820)
GP score (γ13) 0.003 0.003 0.010 0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
N 612 544 648 576
R2 0.155 0.142 0.111 0.108
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Note. a/b/c indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Observations come from rounds 2-10 in M1 and
M3, and from rounds 3-10 in M2 and M4. Residuals are clustered at the group level (17 clusters in HetR, 18 clusters in
HomR), standard errors are computed using the leave-one-out jackknife procedure.
2.6 Concluding remarks
This paper offers a novel study of the effects of environmental risk on cooperation in
the VCM game. Our main result is that moving from the standard environment with
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a deterministic MPCR to the environments in which MPCR is risky does not affect the
main patterns of cooperation.
More generally, this study extends the previous literature and furthers our understand-
ing of the effects of environmental randomness on cooperation in the following ways.
First, the behavioral reaction to environmental risk seems to be different for competitive
and non-competitive risks. In the light of the combined evidence from Fischbacher
et al. (2014) (in which the risk involves within-group competition) and our study (in
which the calibration of the VCM game is the same, but the risk, whether homogeneous
or heterogeneous, always has a non-competitive nature), it seems that the presence
of competition might be detrimental for cooperation under environmental risk. This
observation echoes the previous work by Krawczyk and Le Lec (2010) who show that
competition undermines sharing in the dictator games with risky outcomes. Put to-
gether, this body of evidence suggests that social interactions under risk are sensitive to
competition which may partially mute other-regarding concerns.
Second, our study contributes to the recent experimental investigations of the effects
of environmental randomness on the provision of public goods. Together with the
recent studies by Levati and Morone (2013), Boulu-Reshef et al. (2017) and Björk et al.
(2016) (but notwithstanding Levati et al., 2009; Cárdenas et al., 2017), the results of our
experiment point to the robustness of the standard patterns of cooperation not only
across different domains of (non-competitive) risk, but also across different domains of
(non-competitive) randomness: risk, ambiguity and uncertainty.
Altogether, we find strong support for the “gold standard” approach to studying human
cooperation by means of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism paradigm in which
the marginal per capita return from the public good is deterministic, homogeneous
and publicly known. We reckon that standard methodology provides a robust and
conservative measure of human cooperation.
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A Appendix
A.1 Simulation procedure
Agent i’s utility Ui is defined in (2.3) and depends on πi as well as the other group
members’ average payoff π¯−i = ∑j 6=i
πj
N−1 .
Agent i’s payoff πi is defined in (2.1) and depends on i’s contribution ci, the other group
members’ average contribution c¯−i, and i’s MPCR.
Agent i also considers the remaining group members to be homogeneous with respect
to their contribution levels, each contributing c¯−i. Thus, agent i uses (2.1) to compute
another agent j’s payoff πj that depends on j’s contribution c¯−i, i’s contribution ci, as
well as j’s MPCR.
Agent i also anticipates all the possible distributions of MPCR within his group. With
K such distributions (denoted D1, . . . ,DK) along with their respective probabilities
(denoted Pr(D1), . . . , Pr(DK)), agent i’s expected utility from choosing ci given c¯−i is:
EUi(ci|c¯−i) =
K
∑
k=1
Pr(Dk)Ui(ci|c¯−i,Dk) (4)
In the baseline treatment, K = 1: MPCR=0.4 for all group members with certainty.
In HomR, K = 2: either MPCR=0.3 or MPCR=0.5 for all group members, both distribu-
tions being equally likely.
In HetR, K = 8: there are two possible values of i’s MPCR (either high or low, with equal
probabilities) and four possible combinations of the MPCR among the remaining group
members (either 0, 1, 2, or 3 low MPCR, the rest being high MPCR; their respective
probabilities are 0.125, 0.375, 0.375, 0.125).
Finally, for each c¯−i ∈ [0, 10] (with 0.25 increments) and given his inequality aversion
parameter νi, agent i chooses ci ∈ [0, 10] (with 0.25 increments) that maximizes EUi from
(4).
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A.2 Experimental instructions (translated from French)
Instructions: Baseline Treatment
Thank you for participating to this experiment in economics. Please turn off your phone
and do not communicate with the others unless we ask you to. If you have any questions,
you can press the red button at the left of your desk at any time, we will come to answer
you in private.
During this experiment, you are going to make decisions. These decisions can make
you earn money. During the whole experiment, we will not talk about Euros, but about
Experimental Currency Units (ECU). Your earnings will be computed in ECU, then
converted in Euros at the time of the payment. The conversion rate is the following: 10
ECU = 3 Euro. At the end of the session, you will receive your payment. You will be
paid in Euros, in cash and in private in a separated room.
This session comprises 2 parts. Your total gain for this session will be the sum of your
gains in both parts. The instructions below describe the content of Part 1. The instruc-
tions for Part 2 will be distributed at the end of Part 1. During the whole session, your
decisions are anonymous.
Preliminary part:
In order to match your answers of the online questionnaire and your answers at this
session, please indicate the code we sent you by mail. If you have doubts, please press
the red button on the left-hand side of your desk.
Instructions for Part 1:
In this first part, the computer program will randomly form groups of 4 people. At
the beginning of the part, each member of the group has 10 ECU. Each group member
can invest a part of this amount in a common group project. The amount must be
between 0 and 10 ECU. Then, the sum of the amounts invested in the common project is
multiplied by 1.6 and equally redistributed between the 4 group members. For all the
group members, the amount that is not invested in the common project is stored on a
personal account. Thus, if a group member stores X ECU on his/her personal account,
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he/she will recover exactly X ECU.
Your gain is computed in the following way:
Your gain = [10− (amount invested)] +
1.6× sum of amounts invested
4
(5)
Your task consists in (i) choosing successively 2 "types of amount" that you wish to
invest in the common project and (ii) estimating the amount invested by the other group
members.
• On the first screen, you need to enter an "unconditional amount". This is the
amount you want to invest in the common project independently of the amounts
invested by the 3 other group members. Once this amount is chosen, confirm by
clicking on the OK button.
• On the second screen, you need to enter "conditional amounts". These are the
amounts you want to invest for each average amount invested by your group
members. Once these amounts are chosen, confirm by clicking on the OK button.
• On the third screen, you need to estimate what will be the average amount invested
in the project by your three group members.
How is your gain computed?
The computer program will randomly select a member of your group:
• If you are not the randomly selected group member, the amount taken into account
to compute your gain will be your unconditional amount.
• If you are the randomly selected group member, the amount taken into account to
compute your gain will be the conditional amount corresponding to the average of
the unconditional amounts of your 3 group members, rounded up to the nearest
whole number.
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If you estimate exactly the average amount plus or minus 1 ECU, you will receive 5 ECU.
Otherwise, you will not receive anything. You will be informed about your earnings for
this part at the end of the experiment.
Note that the conditional and unconditional amounts can have an impact on your
payment.
The table displayed in these instructions shows your gain in ECU depending on your
level of contribution to the project as well as the average level of contribution of your
group members.
Before beginning Part 1, you have to reply to a questionnaire that will be distributed.
Please read these instructions again. If you have any questions, please push the red
button on the left-hand side of your desk and we will come to answer you in private.
101
Average contribution of other group members
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0 10 11.2 12.4 13.6 14.8 16 17.2 18.4 19.6 20.8 22
1 9.4 10.6 11.8 13 14.2 15.4 16.6 17.8 19 20.2 21.4
2 8.8 10 11.2 12.4 13.6 14.8 16 17.2 18.4 19.6 20.8
3 8.2 9.4 10.6 11.8 13 14.2 15.4 16.6 17.8 19 20.2
4 7.6 8.8 10 11.2 12.4 13.6 14.8 16 17.2 18.4 19.6
Your contribution 5 7 8.2 9.4 10.6 11.8 13 14.2 15.4 16.6 17.8 19
6 6.4 7.6 8.8 10 11.2 12.4 13.6 14.8 16 17.2 18.4
7 5.8 7 8.2 9.4 10.6 11.8 13 14.2 15.4 16.6 17.8
8 5.2 6.4 7.6 8.8 10 11.2 12.4 13.6 14.8 16 17.2
9 4.6 5.8 7 8.2 9.4 10.6 11.8 13 14.2 15.4 16.6
10 4 5.2 6.4 7.6 8.8 10 11.2 12.4 13.6 14.8 16
Table 1: Your gain depending on your contribution and on the average contribution of your three group
members when the multiplier factor is equal to 1.6
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Instructions for Part 2: This part lasts 10 periods.
During this whole part, you belong to the same group as in Part 1. At the beginning
of each period, each group member has 10 ECU. Each group member can invest a part
of this amount in a common group project. The amount must be between 0 and 10
ECU. Then, the sum of the amounts invested in the common project is multiplied by 1.6
and equally redistributed between the 4 group members. For all the group members,
the amount that is not invested in the common project is stored on a personal account.
Thus, if a group member stores X ECU on his/her personal account, he/she will recover
exactly X ECU.
Your gain is computed in the following way:
Your gain = [10− (amount invested)] +
1.6× sum of amounts invested
4
(6)
At the end of each period, each group member receives information about his/her level
of contribution to the project, the total amount invested by the group members, the
return of the project, the return of his/her personal account, as well as his/her gain.
How is your gain computed?
For this part, one period will be randomly selected and gains will be added to the gains
of Part 1.
Please read these instructions again. If you have any questions, please push the red
button on the left-hand side of your desk and we will come to answer you in private.
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Questionnaire:
1. How many group members do you have?
• 1
• 2
• 3
• 4
2. After drawing lots, the average contribution of the other group members is equal
to 5 ECU. Compute your profit if your finale contribution is:
• 0 ECU
• 5 ECU
• 10 ECU
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In the following questions, we consider some randomly obtained amounts of a
fictional participant.
Screen 1: Unconditional amount
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Screen 2: Conditional amounts
Screen 3: Estimation of the contributions
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3. Suppose that the participant is randomly selected and that the average contribu-
tion of the other members is equal to 6.6 ECU. Which amount will be selected for
his/her contribution?
• 9
• 7
• 5
• 10
4. Suppose that the participant is not randomly selected and that the average con-
tribution of the other group members is equal to 6.6 ECU. Which amount will be
selected for his/her contribution?
• 9
• 7
• 5
• 10
5. The average contribution of the other group members is equal to 6.6 ECU. Did
the participant earn the 5 ECU that depend on his/her estimation concerning the
average level of contribution of his/her group members?
• Yes
• No
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Instructions: Homogeneous Risk Treatment
Thank you for participating to this experiment in economics. Please turn off your phone
and do not communicate with the others unless we ask you to. If you have any questions,
you can press the red button at the left of your desk at any time, we will come to answer
you in private.
During this experiment, you are going to make decisions. These decisions can make
you earn money. During the whole experiment, we will not talk about Euros, but about
Experimental Currency Units (ECU). Your earnings will be computed in ECU, then
converted in Euros at the time of the payment. The conversion rate is the following: 10
ECU = 3 Euro.
At the end of the session, you will receive your payment. You will be paid in Euros, in
cash and in private in a separated room.
This session comprises 2 parts. Your total gain for this session will be the sum of your
gains in both parts.
The instructions below describe the content of Part 1. The instructions for Part 2 will be
distributed at the end of Part 1. During the whole session, your decisions are anonymous.
Preliminary part:
In order to match your answers of the online questionnaire and your answers at this
session, please indicate the code we sent you by mail. If you have doubts, please press
the red button on the left-hand side of your desk.
Instructions for Part 1:
In this first part, the computer program will randomly form groups of 4 people. At the
beginning of the part, each member of the group has 10 ECU. Each group member can
invest a part of this amount in a common group project. The amount must be between 0
and 10 ECU. Then, the sum of the amounts invested in the common project is multiplied
either by 1.2 or by 2 (each possibility has a 50% chance to be realized) and equally
redistributed between the 4 group members.
For all the group members, the amount that is not invested in the common project is
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stored on a personal account. Thus, if a group member stores X ECU on his/her personal
account, he/she will recover exactly X ECU.
Your gain is computed in the following way:
Your gain = [10− (amount invested)] +
r× sum of amounts invested
4
(7)
where r is the multiplier factor of the common project and is worth either 1.2 or 2 de-
pending on the outcome of the random draw.
Your task consists in (i) choosing successively 2 "types of amount" that you wish to
invest in the common project and (ii) estimating the amount invested by the other group
members.
• On the first screen, you need to enter an "unconditional amount". This is the
amount you want to invest in the common project independently of the amounts
invested by the 3 other group members. Once this amount is chosen, confirm by
clicking on the OK button.
• On the second screen, you need to enter "conditional amounts". These are the
amounts you want to invest for each average amount invested by your group
members. Once these amounts are chosen, confirm by clicking on the OK button.
• On the third screen, you need to estimate what will be the average amount invested
in the project by your three group members.
How is your gain computed?
The computer program will randomly select a member of your group:
• If you are not the randomly selected group member, the amount taken into account
to compute your gain will be your unconditional amount.
• If you are the randomly selected group member, the amount taken into account to
compute your gain will be the conditional amount corresponding to the average of
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the unconditional amounts of your 3 group members, rounded up to the nearest
whole number.
If you estimate exactly the average amount plus or minus 1 ECU, you will receive 5 ECU.
Otherwise, you will not receive anything. You will be informed about your earnings for
this part at the end of the experiment.
Note that the conditional and unconditional amounts can have an impact on your
payment.
The table displayed in these instructions shows your gain in ECU depending on your
level of contribution to the project as well as the average level of contribution of your
group members.
Before beginning Part 1, you have to reply to a questionnaire that will be distributed.
Please read these instructions again. If you have any questions, please push the red
button on the left-hand side of your desk and we will come to answer you in private.
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Average contribution of other group members
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0 10 10.9 11.8 12.7 13.6 14.5 15.4 16.3 17.2 18.1 19
1 9.3 10.2 11.1 12 12.9 13.8 14.7 15.6 16.5 17.4 18.3
2 8.6 9.5 10.4 11.3 12.2 13.1 14 14.9 15.8 16.7 17.6
3 7.9 8.8 9.7 10.6 11.5 12.4 13.3 14.2 15.1 16 16.9
4 7.2 8.1 9 9.9 10.8 11.7 12.6 13.5 14.4 15.3 16.2
Your contribution 5 6.5 7.4 8.3 9.2 10.1 11 11.9 12.8 13.7 14.6 15.5
6 5.8 6.7 7.6 8.5 9.4 10.3 11.2 12.1 13 13.9 14.8
7 5.1 6 6.9 7.8 8.7 9.6 10.5 11.4 12.3 13.2 14.1
8 4.4 5.3 6.2 7.1 8 8.9 9.8 10.7 11.6 12.5 13.4
9 3.7 4.6 5.5 6.4 7.3 8.2 9.1 10 10.9 11.8 12.7
10 3 3.9 4.8 5.7 6.6 7.5 8.4 9.3 10.2 11.1 12
Table 1: Your gain depending on your contribution and on the average contribution of your three group
members when the multiplier factor is equal to 1.2
Average contribution of other group members
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0 10 11.5 13 14.5 16 17.5 19 20.5 22 23.5 25
1 9.5 11 12.5 14 15.5 17 18.5 20 21.5 23 24.5
2 9 10.5 12 13.5 15 16.5 18 19.5 21 22.5 24
3 8.5 10 11.5 13 14.5 16 17.5 19 20.5 22 23.5
4 8 9.5 11 12.5 14 15.5 17 18.5 20 21.5 23
Your contribution 5 7.5 9 10.5 12 13.5 15 16.5 18 19.5 21 22.5
6 7 8.5 10 11.5 13 14.5 16 17.5 19 20.5 22
7 6.5 8 9.5 11 12.5 14 15.5 17 18.5 20 21.5
8 6 7.5 9 10.5 12 13.5 15 16.5 18 19.5 21
9 5.5 7 8.5 10 11.5 13 14.5 16 17.5 19 20.5
10 5 6.5 8 9.5 11 12.5 14 15.5 17 18.5 20
Table 2: Your gain depending on your contribution and on the average contribution of your three group
members when the multiplier factor is equal to 2
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Instructions for Part 2: This part lasts 10 periods.
During this whole part, you belong to the same group as in Part 1. At the beginning of
each period, each group member has 10 ECU. Each group member can invest a part of
this amount in a common group project. The amount must be between 0 and 10 ECU.
Then, the sum of the amounts invested in the common project is multiplied either by
1.2 or by 2 (each possibility has a 50% chance to be realized) and equally redistributed
between the 4 group members.
For all the group members, the amount that is not invested in the common project is
stored on a personal account. Thus, if a group member stores X ECU on his/her personal
account, he/she will recover exactly X ECU.
Your gain is computed in the following way:
Your gain = [10− (amount invested)] +
r× sum of amounts invested
4
(8)
where r is the multiplier factor of the common project and is worth either 1.2 or 2 de-
pending on the outcome of the random draw.
Your task consists in choosing the amount you want to invest in the common project.
At the end of each period, each group member receives information about his/her level
of contribution to the project, the total amount invested by the group members, the
return of the project, the return of his/her personal account, as well as his/her gain.
How is your gain computed?
For this part, one period will be randomly selected and gains will be added to the gains
of Part 1.
Please read these instructions again. If you have any questions, please push the red
button on the left-hand side of your desk and we will come to answer you in private.
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Questionnaire:
1. How many group members do you have?
• 1
• 2
• 3
• 4
2. The average contribution of your three groupmembers is equal to 5 ECU. Compute
your profit if your finale contribution is 7:
• If the sum of amounts invested in the common project has been multiplied by
1.2
• If the sum of amounts invested in the common project has been multiplied by
2
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In the following questions, we consider some randomly obtained amounts of a
fictional participant.
Screen 1: Unconditional amount
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Screen 2: Conditional amounts
Screen 3: Estimation of the contributions
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3. Suppose that the participant is randomly selected and that the average contribu-
tion of the other members is equal to 6.6 ECU. Which amount will be selected for
his/her contribution?
• 9
• 7
• 5
• 10
4. Suppose that the participant is not randomly selected and that the average con-
tribution of the other group members is equal to 6.6 ECU. Which amount will be
selected for his/her contribution?
• 9
• 7
• 5
• 10
5. The average contribution of the other group members is equal to 6.6 ECU. Did
the participant earn the 5 ECU that depend on his/her estimation concerning the
average level of contribution of his/her group members?
• Yes
• No
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Instructions: Heterogeneous Risk Treatment
Thank you for participating to this experiment in economics. Please turn off your phone
and do not communicate with the others unless we ask you to. If you have any questions,
you can press the red button at the left of your desk at any time, we will come to answer
you in private.
During this experiment, you are going to make decisions. These decisions can make
you earn money. During the whole experiment, we will not talk about Euros, but about
Experimental Currency Units (ECU). Your earnings will be computed in ECU, then
converted in Euros at the time of the payment. The conversion rate is the following: 10
ECU = 3 Euro.
At the end of the session, you will receive your payment. You will be paid in Euros, in
cash and in private in a separated room.
This session comprises 2 parts. Your total gain for this session will be the sum of your
gains in both parts.
The instructions below describe the content of Part 1. The instructions for Part 2 will
be distributed at the end of Part 1. During the whole session, your decisions are anony-
mous.
Preliminary part:
In order to match your answers of the online questionnaire and your answers at this
session, please indicate the code we sent you by mail. If you have doubts, please press
the red button on the left-hand side of your desk.
Instructions for Part 1:
In this first part, the computer program will randomly form groups of 4 people. At the
beginning of the part, each member of the group has 10 ECU. Each group member can
invest a part of this amount in a common group project. The amount must be between 0
and 10 ECU. Once every group member has chosen the amount he/she wants to invest
in the common project, a random draw determines the return of the project for each
group member. Each group member has a 50% chance to receive either the equivalent of
30% of the total amount invested in the common project, or the equivalent of 50% of the
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total amount invested in the common project. This random draw is individual for each
group member. Thus, the outcomes of the random draw may differ across the members
of a group.
For all the group members, the amount that is not invested in the common project is
stored on a personal account. Thus, if a group member stores X ECU on his/her personal
account, he/she will recover exactly X ECU.
Your gain is computed in the following way:
Your gain = [10− (amount invested)] + p× sum of amounts invested (9)
where p is worth either 30% or 50% depending on the outcome of the random draw.
Your task consists in (i) choosing successively 2 "types of amount" that you wish to
invest in the common project and (ii) estimating the amount invested by the other group
members.
• On the first screen, you need to enter an "unconditional amount". This is the
amount you want to invest in the common project independently of the amounts
invested by the 3 other group members. Once this amount is chosen, confirm by
clicking on the OK button.
• On the second screen, you need to enter "conditional amounts". These are the
amounts you want to invest for each average amount invested by your group
members. Once these amounts are chosen, confirm by clicking on the OK button.
• On the third screen, you need to estimate what will be the average amount invested
in the project by your three group members.
How is your gain computed?
The computer program will randomly select a member of your group:
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• If you are not the randomly selected group member, the amount taken into account
to compute your gain will be your unconditional amount.
• If you are the randomly selected group member, the amount taken into account to
compute your gain will be the conditional amount corresponding to the average of
the unconditional amounts of your 3 group members, rounded up to the nearest
whole number.
If you estimate exactly the average amount plus or minus 1 ECU, you will receive 5 ECU.
Otherwise, you will not receive anything. You will be informed about your earnings for
this part at the end of the experiment.
Note that the conditional and unconditional amounts can have an impact on your
payment.
The table displayed in these instructions shows your gain in ECU depending on your
level of contribution to the project as well as the average level of contribution of your
group members.
Before beginning Part 1, you have to reply to a questionnaire that will be distributed.
Please read these instructions again. If you have any questions, please push the red
button on the left-hand side of your desk and we will come to answer you in private.
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Average contribution of other group members
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0 10 10.9 11.8 12.7 13.6 14.5 15.4 16.3 17.2 18.1 19
1 9.3 10.2 11.1 12 12.9 13.8 14.7 15.6 16.5 17.4 18.3
2 8.6 9.5 10.4 11.3 12.2 13.1 14 14.9 15.8 16.7 17.6
3 7.9 8.8 9.7 10.6 11.5 12.4 13.3 14.2 15.1 16 16.9
4 7.2 8.1 9 9.9 10.8 11.7 12.6 13.5 14.4 15.3 16.2
Your contribution 5 6.5 7.4 8.3 9.2 10.1 11 11.9 12.8 13.7 14.6 15.5
6 5.8 6.7 7.6 8.5 9.4 10.3 11.2 12.1 13 13.9 14.8
7 5.1 6 6.9 7.8 8.7 9.6 10.5 11.4 12.3 13.2 14.1
8 4.4 5.3 6.2 7.1 8 8.9 9.8 10.7 11.6 12.5 13.4
9 3.7 4.6 5.5 6.4 7.3 8.2 9.1 10 10.9 11.8 12.7
10 3 3.9 4.8 5.7 6.6 7.5 8.4 9.3 10.2 11.1 12
Table 1: Your gains depending on your contribution and on the average contribution of your three group
members if what you receive equals 30% of the value of the group project
Average contribution of other group members
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0 10 11.5 13 14.5 16 17.5 19 20.5 22 23.5 25
1 9.5 11 12.5 14 15.5 17 18.5 20 21.5 23 24.5
2 9 10.5 12 13.5 15 16.5 18 19.5 21 22.5 24
3 8.5 10 11.5 13 14.5 16 17.5 19 20.5 22 23.5
4 8 9.5 11 12.5 14 15.5 17 18.5 20 21.5 23
Your contribution 5 7.5 9 10.5 12 13.5 15 16.5 18 19.5 21 22.5
6 7 8.5 10 11.5 13 14.5 16 17.5 19 20.5 22
7 6.5 8 9.5 11 12.5 14 15.5 17 18.5 20 21.5
8 6 7.5 9 10.5 12 13.5 15 16.5 18 19.5 21
9 5.5 7 8.5 10 11.5 13 14.5 16 17.5 19 20.5
10 5 6.5 8 9.5 11 12.5 14 15.5 17 18.5 20
Table 2: Your Your gains depending on your contribution and on the average contribution of your three
group members if what you receive equals 50% of the value of the group project
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Instructions for Part 2: This part lasts 10 periods.
During this whole part, you belong to the same group as in Part 1. At the beginning
of each period, each group member has 10 ECU. Each group member can invest a part
of this amount in a common group project. The amount must be between 0 and 10
ECU. Once every group member has chosen the amount he/she wants to invest in the
common project, a random draw determines the return of the project for each group
member. Each group member has a 50% chance to receive either the equivalent of 30%
of the total amount invested in the common project, or the equivalent of 50% of the total
amount invested in the common project. This random draw is individual for each group
member. Thus, the outcomes of the random draw may differ across the members of a
group.
For all the group members, the amount that is not invested in the common project is
stored on a personal account. Thus, if a group member stores X ECU on his/her personal
account, he/she will recover exactly X ECU.
Your gain is computed in the following way:
Your gain = [10− (amount invested)] + p× sum of amounts invested (10)
where p is worth either 30% or 50% depending on the outcome of the random draw.
Your task consists in choosing the amount you want to invest in the common project.
At the end of each period, each group member receives information about his/her level
of contribution to the project, the total amount invested by the group members, the
return of the project, the return of his/her personal account, as well as his/her gain.
How is your gain computed?
For this part, one period will be randomly selected and gains will be added to the gains
of Part 1.
Please read these instructions again. If you have any questions, please push the red
button on the left-hand side of your desk and we will come to answer you in private.
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Questionnaire:
1. How many group members do you have?
• 1
• 2
• 3
• 4
2. After the random draw, every group member will for sure receive the same pro-
portion, p, of the project?
• Yes
• No
3. The average contribution of the other group members is equal to 5 ECU. Compute
your profit if your finale contribution is 7:
• If the proportion of the common project that you receive is 30%
• If the proportion of the common project that you receive is 50%
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In the following questions, we consider some randomly obtained amounts of a
fictional participant.
Screen 1: Unconditional amount
123
Screen 2: Conditional amounts
Screen 3: Estimation of the contributions
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4. Suppose that the participant is randomly selected and that the average contribu-
tion of the other members is equal to 6.6 ECU. Which amount will be selected for
his/her contribution?
• 9
• 7
• 5
• 10
5. Suppose that the participant is not randomly selected and that the average con-
tribution of the other group members is equal to 6.6 ECU. Which amount will be
selected for his/her contribution?
• 9
• 7
• 5
• 10
6. The average contribution of the other group members is equal to 6.6 ECU. Did
the participant earn the 5 ECU that depend on his/her estimation concerning the
average level of contribution of his/her group members?
• Yes
• No
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A.3 Spitfulness Scale based on Marcus et al. (2014)
1. It might be worth risking my reputation in order to spread gossip about somone I
did not like.
2. If I am going to my car in a crowded parking lot and it appears that another driver
wants my parking space, then I will make sure to take my time pulling out of the
parking space.
3. I hope that elected officials are successful in their efforts to improve my community
even if I opposed their election. (reverse scored)
4. If my neighbor complained that I was playing my music too loud, then I might
turn up the music even louder just to irritate him or her, even if meant I could get
fined.
5. If I had the opportunity, then I would gladly pay a small sum of money to see a
classmate who I do not like fail his or her final exam.
6. There have been times when I was willing to suffer some small harm so that I
could punish someone else who deserved it.
7. I would rather no one get extra credit in a class if it meant that others would receive
more credit than me.
8. If I opposed the election of an official, then I would be glad to see him or her fail
even if their failure hurt my community.
9. I would be willing to take a punch if it meant that someone I did not like would
receive two punches.
10. I would be willing to pay more for some goods and services if other people I did
not like had to pay even more.
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11. If I was one of the last students in a classroom taking an exam and I noticed that
the instructor looked impatient, I would be sure to take my time finishing the exam
just to irritate him or her.
12. If my neighbor complained about the appearance of my front yard, I would be
tempted to make it look worse just to annoy him or her.
13. I would take on extra work at my job if it meant that one of my co-workers who I
did not like would also have to do extra work.
14. I would be happy receiving extra credit in a class even if other students received
more points than me. (reverse scored)
15. Part of me enjoys seeing the people I do not like fail even if their failure hurts me
in some way.
16. If I am checking out at a store and I feel like the person in line behind me is rushing
me, then I will sometimes slow down and take exra time to pay.
17. It is sometimes worth a little suffering on my part to see others receive the punish-
ment they deserve.
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A.4 Non-parametric analysis
A.5 Non-parametric results on the randomization of risk preferences and
other-regarding preferences across treatments
Figure A.1 – Gneezy Potters risk preferences distributions by treatment
Figure A.1 presents the distributions of investment choices in the Gneezy-Potters test
across the three treatments. Kruskal-Wallis test does not reject the null hypothesis that
these outcomes come from the same distribution (p = 0.661).
A.6 Non-parametric support for Result 1: conditional cooperation
Kruskal-Wallis test is used to check if conditional contributions across treatments come
from the same distribution. We replicate the results of the parametric F-test with
one slight difference: p associated with the average contribution conditional on other
members’ average contribution of 1 becomes weakly significant. Altogether, we reject
the null hypothesis that the conditional contributions come from the same distribution
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for three values of the other players’ average contribution: the value of 1 (p = 0.055), the
value of 2 (p = 0.030) and the value of 4 (p = 0.028); neither result remains significant
once we apply the Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. These results hold
after excluding pure free-riders from the analyzed sample (with p = 0.062, p = 0.024,
and p = 0.019, respectively).
A.7 Non-parametric support for Result 2: unconditional contributions and
beliefs
Figure A.2 – Distributions of unconditional contributions by treatment
Figure A.2 shows the distributions of unconditional contributions across the three
treatments. Kruskal-Wallis test does not reject the null hypothesis that these outcomes
come from the same distribution (p = 0.519).
Figure A.3 presents the distributions of beliefs about the group members’ average
contribution to the public good. Kruskal-Wallis test does not reject the null hypothesis
that these outcomes come from the same distribution (p = 0.484).
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Figure A.3 – Distributions of beliefs by treatment
Spearman’s correlation coefficients for these two variables are all significant at the 1%
level and given as follows. Baseline treatment: 0.531; HetR treatment: 0.578; HomR
treatment: 0.677.
A.8 Non-parametric support for Result 4: round 1 and round 10 contribu-
tions
For the repeated VCM game, Kruskal-Wallis test does not reject the null hypothesis
that the contributions in the repeated VCM game are drawn from the same distribution
in round 1 (p = 0.312, individual contribution used as an independent observation
unit) and in round 10 (p = 0.665, group average contribution used as an independent
observation unit).
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A.9 Non-parametric support for Result 5: average group contributions
Kruskal-Wallis test rejects the null hypothesis that the average group contributions in the
repeated VCM game come from the same distribution (p = 0.015). Pairwise comparisons
based on ranksum tests yield the following results. Comparing the baseline treatment
and the HetR treatment, we do not reject the null hypothesis that the average group
contributions come from the same distributions (p = 0.137). However, the distribution of
the average group contributions in the HomR treatment is (weakly) significantly different
than in either of the remaining treatments (baseline: p = 0.008, HetR: p = 0.077).
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A.10 Additional tobit regressions
Table A.1 – Unconditional contributions, beliefs and individual characteristics: tobit regressions
Dep. variable: Beliefs Uncond. contribution
Model: M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9
Treatment: Base HetR HomR Base HetR HomR Base HetR HomR
Intercept 4.404a 3.715a 4.305a 0.929 2.277b 1.740 -3.968 -1.717 -5.517a
(0.516) (0.529) (0.554) (1.353) (1.024) (1.569) (1.759) (1.204) (1.654)
Beliefs — — — — — 1.158a 1.056a 1.718a
(0.287) (0.213) (0.257)
1[Prosocial] -0.028 0.304 -0.025 1.527 0.632 2.770c 1.429 0.378 2.574b
(0.432) (0.469) (0.526) (1.104) (0.910) (1.441) (0.973) (0.766) (1.001)
GP score 0.000 0.018b 0.004 0.025 0.026 0.023 0.022 0.008 0.016
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.019) (0.017) (0.024) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017)
N (total/left-/right-censored) 72/0/1 68/0/1 72/0/0 72/20/6 68/11/5 72/18/12 72/20/6 68/11/5 72/18/12
Prob > χ2 0.997 0.103 0.912 0.192 0.231 0.113 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note. Estimates from double-censored tobit regressions. a/b/c indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Dependent variables are: player’s beliefs about other groupmembers’ average contribution to the public good (M1-M3),
and player’s unconditional contribution to the public good (M4-M9). In all the models, the set of explanatory variables
includes individual characteristics: 1[Prosocial] (dummy variable set to 1 if an individual’s type in the SVO task is
prosocial, and 0 otherwise), and the Gneezy-Potters test score (GP score). In addition, models M7-M9 also include
individual’s beliefs about other group members’ average contribution to the public good as an independent variable.
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Table A.2 – The patterns of cooperation over time and across treatments: tobit regressions
Tobit
Dep. variable: contribution in round t
Model: M1 M2 M3 M4
Observations: t = 1 t = 10 t ∈ [1; 10] t ∈ [1; 10]
Intercept (β0) 3.056a -4.856a -0.271 2.963a
(0.568) (1.391) (0.612) (0.535)
1[HomR] (β1) 1.171 1.226 2.734a 1.226
(0.799) (1.856) (0.953) (0.835)
1[HetR] (β2) 0.397 0.225 0.995 0.428
(0.806) (2.012) (0.808) (0.656)
1[round2− 3] (β3) -1.353b
(0.633)
1[round4− 5] (β4) -2.583a
(0.687)
1[round6− 7](β5) -4.145a
(0.892)
1[round8− 9] (β6) -5.232a
(0.985)
1[round10] (β7) -6.010a
(1.080)
1[round2− 3]× 1[HomR] (β8) 1.864b
(0.792)
1[round4− 5]× 1[HomR] (β9) 1.672
(1.071)
1[round6− 7]× 1[HomR] (β10) 2.337c
(1.279)
1[round8− 9]× 1[HomR] (β11) 1.726
(1.391)
1[round10]× 1[HomR] (β12) -0.241
(1.626)
1[round2− 3]× 1[HetR] (β13) 0.264
(0.769)
1[round4− 5]× 1[HetR] (β14) 0.646
(0.880)
1[round6− 7]× 1[HetR] (β15) 1.056
(1.151)
1[round8− 9]× 1[HetR] (β16) 0.986
(1.205)
1[round10]× 1[HetR] (β17) -0.270
(1.530)
N (total/left-/right-censored) 212/49/24 212/154/6 2120/930/138 2120/930/138
Prob > χ2 0.330 0.793 0.022 0.000
Note. Estimates from double-censored tobit regressions. a/b/c indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
In all models, the set of explanatory variables includes treatment dummies. In M4, it also includes (pairwise) round
dummies and their interactions with treatment dummies. In M2-M4, residuals are clustered at the group level (53
clusters), standard errors are computed using the leave-one-out jackknife procedure.
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Table A.3 – Present contributions and randomMPCR in the past: tobit regressions
Dep. variable: contribution in round t
Model: M1 M2 M3 M4
Treatment: HetR HetR HomR HomR
Intercept 1.241c 0.221 3.724b 3.220
(0.681) (1.214) (1.634) (2.508)
1[α¯t−1] 0.453 0.174 -0.660 -1.006
(0.379) (0.888) (0.954) (1.487)
Freq(α¯)(1;t−2) — 0.064 — 0.612
(1.376) (2.530)
1[α¯t−1]× Freq(α¯)(1;t−2) — 0.912 — 0.195
(1.498) (2.956)
Round (dummy variables):
3 -0.800 — -0.319 —
(0.588) (0.574)
4 -0.922 -0.091 -1.175 -0.786
(0.599) (0.496) (0.763) (0.726)
5 -1.396c -0.599 -2.292b -1.957c
(0.669) (0.529) (0.937) (0.973)
6 -1.965b -1.159 -2.321b -1.984c
(0.800) (0.753) (0.828) (1.020)
7 -2.439b -1.669c -3.317a -2.984b
(0.920) (0.885) (0.948) (1.194)
8 -3.395a -2.635a -3.882a -3.518a
(1.035) (0.869) (0.931) (1.189)
9 -3.247a -2.460a -5.349a -4.973a
(0.844) (0.521) (1.326) (1.673)
10 -5.179a -4.466a -7.622a -7.294a
(1.072) (0.747) (1.499) (1.844)
1[Prosocial] 3.082a 3.100a 1.574 1.636
(0.570) (0.668) (1.427) (1.479)
GP score 0.002 0.002 0.018 0.016
(0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
N (total/left-/right-censored) 612/280/23 544/264/20 648/248/75 576/236/61
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.012
Note. Estimates from double-censored tobit regressions. a/b/c indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Observations come from rounds 2-10 in M1 andM3, and from rounds 3-10 in M2 andM4. Residuals are clustered at the
group level (17 clusters in HetR, 18 clusters in HomR), standard errors are computed using the leave-one-out jackknife
procedure.
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A.11 Econometric support for footnote 28
Table A.4 – Econometric analysis of behavior in the repeated baseline VCM game
Dep. variable: contribution in round t
Model: OLS Double-censored tobit
Intercept 3.334a 2.975b
(0.647) (1.247)
Round (dummy variables):
2 -0.792b -1.047c
(0.351) (0.567)
3 -.931b -1.644b
(0.407) (0.751)
4 -1.472a -2.480b
(0.479) (0.932)
5 -1.389a -2.573a
(0.310) (0.624)
6 -1.986a -3.801a
(0.315) (0.803)
7 -2.111a -4.290a
(0.445) (1.102)
8 -2.222a -4.559a
(0 .405) (0.993)
9 -2.597a -5.693a
(0.405) (1.145)
10 -2.583a -5.791a
(0.428) (1.025)
1[Prosocial] 0.826b 1.614c
(0.379) (0.792)
GP score -0.002 -0.012
(0.007) (0.016)
N (total/left-/right-censored) 720/—/— 720/373/24
R2 0.109 —
Prob > F/Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000
Note. a/b/c indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Observations come from all 10 rounds of the
game. Residuals are clustered at the group level (18 clusters), standard errors are computed using the leave-one-out
jackknife procedure.
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Chapter 3
Competition for the Greater Good:
Does competition for a better access
improve public goods provision?1
3.1 Introduction
In the Public Good Game, agents have the opportunity either to cooperate, by contribut-
ing to a public good, or to free-ride. This game makes salient the conflict - inherent
to every social dilemma (Olson, 1965) - between individual and collective interests.
This conflict leads to inefficiency: a situation in which social welfare is not maximized.
One way to mitigate the underprovision of public goods is to give agents incentives
to contribute to the public good. Different mechanisms have been tested so far (for a
review, see Chaudhuri, 2011).
In this paper, I investigate in the laboratory the effects of within-group competition on
contributions to the public good.2 In the incentivized Rank Order Tournaments, agents
compete - through their individual contribution to the public good - for a higher return
1This chapter is single-authored.
2Since the pioneering work of Lazear and Rosen (1981), economists know that one way to incite agents
to provide effort is through contest. Many experiments have implemented contest in the laboratory (e.g.
Bull et al., 1987; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) or in the field (e.g. Erev et al., 1993) and have provided
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of the public good, in others words a higher Marginal Per Capita Return (hereafter
MPCR). The rank in the competition - and therefore the MPCR - depends on how one’s
contribution ranks within the group. The aim of these mechanisms is to encourage
agents to contribute to the public goods by giving them (i) a monetary incentive to
contribute and by (ii) stimulating their competitive spirit.
In natural settings, an agent’s return of a public good may depend on her effort provided.
As already mentioned by Dawes et al. (1986), this logic exists in political or union
elections. Most often, lobbyists fund or actively support candidates in order to benefit
from future policies. The most important a donor, the more likely elected members will
consider her opinion when making their policies. Every supporting citizen/worker
benefits from the aid of the lobbyists because it helps their favourite candidate to be
elected. In this way, fundraising campaigns can be seen as public goods in which the
most important donors get a premium access, i.e. a higher return from the public good.
In the same vein, Kickstarter, since its creation, has enabled to fund 160680 projects and
more than USD 4.2 billion in donations were raised according to their statistics on the
4th of April 2019. Crowdfunding campaigns, such as organized by Kickstarter, use a
mechanism based on rewards to push agents to contribute to the public good: the higher
the contributions, the better the rewards.
Articles have already investigated different forms of mechanism based on competition
on public goods provision. Competition can be informative (e.g. Andreoni, 1995; Niki-
forakis, 2010) such as agents get feedback about the rank of their contribution or the rank
of their earnings. Competition can also be material. Agents can win a fixed prize through
a lottery based on a Tullock contest (e.g. Morgan and Sefton, 2000; Goeree et al., 2005;
Corazzini et al., 2010), an all-pay auction (e.g. Goeree et al., 2005; Corazzini et al., 2010),
or a Rank Order Tournament (e.g. Dickinson and Isaac, 1998; Irlenbusch and Ruchala,
2008). Finally competition can be between two teams for a fixed prize (e.g. Rapoport
and Bornstein, 1987; Rapoport et al., 1989), or for a higher MPCR (e.g. Tan and Bolle,
evidence in that direction (for a review, see Dechenaux et al., 2015). By giving a prize to the more productive
agents, tournaments incite them to provide more efforts than their counterparts.
138
2007; Cárdenas and Mantilla, 2015). These papers find a positive effect of competition
on public goods provision as long as competition is monetary incentivized.
The closest paper to this study has been written by Angelovski et al. (2017). In their
paper, the authors implement for the first time a Rank Order Tournament within groups
with relative prizes in a public good game context. Precisely, every agent benefits from
a different MPCR depending on how their contribution ranks within the group. The
higher the rank of the contribution, the higher the MPCR. They find that Rank Order
Tournament increases contributions to the public good. In order to provide new insights
on the effects of competition within a group, I extend this experiment.
In contrast to Angelovski et al. (2017), I assume that Rank Order Tournaments are
intertwined with inequalities. In their Rank Order Tournament, in case of ties, the
prize is shared between tied members, i.e. equal contributions lead to equal payoffs. In
the present paper, in the incentivized Rank Order Tournaments, MPCRs are randomly
assigned with equal chances for every tied member.3 Agents who provide ex ante the
same effort do not get the same ex post payoff in my experiment. My assumption is that
the inequalities caused by the incentivized Rank Order Tournaments can mitigate the
positive effect of monetary incentives.
I also run two additional treatments. In numerous situations, there is only a single
premium member, i.e. every agent but one gets the same return. One can think about
the "Most Valuable Player" award in sport. From a theoretical point of view, this new
treatment is a Single-Relative-Prize Rank Order Tournament, when the original one can be
seen as aMultiple-Relative-PrizeRankOrder Tournament. These two treatments propose a
different trade-off between risk and rewards. In the Single Prize Rank Order Tournament,
only the top contributor in the group gets a high MPCR: agents have a lower probability
to have a higher MPCR, but this MPCR is higher than in the Multiple Prize Rank Order
Tournament. Importantly, this treatment also exacerbates the potential inequalities in
3This choice can be seen as an imperfect scrutiny of the central authority. Between several players who
exert the same level effort, the central authority observes every effort with a negligible bias - such as it
certainly does not affect the ranking of the agents who exert a different level of effort - that leads to a
ranking with no ties.
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ex post payoffs. These two treatments are compared to a Rank Order Tournament with
no monetary prize. In this treatment, agents get the same MPCR whatever the rank of
their contribution. This game is similar to the standard linear Public Good Game with
additional information about the rank of the contributions of every group member. This
treatment allowsme to study if incentivized Rank Order Tournament triggers an increase
in efficiency with respect to the standard way to privately provide public goods.4
The aggregated return of the public good (i.e. the sum of MPCR) is kept constant
across treatments, and every treatment maintains the social dilemma paradigm with
a null provision of the public good as a Nash Equilibrium. Theoretically, I show that
in the Multiple Prize Rank Order Tournament and in the Single Prize Rank Order
Tournament, there is a large set of other group members’ contributions for which the
best response of a self-interested and rational agent is to contribute a non null amount.
In these treatments, if agents expect that other group members will contribute a positive
amount, their best response is to contribute a positive amount to maximize their payoff
in more than 99.86% of the cases. In the No-Prize Rank Order Tournament, the best
response is to contribute nothing to the public good whatever the beliefs about other
group members contributions. My research hypothesis is that incentivized Rank Order
Tournaments will lead to higher contributions in comparison to the No Prize Rank
Order Tournament. I also compute the best response of an inequality averse agent
across treatments. In this case, monetary incentives can backfire. Specially, the Single
Prize Rank Order Tournament can be less efficient than the Multiple Prize Rank Order
Tournament because of the potential inequalities caused by this treatment.
In order to test these research hypotheses, I develop a laboratory experiment. This
method allows me to have a high control on the task, maintaining homogeneous the
cost of effort and the endowment of every agent, and presenting the same set of choices
for every agent. I find mixed evidence. Regarding efficiency, the Multiple Prize Rank
4I do not choose to run a standard Public Good Game for two reasons. First, I assume that incentivzed
Rank Order Tournament may have two effects: a monetary effect and a image effect. I control for this image
effect by introducing Rank Order Tournament in the standard mechanism. Second, this choice allows me to
keep the instructions constant across treatments. It limits noise due to difference in comprehension between
treatments.
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Order Tournament leads to higher aggregated contributions than the No Prize Rank
Order Tournament when considering the fifteen periods, but aggregated contributions
are not significantly different in the Single Prize Rank Order Tournament with respect
to the No Prize Rank Order Tournament. Regarding inequalities, even if Rank Order
Tournaments imply inequalities in MPCR, I find that inequalities in payoffs are not
different in the Multiple Prize Rank Order Tournament with respect to the No Prize
Rank Order Tournament. The Single Prize Rank Order Tournament triggers large
inequalities in payoffs. Regarding the effect of time, contributions decrease over time.
I additionally compare the two incentivized Rank Order Tournaments to two control
conditions in which the rank of the agents is randomly attributed and is independent
from individual contributions to the public good. I do that for two reasons. First, the
difference between the No-Prize Rank Order Tournament and the incentivized Rank
Order Tournaments may be due to uncertainty or by heterogeneity in MPCR. I reject
this assumption by finding no difference in efficiency between the No-Prize Rank Order
Tournament and the two controls. Second, I compare public good games in which prizes
are randomly attributed and the incentivized Rank Order Tournaments. I find that
incentivized Rank Order Tournaments outperform a situation with randomly attributed
premium positions only when there is a single prize.
3.2 Related literature
In this section, I first present the articles studying competition as a way to improve
public goods provision and then I distinguish this study from the article of Angelovski
et al. (2017).
3.2.1 Competition mechanism
Competition in the laboratory is most often centralized - a central authority observes
individual or groups contributions and rewards the winning player or the winning team.
Numerous mechanisms, for example, incite agents to contribute by rewarding the top
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contributor. Rewards can be fixed prizes, perceived as premiums. In Dickinson and Isaac
(1998), as agents are heterogeneously endowed, the authors study the effects of a reward
that is attributed either to the relative top contributor (i.e. the subject with the higher
share of endowment contributed) or to the absolute top contributor. They find that
the two treatments with competition outperform the standard Voluntary Contribution
Mechanism (hereafter VCM). Furthermore, the gain in contributions is higher than the
cost of the prize such as these mechanisms can be self-funded.
Competition between teams may also lead to an increase in cooperation. Such topic has
been carefully studied since the seminal paper of Rapoport and Bornstein (1987). The
authors created the Intergroup Public Good in which two teams - through the sum of
contributions - compete for a prize. The losing team gets nothing while the winner team
gets the prize. In case of tied contributions, teams share the prize. Contributions are
costly such as the Pareto dominant situation is that both teams contribute nothing and
share the prize. This game has been tested in Bornstein and Rapoport (1988); Rapoport
et al. (1989); Bornstein et al. (1989).The authors find that contributions increase in pres-
ence of competition and that communication also increases competition and therefore
contributions. Finally, with a variation of the game, the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma,
Bornstein and Erev (1994) show that competition motivates subjects to contribute. In a
field experiment, Erev et al. (1993) investigate the level of efficiency obtained after the
implementation of three incentives schemes. In this experiment, four subjects have to
gather oranges and are paid either depending on the performance of the group (TEAM),
on their own performance (PERSONAL) or depending on their relative performance
within the group (COMPETITION). Precisely, in the last treatment, the two best contrib-
utors receive a bonus payment when the two lower contributors receive no bonus. They
find that COMPETITION and PERSONAL treatments outperform the TEAM treatment
and perform equally well. Other games, based on VCMs, exist with between-groups
competition. In Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006); Burton-Chellew et al. (2010),
groups, through their aggregated contributions, compete for a fixed prize; in Tan and
Bolle (2007); Cárdenas and Mantilla (2015), they compete for a higher MPCR; in Pu-
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urtinen and Mappes (2009); Markussen et al. (2014), they compete for positive money
transfers from other agents and in Reuben and Tyran (2010) they compete to avoid a
fee. In all these articles, competition, as long as it is monetary incentivized, promotes
contributions.5
Other kinds of mechanism based on within-group contributions’ ranking have been
tested. Morgan (2000) first shows theoretically that Tullock fixed-prize lotteries should
improve contributions to the public good. Morgan and Sefton (2000) test it in the
laboratory and confirm the theoretical result. In their experiment, agents contribute by
purchasing tickets and have a proportional chance to win the fixed prize. They find
that the net quantity of money due to the sales of tickets bought balances the prize.
Goeree et al. (2005) have shown that using all-pay auctions to fund public goods leads
to higher contributions than using lotteries or winner-pay auctions. This study has
been extended by Corazzini et al. (2010) with agents with heterogeneous endowment.
They compare all-pay auctions and Tullock contest to a VCM with a heterogeneous
population. They find that lottery performs slightly better than all-pay auctions and that
both mechanisms outperform the VCM. In all treatments, they find that subjects with
a high endowment contribute more, and that this effect is even more important with
a fixed prize. In Faravelli and Stanca (2014), the authors find that lotteries and all-pay
auctions are both equally efficient to raise funds. In a heterogeneous environment,
Faravelli and Stanca (2012) show that single-prize all-pay auctions perform better than
multiple-prize all-pay auctions but that the participation is higher with multiple prizes.
Single-prize auctions lead to an increase in contributions of high endowed agents while
multiple-prize auctions do not trigger more contributions of low endowed agents. In
Croson et al. (2015), the agent with the lowest contribution is systematically excluded
from the public good - in other words, her MPCR for the round is equal to 0. The authors
5What must be noticed is the change in equilibrium depending on the prize. A fixed prize associated
with a lottery (e.g. Burton-Chellew et al., 2010; Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport, 2006) leads to a situation
with positive contributions as a Nash Equilibrium. In Cárdenas and Mantilla (2015) and in Reuben and
Tyran (2010), there is a Pareto-dominant Equilibrium.
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show that excludability is associated with a large increase in contributions in the long
run.
Finally, competition with no monetary rewards exists. In Cabrera et al. (2013), agents
are grouped according to their previous contribution level. The top contributors are in
the "first league" when the low contributors are in the "second league". They find that
this mechanism increases contribution in the two leagues with respect to a standard
VCM. In Nikiforakis (2010), agents have a detailed feedback either about every group
member’s earnings or about every group member’s contribution. Subjects tend to be less
cooperative when they have information about earnings in comparison to the situation
in which they have information about contributions. Andreoni (1995) tests, among
others, two treatments: one standard VCM and one standard VCM with feedback about
the rank of earnings and finally find a negative effect of feedback on contributions.
Taking together, this literature suggests that competition leads to higher efficiency than
the standard VCM. Two effects can explain this result: competition can lead to monetary
rewards and therefore give an incentive to subjects to contribute, or competition can
stimulate contributions through image.
3.2.2 This study
To the best of my knowledge, Angelovski et al. (2017) was the first to study within-group
competition with relative rewards.6 They implement a mechanism - a Multiple Prize
Rank Order Tournament - such as the rank of the contribution in a round impacts the
MPCR an agent gets for this round. The top contributor - the group member with the
highest contribution - gets a MPCR equals to 0.65, the second best contributor gets a
6Recently, Colasante et al. (2019) investigate the effect of within-group competition. The authors study
contributions to the public good in three environments: two Rank Order Tournaments and a standard
Public Good Game. They vary the risk in the two Rank Order Tournaments by modifying the variation
in MPCR. As in Angelovski et al. (2017), the prize is shared between subjects who contribute the same
amount. They find that (i) Rank Order Tournaments increase contributions to the public good with respect
to the standard mechanism, (ii) that the riskier treatment, the treatment with the largest variation in ex post
MPCRs, leads to the higher level of contributions. This paper (i) does not use the same calibration than us,
(ii) does not focus their theoretical framework on other-regarding preferences, (iii) uses a rule of "sharing
the prize" in case of tied contributions, (iiii) does not consider in their baseline treatment a Rank Order
Tournament framework.
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MPCR equals to 0.55, the third one gets a MPCR equals to 0.45 and finally the last one
gets a MPCR equals to 0.35. They find that within-group competition increases the
private provision of public goods.
Using the same calibration, I replicate their Multiple Prize Rank Order Tournament
treatment with an important difference. In the original Rank Order Tournament, in case
of tied contributions, an average value of the MPCR is applied to every tied member.
In my experiment, in the incentivized Rank Order Tournaments, MPCRs are randomly
assignedwith equal chances for every tiedmember. In these treatments, if agents provide
ex ante the same effort, they will not have the same ex post payoff. My assumption is that
the inequalities caused by the incentivized Rank Order Tournaments can mitigate the
positive effect of monetary incentives.
I also implement a new mechanism: a Single Prize Rank Order Tournament. In this
mechanism, there is a unique prize. Only the top contributor gets a premium access
associated with a MPCR equals to 0.95. Every other agents gets a return of 0.35. I
develop this mechanism to study the trade-off between risk and rewards: In SP-ROT,
members have a smaller chance to win the prize, but the prize is more rewarding. Note
that, two contributors cannot reach a cooperation equilibrium in the Single Prize Rank
Order Tournament treatment in a one shot.7 This feature is important and may explain
why agents contribute in Multiple Prize Rank Order Tournament. Additionally, this
treatment is likely to triggers larger inequalities with respect to the Multiple Prize Rank
Order Tournament and may lead to lower contributions for inequality averse agents. I
discuss this question in Section 3.3.3.2.
I also differentiate from Angelovski et al. (2017) in the comparison I choose to make.
I compare the two treatments not only to two control conditions in which ranks are
randomly attributed but also to the standard VCM with a Rank Order Tournament with
7In Angelovski et al. (2017), if exactly two agents contribute their full endowment, they have a final
payoff of 60 tokens, higher than their initial endowment of 50 tokens. In my version of the MP-ROT, in the
same situation, the payoff of the highest contributor who has been randomly selected is equal to 65 tokens,
when the other contributor gets a final payoff of 55 tokens. In the Single Prize Rank Order Tournament
treatment I propose to implement, in the same situation, the two contributors would have a payoff of
80 tokens and 40 tokens, such as one contributor would have lost 10 tokens in comparison to her initial
endowment.
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no reward (called No Prize Rank Order Tournament) in order to see how efficient are
the incentivized Rank Order Tournaments in comparison to the standard one.8
3.3 Games, Calibration and Predictions
3.3.1 Rank Order Tournaments
In the standard VCM, N subjects are endowed with e tokens and have the possibility
to contribute a part c, between 0 and e, of their endowment to the public good. Every
token contributed to the public good yields a Marginal Per Capita Return of α token to
every group member. Every token not contributed by an agent is saved on a private
account and yields exactly one token to this agent. In this game, the Nash Equilibrium is
a situation in which no agents contribute to the public good (because the return of the
public good α is lower than return of the private account: α < 1 ) while social welfare
is maximized when every agent contributes her whole endowment to the public good.
Decisions about the amount to contribute are made simultaneously and privately, such
as agents ignore the choice made by their counterparts. The payoff function of agent i
can be written as follows:
Πi(ci) = (e− ci) + α
n
∑
k=1
ck (3.1)
In Rank Order Tournaments, agents’ contributions are ranked from the highest (which
ranks 1) to the lowest (which ranks N). The payoff system described below is common
knowledge. Agents know that the top contributor will receive a MPCR equals to α1, the
second best contributor will receive a MPCR equals to α2, . . . , and the bottom contributor
will receive a MPCR equals to αN . In case of tied contributions, α is randomly attributed
between the tied contributors. Finally, the payoff function of agent i is the following:
8The control condition chosen by Angelovski et al. (2017) was in line with their motivating example: in
their paper, the authors propose as an illustration for their mechanism the organ donation system, in which
the recipient is randomly chosen.
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Πi(ci) =


(e− ci) + α
1 ∑
N
k=1 ck if ci = max (c1, c2, ..., cN) and ∀j 6= i|cj = ci ; ǫi = max
k={i;j}
{ek}
...
(e− ci) + α
N ∑
N
k=1 ck if ci = min (c1, c2, ..., cN) and ∀j 6= i|cj = ci ; ǫi = min
k={i;j}
{ek}
(3.2)
(α1, ..., αN) take different values depending on the treatment. In the No Prize Rank
Order Tournament (hereafter NP-ROT), the MPCR does not depend on the rank of the
contribution: α1 = ... = αN . In the Single Prize Rank Order Tournament (hereafter
SP-ROT), α1 > α2 = ... = αN . The top contributor gets a high MPCR, and every other
agent gets the same MPCR. In the Multiple Prize Rank Order Tournament (hereafter
MP-ROT), agents know that α1 > α2 > ... > αN . (α1, ..., αN) are chosen across treatments
such that the aggregated return of the public good (i.e. the sum of α) is identical in every
treatment and in order to maintain a social dilemma.
3.3.2 Control Conditions
One may wonder if ex post inequalities in MPCR and imperfect information about the
value of the MPCR may explain differences in results other than those attributed to Rank
Order Tournaments. In order to deal with these points, I run two additional control
conditions: a Single-Prize Control (hereafter SP-CTL) and a Multiple-Prize Control
(hereafter MP-CTL). In these control conditions, agents have to choose how many tokens
they want to contribute to the public good. They know that a rank - between 1 and N
- will be randomly attributed to each of them after that they make their decision. Two
agents cannot be assigned the same rank. In SP-CTL, the agent with rank 1 will benefit
from a MPCR equals to α1 and every other agents will benefit from the same MPCR,
lower than α1: α1 > α2 = ... = αN . The values (α1, ..., αN) are known by the subjects and
are equal to the MPCR values in SP-ROT. In MP-CTL, an agent with the rank i will have
a MPCR equals to αi. Agents know the values of (α1, ..., αN). In MP-CTL, (α1,...,αN) are
the same than in MP-ROT.
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3.3.3 Predictions
3.3.3.1 Predictions with no other-regarding preferences
Table 3.1 – Calibration of the MPCR depending on the treatment
Treatments MP-ROT SP-ROT NP-ROT MP-CTL SP-CTL
α1 = 0.65 α1 = 0.95 α1 = 0.5 α1 = 0.65 α1 = 0.95
Value α2 = 0.55 α2 = 0.35 α2 = 0.5 α2 = 0.55 α2 = 0.35
of α α3 = 0.45 α3 = 0.35 α3 = 0.5 α3 = 0.45 α3 = 0.35
α4 = 0.35 α4 = 0.35 α4 = 0.5 α4 = 0.35 α4 = 0.35
Note. α1, α2, α3, α4 represent the respective MPCR of the agent who ranks 1, 2, 3, and 4. In the Rank Order Tournament
treatments (-ROT), the rank of an agent depends on how her contribution ranks within the group. In the control
conditions (-CTL), the rank is randomly attributed.
In the present experiment, I use the calibration (which is common knowledge) presented
in Table 3.1. Each group is composed of four agents endowed with 50 ECU.9 In every
treatment, every token contributed to the public good is multiplied by two and redis-
tributed. The redistribution rule differs across treatments. Consequently, ex post payoffs
may be different across treatments for the same set of contributions.
In NP-ROT, MP-CTL and SP-CTL, the payoff function of agent i is decreasing in ci
whatever the average contribution value of the other group members (c¯). In other words,
the more an agent contributes to the public good ceteris paribus, the less her payoff. It
is not necessarily the case in SP-ROT and in MP-ROT. I depict, for instance, the payoff
function of agent i depending on her contribution in every Rank Order Tournament
treatment in Figure 3.1 when one group member contributes 10 tokens, another group
member contributes 20 tokens and the last group member contributes 30 tokens to the
public good.
In SP-ROT, given the value of α1 and αi (∀i 6= 1), the sum of other group members con-
tributions and the highest contribution among other group members, there potentially
exist up to two local maxima in the payoff function (Equation 3.2), namely c∗i = 0 and
9The calibration chosen for NP-ROT has been already used in different articles (e.g. Andreoni, 1990;
Buckley and Croson, 2006). The calibration chosen for MP-ROT is the same as in Angelovski et al. (2017).
The calibration chosen for SP-ROT is such as the low MPCR is identical as in MP-ROT. In SP-ROT and in
MP-ROT, agents have the same interest to free-ride.
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other group members.12 I observe that the average best responses are lower in MP-ROT
than in SP-ROT. This result can be easily explained. In MP-ROT, you may benefit to
not rank 1, because the cost of ranking 1 is larger than the benefit of ranking 2, 3 or 4
(it happens in 22.77% of the cases). In SP-ROT, the best response is the contribution
associated to rank 1 in more than 99.7% of the cases. A positive contribution is the best
response in more than 99.93% of the cases (132563 out of 132651 of the possible sets of
contributions) in MP-ROT and in more than 99.86% of the cases (132475 out of 132651 of
the possible sets of contributions) in SP-ROT.
Figure 3.2 – Average best responses in MP-ROT, in SP-ROT and in NP-ROT depending on the
other group members average contribution
Note that, in every treatment, the best response of a rational and self-interested agents is
to contribute nothing when every other group member contributes their whole endow-
12In this project, I do not work only with the average contribution of other group members because
this average value does not give the contribution of every agent and therefore their rank. Instead, I work
with the set of contributions. I compute every combination of (c1, c2, c3) and determine for each of the
132651 combinations the best response depending on the contributions and the rank associated in the
two treatments. I then compute an average best response for each average value of other group members
contribution.
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ment. It leads me to the following research hypothesis.
Research hypothesis - Self-Interested: If agents expect positive contributions from other
group members, the ranking of contributions should be:
SP-ROT >MP-ROT > NP-ROT = SP-CTL = MP-CTL.
3.3.3.2 Theoretical predictions using ERC framework (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000)
In Figure 3.3, I plot the average GINI index values when a rational and self-interested
agent plays her best response. Best responses are associated with larger inequalities in
SP-ROT than inMP-ROT. I assume that the inequalities driven by the different treatments
are likely to influence the contribution behaviour.13
Figure 3.3 – Average GINI index value associated with average best response of a rational and
self-interest agent in MP-ROT and in SP-ROT
13Another valid approach would have been to focus on an agent’s risk preferences. No model linking
other-regarding preferences and risk preferences is unanimously approved. Since (i) agents evolve in
a group and (ii) a standard way of explaining contributions to the public good game is based on other-
regarding preferences, I have favoured an approach based on inequality aversion.
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In the Equality, Reciprocity and Competition (ERC) framework, built by Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000), the utility function of an agent depends not only on her payoff but also
on the relative inequalities. Utility increases when πi (i’s payoff) increases but decreases
as the distance between πi and
πi
Π
(Π represents the sum of payoffs within the group)
increases. The utility function can be written as follows:
Ui = Vi
(
πi,
πi
Π
)
(3.3)
In the specific context of a four-player VCM, I adapt the method developed by Fis-
chbacher et al. (2014) and used in Théroude and Zylbersztejn (2019). I use the following
additively separable utility function:
Ui(πi) = πi − νi ×
(
πi
πi + ∑j 6=i πj
−
1
4
)2
(3.4)
with πi and πj defined in Equation 3.2. νi represents a measure of inequality aversion.
Note that, in this model, agents are as averse to disadvantageous inequalities as to
advantageous inequalities.
The decision maker considers every possible set of other group members contributions.
She then is able to find the contribution that maximizes her utility for every set of
contributions. In simulations, I derive her average best response for every other group
members average contribution using three levels of risk aversion: νi = 250, νi = 2500
and νi = 25000 . I plot these simulations in Figure 3.4.
What I observe is that inequality aversion leads to several effects. First of all, in NP-ROT,
when an agent’s inequality aversion goes beyond a threshold, her average best response
increases when other average group members contribution increases. This agent does
not accept to be richer than the other group members and therefore contributes to the
public good. Second, in incentivized Rank Order Tournaments, agents with a low level
of inequality aversion contribute more than self-interested agents. It is explained by the
fact that being the top contributor leads to too large inequalities. Consequently, her best
response is to overcontribute (i.e. to contribute a higher amount than what maximize
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Figure 3.4 – Average best responses of an inequality averse agent in MP-ROT, in SP-ROT and in
NP-ROT depending on other group members average contribution
(i) ν = 250 (ii) ν = 2500
(iii) ν = 25000
her payoff) in order to decrease inequalities. However, beyond a threshold, inequality
aversion decreases the average best response. This effect is even more important in
SP-ROT in which inequalities can be important for a high best response. For instance,
when ν = 25000, there is a large number of other group members average contribution
for which the average best response is equal or higher in NP-ROT than in SP-ROT. Even
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if MP-ROT leads to inequalities in MPCR, average best responses are higher in MP-ROT
than in NP-ROT because the monetary gain is higher than the loss due to inequalities.14
Finally, given the theoretical predictions I compute and the results of Angelovski et al.
(2017), I assume that there will be higher contributions in the Rank Order Tournaments
with relative rewards than in the NP-ROT and than in the two control conditions. Fol-
lowing the result of Fischbacher et al. (2014), I also assume that a competitive risk - a
risk such as it certainly creates ex post inequalities in MPCRs - is likely to trigger lower
contributions in the control conditions with respect to NP-ROT. Regarding MP-ROT and
SP-ROT, two kinds of evidence go one against another with respect to the contributions.
If I consider a self-interested agent, contributions should be higher in SP-ROT than in
MP-ROT. However, when introducing other-regarding preferences, this statement may
not hold because of the inequalities present in SP-ROT.
Research hypothesis 2 - including other-regarding preferences: The ranking of contri-
butions should be: MP-ROT ?= SP-ROT > NP-ROT >MP-CTL ≥ SP-CTL.
3.4 Experimental Procedures
Eleven sessions were run between June and December 2018 in the GATE-Lab. Subjects
(49% males, average age 21.25), who had registered in hroot Bock et al. (2014), were
recruited. 56 subjects (in 14 groups) participated in MP-ROT, 36 subjects (in 9 groups)
participated in SP-ROT and 40 subjects participated (in 10 groups) in NP-ROT, MP-CTL
and SP-CTL. All experimental treatments were computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). Experiments lasted between one hour and one hour and half. The average payoff
was e15.8. This payoff included a e5 show-up fee and the payoff earned during the
experiment.
14Average best response is an indicator. The proportion of best response equal or higher in a treatment
with respect to another is a complementary indicator. When ν = 25000, best responses are equal or higher
in MP-ROT than in SP-ROT in 89.5% of the possible sets of contributions. Best responses are equal or higher
in NP-ROT than in SP-ROT in 45.71% of the possible sets of contributions. Best responses are equal or
higher in MP-ROT than in NP-ROT in 99.13% of the possible sets of contributions.
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I invited only subjects who had never participated in Public Good Games experiments
in order to avoid observing behaviours contaminated by previous experiments. Subjects
came to the laboratory and were randomly assigned to a computer. Instructions were
first read aloud.15 Then subjects read them alone, quietly and had the possibility to
privately ask any question to the experimenter. The instructions were neutrally framed:
every agent had the possibility to invest in a common group account. When they finished
to read the instructions, they were asked to fill an understanding questionnaire about
the experiment. Once every subject completed the questionnaire, the experiment began.
The experiment consisted on a unique fifteen-period game. The game differed across
treatments (either MP-ROT, SP-ROT, NP-ROT, MP-CTL or SP-CTL). Treatments were
introduced in a between-subjects manner. At the beginning of the game, subjects were
randomly matched in groups of four. Agents interacted with the same group during
the whole experiment (this was common knowledge). The partner matching protocol
allowed subjects to have information about other subjects’ choices and to adapt their
strategy over time. In every period, agents had to choose their contribution to the public
good. Their contribution level should be an integer value. They had the possibility to
enter four virtual contributions in a simulator in order to know their potential payoff
associated with such contributions. At the end of each period, subjects received an
individual feedback reminding them their level of contribution, giving them their rank,
their MPCR, and detailing their potential gain for this period separating earnings from
the public account and from the private account. Additionally, they were informed
about the individual contribution of every group member and the rank associated to
each contribution.16 Contributions were anonymous. One period was randomly and
independently selected to determine every agent final payoff.
15Instructions translated in English are provided in Appendix A.2.
16I assume that being informed about individual contribution may lead to more efficiency in this frame-
work. Indeed, agents know what are the contributions and may react accordingly. It may allow for more
coordination even in a VCM. Sell and Wilson (1991) find that feedback at the individual level increases
efficiency when Croson (2001) andWeimann (1994) find no significant differences. Moreover, for an external
validity concern, such feedback may be obtained in a employee of the month contest.
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At the end of the game, after knowing their final earnings, agents were asked to complete
a small questionnaire with Likert scales about their understanding of the game, the
clarity of the instructions, the fairness of the mechanism they coped with and how nice
they thought it was to contribute to the public good.
3.5 Results
In this section, I present the results of the experiment, focusing on three different aspects:
efficiency, inequalities and sustainability.17 These three aspects of the game are important
for the decision maker. Do agents contribute? Do mechanisms generate inequalities? Do
contributions decay over time?
3.5.1 Efficiency
Table 3.2 – Descriptive statistics: Contributions by treatment
Dep. variable: Contributions over the fifteen periods
Quartiles
Mean Standard Deviation 25% 50% 75%
MP-ROT 26.914 20.073 5.5 27 50
SP-ROT 23.383 22.983 0 18.5 50
NP-ROT 19.39 18.681 0 15 35
MP-CTL 22.05 14.454 10 20 30
SP-CTL 16.123 16.131 2 10 25
I measure efficiency as the average contribution within groups. I compute in Table 3.2
the mean contribution, the standard deviation and the quartile contributions in each
treatment. Looking at average contributions, I observe that the efficiency ranking is
slightly different from the one of my first research hypothesis: as predicted, contributions
are higher in the incentivized Rank Order Tournaments, but are higher in MP-ROT than
in SP-ROT. As I provide theoretical insights predicting that contributions should be
higher in the incentivized Rank Order Tournament, I use one-tailed tests in this section
17Additional evidence for each result is provided in Appendix A.1.
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when I compare incentivized Rank Order Tournaments to the other treatments.
Result 1 - Effects of Monetary Incentives: When considering the fifteen periods, (i)
I find that efficiency is higher in MP-ROT than in NP-ROT but (ii) I find no increase
in efficiency in SP-ROT with respect to NP-ROT. Efficiency is not different in the two
incentivized Rank Order Tournament treatments.
Support. At first glance, Figure 3.5 seems to indicate higher contributions in both
MP-ROT and SP-ROT with respect to NP-ROT. Using pairwise comparisons based on
Wilcoxon ranksum test, I reject the null hypothesis that the groups average contributions
over the fifteen periods come from the same distribution when comparing MP-ROT and
NP-ROT (one-tailed test, p-value = 0.051), but I do not reject the null hypothesis when
comparing SP-ROT and NP-ROT (one-tailed test, p-value = 0.111). Using a Wilcoxon
ranksum test, I also do not reject the null hypothesis when comparing MP-ROT and
SP-ROT (two-tailed test, p-value = 0.4128). 
One can argue that the differences in efficiency between MP-ROT and NP-ROT can be
due to heterogeneity in MPCR and to uncertainty about MPCR when the agents make
their decision. To tackle this question, I compare efficiency in NP-ROT to efficiency in
MP-CTL and in SP-CTL. In the two control conditions, agents (i) do not know their future
MPCR when they make their decision and (ii) know that there will be heterogeneity in
MPCR when the public good will be provided.
Result 2 - No effect of uncertainty and heterogeneity in MPCRs When comparing
NP-ROT and MP-CTL and SP-CTL, I find no differences in efficiency.
Support. I plot the average contribution per period in NP-ROT, MP-CTL and SP-CTL
in Figure 3.6. Using two pairwise Wilcoxon ranksum tests, I do not reject the null
hypothesis that the groups average contributions come from the same distribution when
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Figure 3.5 – Average contribution over time across Rank Order Tournament Treatments
comparing NP-ROT and MP-CTL (two-tailed, p-value = 0.406) and when comparing
NP-ROT and SP-CTL (two-tailed, p-value = 0.326).18
This result shows that the differences observed between NP-ROT andMP-ROT is neither
due to uncertainty in MPCR nor to heterogeneity in MPCR. Taking together, Result 1
and Result 2 indicate that Rank Order Tournaments with incentives may lead to an
increase in public goods provision with respect to the standard mechanism when there
are multiple prizes. As I consider a Rank Order Tournament with no prize, I control for
the potential competitive spirit effect present in MP-ROT and in SP-ROT. The positive
effect on efficiency observed in MP-ROT with respect to NP-ROT should be mainly due
to the monetary rewards provided to the high contributors in MP-ROT. However, this
monetary reward does not increase efficiency in SP-ROT with respect to NP-ROT. I see at
least two reasons to explain this null result. First, as discussed in footnote 7, in MP-ROT,
when only two agents contribute the same amount to the public good, they are better off
than when they do not contribute. It is not the case in SP-ROT in a single period. Second,
18Interestingly, this result goes against what has been previously found in Fischbacher et al. (2014).
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Figure 3.6 – Average contribution per period across treatments: NP-ROT vs MPCTL vs SPCTL
SP-ROT may lead to high inequalities because of the distribution of ex postMPCR. Such
a question is tackled in Section 3.5.2. According to my second research hypothesis, these
inequalities may decrease the contributions of highly inequality averse agents.
Result 3 - Effects of Rank Order Tournaments: When comparing Rank Order Tourna-
ment treatments with controls in which prizes are randomly attributed, I find mixed
results. Efficiency is higher in SP-ROT with respect to SP-CTL but is not significantly
higher in MP-ROT with respect to MP-CTL.
Support. In Figure 3.7, I plot the average contribution per period comparing SP-ROT
vs SP-CTL and MP-ROT vs MP-CTL. Contributions seem higher in the Rank Order
Tournament treatments. Using pairwise comparisons based on Wilcoxon ranksum test,
(i) I reject the null hypothesis that the groups average contributions over the fifteen peri-
ods come from the same distribution (one-tailed test, p-value = 0.021) when comparing
SP-ROT and SP-CTL and (ii) I do not reject the null hypothesis that the groups average
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Figure 3.7 – Average contribution over time across environments: Rank Order Tournament
treatments vs control conditions
(i) SP-ROT vs SP-CTL (ii) MP-ROT vs MP-CTL
contributions over the fifteen period come from the same distribution (one-tailed test,
p-value = 0.121) when comparing MP-ROT and MP-CTL. 
At this stage, two points have to be mentioned. First, I find evidence that a Rank Order
Tournament with a single prize leads to higher efficiency than a game with a randomly
attributed premium access. This result indicates that Rank Order Tournament may
increase public goods provision: agents contribute more when their contribution affects
their probability to win the prize. However, when considering multiple prizes, I do
not find any effect on efficiency of a Rank Order Tournament. This result is different
from the one found by Angelovski et al. (2017). Logically, contributions in MP-ROT
(mean: 26.91) are lower in my experiment than in theirs (mean: 38.5). One reason for
such a difference is that agents, most likely, do not enjoy ex post inequalities when they
ex ante provide the same effort. This fact holds with median contribution (median: 27 vs
50). I also observe larger standard errors in my experiment (s.e: 20.07) than in the one
of Angelovski et al. (2017) (s.e: 13.8). It can also be explained by the difference in my
game. Once agents reach the full contributions situation, it creates inequalities in my
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experiment that may lead to changes in behaviours. In their experiment, when agents
reach the full contributions situation, there are no inequalities and agents are less likely
to change their contribution behaviour. What is more puzzling is the behaviour in the
control condition (MP-CTL). In their experiment, they observe lower contributions and
lower standard errors (mean: 16.4; s.e: 11.5) than in the present paper (mean: 22.05; s.e:
14.45). To the best of my knowledge, there is no difference between my control condition
and theirs. Such difference may be explained by either a different pool of subjects or by
randomness.
3.5.2 Inequalities
Figure 3.8 – Average GINI Index value per period across treatments
One important concern of the policy makers lies on inequalities. Decision-makers may
be uncomfortable with mechanisms that generate large inequalities. Additionally, in-
equalities may be detrimental because it can reduce the contribution of inequality averse
agents. I investigate the level of inequalities in every treatment. In order to do so, I
compute the GINI Index of each group for each period in every treatment. I present
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visual evidence in Figure 3.8. At first glance, inequalities seem larger in SP-ROT.
Result 4 - Inequalities: Inequalities differ across treatments. Inequalities are more im-
portant in SP-ROT.
Support. I run 3 pairwise Wilcoxon ranksum tests. I reject the null assumption that the
average GINI index per group over the fifteen periods comes from the same distribution
in MP-ROT and in SP-ROT (p-value = 0.005). I also reject the null assumption of the
Wilcoxon ranksumwhen comparing SP-ROT vs NP-ROT (p-value = 0.033). I do not reject
the null assumption of the Wilcoxon ranksum for the comparison between MP-ROT and
NP-ROT (p-value = 0.466).
Two explanation criteria may explain differences in GINI index. First, the environment
may be by nature more unequal. Second, inequalities may be due to differences in
contributions. Indeed, whatever the treatment, a null contribution within a group leads
to zero inequality and, consequently, a null value of the GINI index. In order to have
a proper idea about the reason of the inequalities observed in Figure 3.8, I present in
Table 3.3 the relation between inequalities and efficiency for every treatment. I find
that higher contributions within a group lead to higher inequalities in every treatment
(Spearman’s ρ > 0.232, p-value < 0.004). Jennrich test rejects the equality of correlation
between the sum of contributions and GINI index value in the three treatments (p-value
< 0.001). Using three pairwise Jennrich tests, I find that the correlation between the sum
of contributions and the GINI index value is significantly different when comparing
SP-ROT andMP-ROT (p-value < 0.001), when comparing MP-ROT and SP-ROT (p-value
< 0.001) and when comparing SP-ROT and NP-ROT (p-value < 0.001). I conclude that
higher contributions lead to higher inequalities in SP-ROT with respect to MP-ROT.
This effect may explain Result 1: agents may reduce their contributions to avoid large
inequalities. Such an effect goes in the same direction that the theoretical predictions I
present in Section 3.3.3.2.
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Table 3.3 – Sum of contributions and GINI index value across experimental conditions
Average
Measure: MP-ROT SP-ROT NP-ROT
Sum of contributions 108.2 95.533 77.56
GINI index value 0.067 0.127 0.076
Spearman’s ρ 0.615 0.961 0.232
3.5.3 Trend over time
One of the standard results of the public good game literature is the existence of a trend
over time in contributions. Contributions tend to decrease with time. What happens in
the different treatments?
Result 5 - Trend in contributions: In every treatment, I find a significant and negative
trend over time in contributions. In incentivized Rank Order Tournaments, this trend
is mostly due to early periods in which contributions first increase, then decrease and
finally stabilise after period 5.
Support. Using Spearman correlation, I reject in every treatment the null assumption
that contribution and period are independent (p-value < 0.005). Spearman ρ values are
negative for all treatments (ρ < -0.096). I interpret this result as a significant negative
trend of contributions over time. Interestingly, when looking at the pattern of contri-
bution, presented in Figure 3.5, there seems to have a large variation of the average
contribution in the earliest period. Consequently, I study Spearman correlation between
contribution and period for the ten final periods (period 6 to 15). I can not reject the null
assumption that the variable contribution and the variable period are independent in
MP-ROT (p-value = 0.439) and in SP-ROT (p-value = 0.295) after period 5. In NP-ROT, I
reject the null assumption (p-value = 0.078).
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One of the consequence is that efficiency is higher in the two incentivized Rank Order
Tournament treatments in the last period. When considering the fifteen and last period,
contributions seem to be more important in MP-ROT and SP-ROT (around 45%) than
in NP-ROT (around 20%). Using a Wilcoxon ranksum test, I reject the null assumption
that groups average contributions come from the same distribution when comparing
MP-ROT and NP-ROT (one-tailed test, p-value = 0.035) and when comparing SP-ROT
and NP-ROT (one-tailed test, p-value = 0.051).
3.6 Discussion and conclusion
I claim in this paper that incentivized Rank Order Tournaments may align individual
interest and social welfare. I provide some evidence that contributors may actually
benefit from contributing in Table 3.4. In this table, I show the relationship between the
rank obtained in the tournament (after that tied contribution have been ranked) and the
rank of the final payoff.19 I observe that the top contributor is more likely to be the agent
with the highest payoff in the incentivized tournaments (32.86% of the cases in MP-ROT,
66.67% of the cases in SP-ROT) in comparison to NP-ROT (3.33% of the cases in NP-ROT,
due to the ties). Moreover, the agent with the lowest contribution is less likely to be the
richest agent in the incentivized tournaments (29.05% in MP-ROT, 17.78% in SP-ROT)
with respect to NP-ROT (72.67% of the cases in NP-ROT) after that the public good has
been provided.
In this paper, (i) I replicate the paper of Angelovski et al. (2017), (ii) I introduce a
new Rank Order Tournament with a single prize (SP-ROT) and (iii) I compare these
two treatments with a Rank Order Tournament with no prize (NP-ROT). MP-ROT
leads to higher contributions than NP-ROT. SP-ROT is not more efficient than NP-ROT.
One potential explanation is that SP-ROT leads to significantly higher inequalities and
discourage agents to contribute. When comparing incentivized Rank Order Tournaments
with their control in which the prize are randomly attributed, I find that only SP-ROT
19In order to have a final payoff ranking with no ties, I add a negligible bias to every payoff that certainly
does not affect the ranking of unequal payoffs.
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Table 3.4 – Frequency of rank obtained during the tournament and rank of earnings in a period
(in%)
Final rank obtained in the tournament
Treatments: MP-ROT SP-ROT NP-ROT
Rank 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Rank 1 32.86 10 28.10 29.05 66.67 5.19 10.37 17.78 3.33 4.44 20 72.67
of 2 22.86 28.58 18.10 30.48 0.74 6.67 26.67 65.93 4.67 15.33 60.67 19.33
Final 3 12.86 42.86 30 14.29 9.63 20.74 53.33 16.30 16 66 12 6
Payoff 4 31.43 18.57 23.81 26.19 22.96 67.41 9.63 0 76 14.67 7.33 2
Note. The final rank obtained in the tournament corresponds to the rank of the contribution obtained after that the
random process applied to the tied contributions. The rank of the final payoff is equal to the rank of the final payoff
plus a insignificant noise.
outperforms its control. This result moderates the ones of Angelovski et al. (2017). When
Rank Order Tournaments certainly lead to ex post inequalities for equal contributions ex
ante, the mechanism is less efficient.
This article is a part of the large literature about Public Good Games and, precisely
sheds light on a new enhancing-efficiency mechanism. The core idea here was to test
a new mechanism that readapts the incentive scheme of the game. Outside the lab, in
order to implement this kind of mechanisms, first there is a need for a central authority
capable of observing the objective level of the effort provided. Second, there is a need
for social acceptance of the privileged status. If these conditions are completed, then the
mechanism can be easily explained and applied.
More research is needed to keep improving the state of knowledge about the effects
of competition on public goods provision. It can be a solution to counter free-riding
behaviours. This kind of mechanisms is more likely to be efficient in a world with agents
homogeneous in endowment (among others, time and money). However, I believe
that, in most situations, agents differ in endowment. It would be interesting to test
this mechanism in a heterogeneous population. The first objective is to study if this
mechanism is likely to lead to better contributions to the public good when agents are
not endowed with the same value. The second objective is to come with a potential
solution when agents are heterogeneous. A first part of the answer can be relative
competition such as implemented in Dickinson and Isaac (1998).
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A Appendix
A.1 Additional evidence
A.1.1 Result 1
In Table A.1, I run one regression comparing efficiency - through the sum of contributions
- in three treatments: MP-ROT, SP-ROT and NP-ROT. I focus on the entire game, i.e. the
fifteen periods. I find that the sum of contributions are significantly higher in MP-ROT
than in NP-ROT (one-tailed t-test, p-value = 0.053). I do not find any differences in sum
of contributions when comparing MP-ROT vs SP-ROT (two-tailed t-test, p-value = 0.375)
and when comparing SP-ROT vs NP-ROT (one-tailed t-test, p-value = 0.197).
Table A.1 – Efficiency: incentivized Rank Order Tournament vs unincentivized Rank Order
Tournament
Dep. variable: Sum of contributions within a group
Period 1-15
Intercept 77.56a
(14.364)
MP-ROT 30.64
(18.389)
SP-ROT 15.973
(18.341)
N 495
Prob > F 0.260
Note. a/b/c indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level for two-tailed tests. Dependent variable is: Sum
of contributions at the the public good level. In all the models, the set of explanatory variables includes a dummy
for MP-ROT and for SP-ROT. Every treatment is compared to NP-ROT. Residuals are clustered at the group level (33
groups). Standard errors are computed through the leave-one-out jackknife procedure.
A.1.2 Result 2
In Table A.2, I run one regression comparing efficiency - through the sum of contributions
- in three treatments: NP-ROT, MP-CTL and SP-CTL. I focus on the entire game, i.e. the
fifteen periods. Using a test of Student, I do not reject the null hypothesis that the sum
of contributions are significantly different in NP-ROT than in MP-CTL (two-tailed t-test,
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Table A.2 – Efficiency: NP-ROT vs Control Conditions
Dep. variable: Sum of contributions within a group
Period 1-15
Intercept 77.56a
(14.341)
MP-CTL 10.64
(17.702)
SP-CTL -13.18
(21.295)
N 450
Prob > F 0.451
Note. a/b/c indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level for two-tailed tests. Dependent variable is: Sum
of contributions at the the public good level. In all the models, the set of explanatory variables includes a dummy
for MP-CTL and for SP-CTL. Every treatment is compared to NP-ROT. Residuals are clustered at the group level (30
groups). Standard errors are computed through the leave-one-out jackknife procedure.
p-value = 0.552). I also do not reject the null hypothesis when I compare the sum of
contributions in NP-ROT and in SP-CTL (two-tailed t-test, p-value = 0.541).
A.1.3 Result 3
Table A.3 – Efficiency across treatments
Dep. variable: Sum of contributions within a group
Model: M1 M2
Intercept 88.2a 64.38a
(10.333) (15.583)
MP-ROT 20 -
(15.396) -
SP-ROT - 29.1533
- (19.317)
N 360 285
Prob > F 0.207 0.149
Note. a/b/c indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Dependent variable is: Sum of contributions at the
the public good level. M1 includes a dummy variable for the treatment MP-ROT. M2 includes a dummy variable for the
treatment SP-ROT. M1 is compared to MP-CTL. M2 is compared to SP-CTL. Residuals are clustered at the group level
in M1 (24 groups) and in M2 (19 groups). Standard errors are computed through the leave-one-out jackknife procedure.
In Table A.3, I run two regressions (M1,M2). In these regressions, I study the effect
of Rank Order Tournament on the sum of contributions. I compare in model M1, the
sum of contributions in MP-ROT and in MP-CTL. I do not reject the null assumption of
equality in sum of contributions in MP-ROT and MP-CTL (one-tailed t-test, p-value =
170
0.104). In model M2, I compare the sum of contributions in SP-ROT and in SP-CTL. I
reject the null assumption of equality in sum of contributions in SP-ROT and SP-CTL
(one-tailed t-test, p-value = 0.075). Contributions are higher in SP-ROT than in SP-CTL.
A.1.4 Result 4
I run a regression in Table A.4 to study the level of inequalities in the five treatments.
Results indicate that inequalities are higher in SP-ROT (t-test, p-value = 0.014) and in
SP-CTL (t-test, p-value < 0.001) than in NP-ROT. Moreover, a test of Student indicates
that inequalities are higher in MP-CTL than in MP-ROT (p-value = 0.005), are higher
in SP-ROT than in MP-ROT (p-value = 0.002), and are higher in SP-CTL than in MP-
ROT(0.001). Inequalities are higher (weakly significant, p-value <0.077) in SP-ROT and
in SP-CTL than in MP-CTL.
Table A.4 – Inequalities across treatments
Dep. variable: GINI Index in periods 1-15.
Intercept 0.076a
(0.011)
MP-ROT -.009
(.0.013)
SP-ROT 0.05b
(.020)
MP-CTL .018
(.013)
SP-CTL 0.076a
(.011)
N 795
Prob > F <0.001
Note. a/b/c indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Dependent variable is: GINI Index value at the
the public good level. In all the models, the set of explanatory variables includes the type of treatment. Every treatment
is compared to NP-ROT. Residuals are clustered at the group level (53 groups). Standard errors are computed through
the leave-one-out jackknife procedure.
In Table A.5, I run 3 regressions (M1,...,M3). In each regression, I study the effect of
the sum of contributions on GINI index depending on the treatment. I reject the null
assumption that the sum of contributions increase inequalities in the treatment MP-ROT
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(p-value < 0.001), SP-ROT (p-value < 0.001). I can not reject the null assumption in
NP-ROT (p-value = 0.755).
Table A.5 – Inequalities over efficiency
Dep. variable: GINI index
Model: M1 M2 M3
Treatment: MP-ROT SP-ROT NP-ROT
Intercept .0249a -.0140b .0682b
(.0056) (.0066) (.0237)
Sum of Contributions .0004a .0015a .0001
(.00005) (.00007) (.0002)
N 210 140 150
Prob > F <0.001 <0.001 0.755
Note. a/b/c indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Dependent variable is: Contribution to the public
good (M1-M5). In all the models, the set of explanatory variables includes: Period. Residuals are clustered at the group
level in M1(13 groups), M2(9 groups), M3(10 groups), M4(10 groups) andM5(10 groups). Standard errors are computed
through the leave-one-out jackknife procedure.
A.1.5 Result 5
In Table A.6, I run 3 regressions (M1,. . . ,M3). In each regression, I study the effect of
time (through the variable period) on contributions depending on the treatment. In the
three regressions, I find a negative effect of time on contributions. M1 focuses on the
effect of time in MP-ROT. In this treatment, I cannot reject the null assumption, namely,
there is no effect of time on contributions (t-test, p-value = 0.105). This trend is weakly
significant in SP-ROT (t-test, p-value = 0.076). In NP-ROT, the coefficient of period is
significantly different from 0 (p-value = 0.026), and contributions tend to decrease over
time.
Finally, in Table A.7, I find that the sums of contributions in period 15 are significantly
higher in MP-ROT (one-tailed t-test, p-value = 0.019) and in SP-ROT (one-tailed t-test,
p-value = 0.024) with respect to NP-ROT.
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Figure A.1 – GINI Index over Sum of contributions within a group across treatments
(a) MP-ROT (b) SP-ROT
(c) NP-ROT
Table A.6 – Trend over contributions by treatments
Dep. variable: Contributions in periods 1-15.
Model: M1 M2 M3
Treatment: MP-ROT SP-ROT NP-ROT
Intercept 31.485a 28.004a 27.546a
(2.796) (2.745) (4.725)
Period -.571 -.578c -1.019b
(.328) (0.283) (.383)
N 840 560 600
Prob > F 0.105 0.076 0.026
Note. a/b/c indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Dependent variable is: Contribution to the public
good (M1-M3). In all the models, the set of explanatory variables includes: Period. Residuals are clustered at the
group level in M1(13 groups), M2(9 groups), M3(10 groups). Standard errors are computed through the leave-one-out
jackknife procedure.
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Table A.7 – Efficiency: incentivized Rank Order Tournament vs unincentivized Rank Order
Tournament
Dep. variable: Sum of contributions within a group
Period 15
Intercept 45a
(11.397)
MP-ROT 38.286b
(17.597)
SP-ROT 49.667b
(24.043)
N 33
Prob > F 0.044
Note. a/b/c indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level for two-tailed tests. Dependent variable is: Sum
of contributions at the the public good level in period 15. In all the models, the set of explanatory variables includes
a dummy for MP-ROT and for SP-ROT. Every treatment is compared to NP-ROT. Residuals are clustered at the group
level (33 groups). Standard errors are computed through the leave-one-out jackknife procedure.
174
A.2 Instructions (Translated from French)
A.2.1 MP-ROT
Instructions
Thank you for participating to this experiment in economics. Please turn off your phone
and do not communicate with the other participants unless I ask you to. If you have any
questions, you can press the red button on the left of your desk at any time, I will come
to answer you in private.
During this experiment, you are going to make decisions. These decisions can make
you earn money. During the whole experiment, I will not talk about Euros, but about
Experimental Currency Units (ECU). Your earnings will be computed in ECU, then
converted in Euros at the time of the payment. The conversion rate is the following:
10 ECU = e1,5
You earn an additional e5 for participating to this experiment. At the end of the session,
you will receive your payment. You will be paid in Euros, in cash and in private in a
separated room.
With who are you going to interact ?
At the beginning of the experiment, the computer program will randomly form groups
of 4 people. The groups will be made of the same members during the whole experiment.
The identity of group members won’t be revealed at any moment.
The experiment lasts 15 identical periods
The decision
At the beginning of each period, each group member is endowed with 50ECU. Each
group member can invest a part of this amount in a common group account. The amount
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invested must be between 0 and 50 ECU. The sum of the amounts invested in the com-
mon group account by each group member is then multiplied by 2 and redistributed
between groupmembers according to a rule explicited below. For all the group members,
the amount that is not invested in the common project is stored on a personal account.
Thus, if a group member stores X ECU on his/her personal account, he/she will recover
exactly X ECU.
The rank
At the end of each period, a rank is attributed to each group member. Ranking is
determined as follows : the lower an investment to the common group account relative
to other group members investment, the higher the rank. In other words, the member
who invests the higher amount ranks 1. The member who invests the lower amount
ranks 4. Two different members cannot be ranked at the same position. If several group
members invest the same amount, then their rank is randomly attributed. Every group
member who invests the same amount has the same likelihood to be ranked at each
position.
The rank obtained by each group member determines the percentage of the common
account that the member will obtain:
If the amount you have invested makes you rank 1, then you will get 32,5% of the
common account.
If the amount you have invested makes you rank 2, then you will get 27,5% of the
common account.
If the amount you have invested makes you rank 3, then you will get 22,5%of the com-
mon account.
If the amount you have invested makes you rank 4, then you will get 17,5% of the
common account.
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The common group account is entirely redistributed. A period will be randomly drawn
to determine your payoff for the experimental session.
How is computed your gain?
Your gain for a period is computed in the following way:
Your Gain
=
The money you have not invested
+
The sum of amounts invested by the four members in your group × 2
×
Your percentage (that depends on your rank)
Where do I make my decision?
In order to make your decision, indicate the amount in the provided space and confirm
your choice by clicking the OK button. Once the choice confirmed, you cannot change it
anymore.
Gain simulation
On the left of your screen, you have a gain simulator. When you indicate the potential
value of your investment, and the potential value of other group members investment,
it computes your potential payoff.
Feedback
At the end of every period, you have available a table that informs you about the amount
invested by every group members and the rank associated to each of these investments.
You are also reminded for this period:
The amount you have invested and your rank;
The sum of the amounts invested by every group members in the common account;
The total sum in the common account after multiplication;
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The percentage of the common account you get;
The income you get from your personal account and the income you get from your
common account;
The gain associated to this period if it is randomly drawn.
Thank you for reading again these instructions. If you have any question, please push
the red button on your left or on your right side, and I will come to you individually.
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A.2.2 SP-ROT
Instructions
Thank you for participating to this experiment in economics. Please turn off your phone
and do not communicate with the others unless I ask you to. If you have any questions,
you can press the red button on the left of your desk at any time, I will come to answer
you in private.
During this experiment, you are going to make decisions. These decisions can make
you earn money. During the whole experiment, I will not talk about Euros, but about
Experimental Currency Units (ECU). Your earnings will be computed in ECU, then
converted in Euros at the time of the payment. The conversion rate is the following:
10 ECU = e1,5
You earn an additional e5 for participating to this experiment. At the end of the session,
you will receive your payment. You will be paid in Euros, in cash and in private in a
separated room.
With who are you going to interact ?
At the beginning of the experiment, the computer program will randomly form groups
of 4 people. The groups will be made of the same members during the whole experiment.
The identity of group members won’t be revealed at any moment.
The experiment lasts 15 identical periods
The decision
At the beginning of each period, each group member is endowed with 50ECU. Each
group member can invest a part of this amount in a common group account. The amount
invested must be between 0 and 50 ECU. The sum of the amounts invested in the com-
mon group account by each group member is then multiplied by 2 and redistributed
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between groupmembers according to a rule explicited below. For all the group members,
the amount that is not invested in the common project is stored on a personal account.
Thus, if a group member stores X ECU on his/her personal account, he/she will recover
exactly X ECU.
The rank
At the end of each period, a rank is attributed to each group member. Ranking is
determined as follows : the lower an investment to the common group account relative
to other group members investment, the higher the rank. In other words, the member
who invests the higher amount ranks 1. The member who invests the lower amount
ranks 4. Two different members cannot be ranked at the same position. If several group
members invest the same amount, then their rank is randomly attributed. Every group
member who invests the same amount has the same likelihood to be ranked at each
position.
The rank obtained by each group member determines the percentage of the common
account that the member will obtain:
If the amount you have invested makes you rank 1, then you will get 47,5% of the
common account.
If the amount you have invested doesn’t make you rank 1, then you will get 17,5% of
the common account.
The common group account is entirely redistributed. A period will be randomly drawn
to determine your payoff for the experimental session.
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How is computed your gain?
Your gain for a period is computed in the following way:
Your Gain
=
The money you have not invested
+
The sum of amounts invested by the four members in your group × 2
×
Your percentage (that depends on your rank)
Where do I make my decision?
In order to make your decision, indicate the amount in the provided space and confirm
your choice by clicking the OK button. Once the choice confirmed, you cannot change it
anymore.
Gain simulation
On the left of your screen, you have a gain simulator. When you indicate the potential
value of your investment, and the potential value of other group members investment,
it computes your potential payoff.
Feedback
At the end of every period, you have available a table that informs you about the amount
invested by every group members and the rank associated to each of these investments.
You are also reminded for this period:
The amount you have invested and your rank;
The sum of the amounts invested by every group members in the common account;
The total sum in the common account after multiplication;
The percentage of the common account you get;
The income you get from your personal account and the income you get from your
common account;
The gain associated to this period if it is randomly drawn.
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Thank you for reading again these instructions. If you have any question, please push
the red button on your left or on your right side, and I will come to you individually.
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A.2.3 NP-ROT
Instructions
Thank you for participating to this experiment in economics. Please turn off your phone
and do not communicate with the other participants unless I ask you to. If you have any
questions, you can press the red button on the left of your desk at any time, I will come
to answer you in private.
During this experiment, you are going to make decisions. These decisions can make
you earn money. During the whole experiment, I will not talk about Euros, but about
Experimental Currency Units (ECU). Your earnings will be computed in ECU, then
converted in Euros at the time of the payment. The conversion rate is the following:
10 ECU = e1,5
You earn an additional e5 for participating to this experiment. At the end of the session,
you will receive your payment. You will be paid in Euros, in cash and in private in a
separated room.
With who are you going to interact ?
At the beginning of the experiment, the computer program will randomly form groups
of 4 people. The groups will be made of the same members during the whole experiment.
The identity of group members won’t be revealed at any moment.
The experiment lasts 15 identical periods
The decision
At the beginning of each period, each group member is endowed with 50ECU. Each
group member can invest a part of this amount in a common group account. The amount
invested must be between 0 and 50 ECU. The sum of the amounts invested in the com-
mon group account by each group member is then multiplied by 2 and redistributed
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between groupmembers according to a rule explicited below. For all the group members,
the amount that is not invested in the common project is stored on a personal account.
Thus, if a group member stores X ECU on his/her personal account, he/she will recover
exactly X ECU.
The rank
At the end of each period, a rank is attributed to each group member. Ranking is deter-
mined as follows : more an investment to the common group account is low relative to
other group members investment, the higher the rank. In other words, the member who
invest the higher amount ranks 1. The member who invest the lower amount ranks 4.
Two different members can’t be ranked at the same position. If several group members
invest the same amount, then their rank is randomly attributed. Every group member
who invests the same amount has the same likelihood to be ranked at each position.
Whatever your rank, you will get 25% of the common account.
The common group account is entirely redistributed. A period will be randomly drawn
to determine your payoff for the experimental session.
How is computed your gain?
Your gain for a period is computed in the following way:
Your Gain
=
The money you have not invested
+
The sum of amounts invested by the four members in your group × 2
×
Your percentage
Where do I make my decision?
In order to make your decision, indicate the amount in the provided space and confirm
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your choice by clicking the OK button. Once the choice confirmed, you cannot change it
anymore.
Gain simulation
On the left of your screen, you have a gain simulator. When you indicate the potential
value of your investment, and the potential value of other group members investment,
it computes your potential payoff.
Feedback
At the end of every period, you have available a table that informs you about the amount
invested by every group members and the rank associated to each of these investments.
You are also reminded for this period:
The amount you have invested and your rank;
The sum of the amounts invested by every group members in the common account;
The total sum in the common account after multiplication;
The percentage of the common account you get;
The income you get from your personal account and the income you get from your
common account;
The gain associated to this period if it is randomly drawn.
Thank you for reading again these instructions. If you have any question, please push
the red button on your left or on your right side, and I will come to you individually.
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A.2.4 MP-CTL
Instructions
Thank you for participating to this experiment in economics. Please turn off your phone
and do not communicate with the other participants unless I ask you to. If you have any
questions, you can press the red button on the left of your desk at any time, I will come
to answer you in private.
During this experiment, you are going to make decisions. These decisions can make
you earn money. During the whole experiment, I will not talk about Euros, but about
Experimental Currency Units (ECU). Your earnings will be computed in ECU, then
converted in Euros at the time of the payment. The conversion rate is the following:
10 ECU = e1,5
You earn an additional e5 for participating to this experiment. At the end of the session,
you will receive your payment. You will be paid in Euros, in cash and in private in a
separated room.
With who are you going to interact ?
At the beginning of the experiment, the computer program will randomly form groups
of 4 people. The groups will be made of the same members during the whole experiment.
The identity of group members won’t be revealed at any moment.
The experiment lasts 15 identical periods
The decision
At the beginning of each period, each group member is endowed with 50ECU. Each
group member can invest a part of this amount in a common group account. The amount
invested must be between 0 and 50 ECU. The sum of the amounts invested in the com-
mon group account by each group member is then multiplied by 2 and redistributed
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between groupmembers according to a rule explicited below. For all the group members,
the amount that is not invested in the common project is stored on a personal account.
Thus, if a group member stores X ECU on his/her personal account, he/she will recover
exactly X ECU.
The rank
At the end of each period, a rank is attributed to each group member. Ranks randomly
determined by the software and can take four different values: 1, 2, 3 or 4. Two different
members can’t be ranked at the same position.
The rank obtained by each group member determines the percentage of the common
account that the member will obtain:
If you rank 1, then you will get 32,5% of the common account.
If you rank 2, then you will get 27,5% of the common account.
If you rank 3, then you will get 22,5%of the common account.
If you rank 4, then you will get 17,5% of the common account.
The common group account is entirely redistributed. A period will be randomly drawn
to determine your payoff for the experimental session.
How is computed your gain?
Your gain for a period is computed in the following way:
Your Gain
=
The money you have not invested
+
The sum of amounts invested by the four members in your group × 2
×
Your percentage (that depends on your rank)
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Where do I make my decision?
In order to make your decision, indicate the amount in the provided space and confirm
your choice by clicking the OK button. Once the choice confirmed, you cannot change it
anymore.
Gain simulation
On the left of your screen, you have a gain simulator. When you indicate the potential
value of your investment, and the potential value of other group members investment,
it computes your potential payoff.
Feedback
At the end of every period, you have available a table that informs you about the amount
invested by every group members and the rank associated to each of these investments.
You are also reminded for this period:
The amount you have invested and your rank;
The sum of the amounts invested by every group members in the common account;
The total sum in the common account after multiplication;
The percentage of the common account you get;
The income you get from your personal account and the income you get from your
common account;
The gain associated to this period if it is randomly drawn.
Thank you for reading again these instructions. If you have any question, please push
the red button on your left or on your right side, and I will come to you individually.
188
A.2.5 SP-CTL
Instructions
Thank you for participating to this experiment in economics. Please turn off your phone
and do not communicate with the other participants unless I ask you to. If you have any
questions, you can press the red button on the left of your desk at any time, I will come
to answer you in private.
During this experiment, you are going to make decisions. These decisions can make
you earn money. During the whole experiment, I will not talk about Euros, but about
Experimental Currency Units (ECU). Your earnings will be computed in ECU, then
converted in Euros at the time of the payment. The conversion rate is the following:
10 ECU = e1,5
You earn an additional e5 for participating to this experiment. At the end of the session,
you will receive your payment. You will be paid in Euros, in cash and in private in a
separated room.
With who are you going to interact ?
At the beginning of the experiment, the computer program will randomly form groups
of 4 people. The groups will be made of the same members during the whole experiment.
The identity of group members won’t be revealed at any moment.
The experiment lasts 15 identical periods
The decision
At the beginning of each period, each group member is endowed with 50ECU. Each
group member can invest a part of this amount in a common group account. The amount
invested must be between 0 and 50 ECU. The sum of the amounts invested in the com-
mon group account by each group member is then multiplied by 2 and redistributed
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between groupmembers according to a rule explicited below. For all the group members,
the amount that is not invested in the common project is stored on a personal account.
Thus, if a group member stores X ECU on his/her personal account, he/she will recover
exactly X ECU.
The rank
At the end of each period, a rank is attributed to each group member. Ranks randomly
determined by the software and can take four different values: 1, 2, 3 or 4. Two different
members can’t be ranked at the same position.
The rank obtained by each group member determines the percentage of the common
account that the member will obtain:
If you rank 1, then you will get 32,5% of the common account.
If you don’t rank 1, then you will get 17,5% of the common account.
The common group account is entirely redistributed. A period will be randomly drawn
to determine your payoff for the experimental session.
How is computed your gain?
Your gain for a period is computed in the following way:
Your Gain
=
The money you have not invested
+
The sum of amounts invested by the four members in your group × 2
×
Your percentage (that depends on your rank)
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Where do I make my decision?
In order to make your decision, indicate the amount in the provided space and confirm
your choice by clicking the OK button. Once the choice confirmed, you cannot change it
anymore.
Gain simulation
On the left of your screen, you have a gain simulator. When you indicate the potential
value of your investment, and the potential value of other group members investment,
it computes your potential payoff.
Feedback
At the end of every period, you have available a table that informs you about the amount
invested by every group members and the rank associated to each of these investments.
You are also reminded for this period:
The amount you have invested and your rank;
The sum of the amounts invested by every group members in the common account;
The total sum in the common account after multiplication;
The percentage of the common account you get;
The income you get from your personal account and the income you get from your
common account;
The gain associated to this period if it is randomly drawn.
Thank you for reading again these instructions. If you have any question, please push
the red button on your left or on your right side, and I will come to you individually.
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General Conclusion
Understanding cooperation is one of the challenge of social sciences. In order to enrich
knowledge about cooperation, experimental economists have used the Public Good
Game for almost four decades. In this thesis, I have given new insights on how people
cooperate in a more complex environment - in which agents may differ in endowment,
in MPCR, or in which MPCR is uncertain.
In Chapter 1, I have investigated the literature which relaxes the standard assumption
of homogeneity in endowment and homogeneity in return of the public good (MPCR)
within a group. My general conclusion is that, despite a normative conflict exacerbated,
heterogeneity does not harm cooperation. Yet, there is still a substantial underprovision
of public goods. As underprovision leads to a social loss in welfare, I have investigated
whether heterogeneous agents manage to overcome the underprovision problem with
efficiency-enhancing mechanisms. The results are mixed. On one hand, agents hetero-
geneous in endowment manage to increase efficiency when mechanisms are available.
On the other hand, agents heterogeneous in MPCR do not totally overcome the under-
provision problem. The main reason for this result is that efficiency is associated with
inequalities in payoffs that are not accepted by the agents left behind.
These results suggest that heterogeneous agents are ready to cooperate even when they
do not share the same view about what level of contributions they should adopt. In
a large majority of the surveyed studies, authors do not observe statistical differences
in the level of contribution dedicated to the public good with respect to homogeneous
groups. Methodologically, a further step would be to run a meta-analysis of these articles
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to quantify the effect of heterogeneity (depending on its type) when no mechanisms are
implemented to promote cooperation.
Chapter 1 somehow complements the empirical studies investigating the effect on
heterogeneity in public goods provision (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara,
2000; Miguel, 2004; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Algan et al., 2016). These papers find
a negative effect of ethnic diversity on contributions to the public good. Chapter 1
gives some evidence that the negative effect of heterogeneity observed outside the
laboratory should not come neither from differences in return from public goods nor
from differences in income. Of course, the effect of income and return could be additive.
To the best of my knowledge this question has not been investigated in the laboratory.
Additionally, there is a need for future research on the effect of heterogeneity. Returns of
the public good outside the laboratory are often time-dependant. Young agents benefit
more from the educational system while older agents benefit more from the heath
system. It would be interesting to study inter-generational solidarity in the laboratory in
which agents know for sure that the left behind (low MPCR) in period 1 would be the
privileged agents (high MPCR) in period 2 and vice versa. Finally, economists have to
keep investigating on the mechanisms that would achieve efficiency when agents are
heterogeneous in return from the public good.
In Chapter 2, co-written with Adam Zylbersztejn, we study the effects of environmental
risk on cooperation. We call an environmental risk a situation in which the return of the
public good is a lottery at the the time of the decision. We consider two kinds of risk. In
the first risky treatment, the risk is collective: once every agent makes her decision, every
agent gets the same MPCR. In the second risky treatment, the risk is individual: once
every agent makes her decision, every agent learns her individual MPCR. We compare
these two risky treatments with a standard situation in which the MPCR is certain,
homogeneous, and known by advance. We find that uncertainty does not affect neither
other-regarding preferences (measured with conditional contributions), nor beliefs about
other group members average contribution, nor contributions.
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With this chapter, we show that environmental risk does not hamper cooperation. De-
spite risk aversion, subjects keep contributing to the public good. This chapter highlights
the complex link between risk preferences and other-regarding preferences. Agents
contribute to the public good as much when the return of the public is risky or when it is
certain. There is a need for more research on how risk preferences and other-regarding
preferences interact. The link between risk-preferences and other-regarding preferences
is still unclear and, no theory reaches the consensus.
Additionally, in this chapter, we observe an underprovision of the public good. As far
as I know, no mechanisms have been tested in a risky context. Yet, the improvement
of efficiency due to a mechanism in a risky context is uncertain, especially because an
individual risk may lead to inequalities in ex post payoffs. Another way to work on risky
returns is to start from a situation with no environmental risk in which agents cooperate
and to incorporate risk. This situation is likely to exacerbate the normative conflict and
to erode coordination.
Taking together, Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 indicate that the standard experimental
methodology provides a robust and conservative measure of human cooperation. Relax-
ing the standard hypotheses of homogeneity and certainty does not change the pattern
of cooperation observed in the classic game.
Chapter 3 is slightly different. In this chapter, I investigate the effects of within-group
competition in Public Good Games. Agents compete for a higher Marginal Per Capita
Return (MPCR) from the public good. The rank in the competition - and therefore the
MPCR - depends on how one’s contribution ranks within the group. I implement two
kinds of incentivized tournament. In theMultiple-Prize Rank Order Tournament treatment
(MP-ROT), four subjects compete for four different MPCRs. In the Single-Prize Rank Order
Tournament treatment (SP-ROT), only the best contributor gets a high MPCR. I compare
these two treatments with a control condition in which agents are ranked depending
on their relative contributions but such as there are no monetary rewards (NP-ROT).
My research hypothesis is that incentivized tournaments increase contributions to the
public good. I find mixed evidence about the efficiency of incentivized Rank Order
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Tournaments: only MP-ROT outperforms the NP-ROT. Additionally, I compare MP-ROT
and SP-ROT with two controls in which the same MPCRs are randomly attributed. I
find that only SP-ROT outperforms its control in which the prize is randomly attributed.
The standard way to provide public goods lies on cooperation. Yet, this chapter gives
some evidence that competition can foster the private provision of public goods. Both
ways to provide public goods are antagonistic. It would be interesting to develop an
experiment to study the individual choice of contribution in both contexts depending on
subjects’ elicited risk preferences and on their elicited other-regarding preferences. It is
likely (i) that some subjects that do contribute to the public good for other-regarding
motives stop contributing when competition is implemented, and that (ii) some free-
riders that do not contribute to the public good when the standard way is implemented,
do contribute when there is competition.
Other important questions about competition deserve some attention. If competition
increases efficiency, do agents agree to compete? Are they willing to pay to implement
competition? If agents agree to enter the competition, they know that they are matched
with other agents that want to compete and therefore, they may have higher beliefs
about other group members contribution. The mechanism could be even more efficient
in this case. In the same vein, competition may depend on the number of agents who
compete. Is the mechanism efficient with a higher number of agents? On one hand, the
potential gain is higher. On the other hand, it is less likely to earn the highest prizes.
Finally, competition is potentially efficient when are agents are homogeneous in en-
dowment. What happens when agents are heterogeneous in endowment? Do agents
with a low endowment contribute? In this case, is the public good as provided as when
there is no competition? Can economists find a way to implement competition within a
heterogeneous population?
This thesis has highlighted that there is still a lot of topics to investigate in cooperation.
The public good game seems to be a good instrument to measure human cooperation
behaviour. Research on this topic is even more important given the ecological and
political situation of today’s world. The United Nations Organization has implemented
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a program composed of 17 goals to transform the world. Among these 17 goals, the
ecological issue (related to Goal 13, 14 and 15) and the peace issue (related to Goal 16)
are central.20 The United Nations Organization encourages countries and citizen to
cooperate to change people’s behaviour. It promotes the implementation of concrete
mechanisms (e.g.goals 14.4; 14.6; 13.B) but also a better education/information to change
behaviours (e.g. goals 13.3; 16.10).
20See more in https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/
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RULES AND EFFICIENCY IN COLLECTIVE CHOICES: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH
Vincent Théroude
Abstract
This thesis contains three essays on cooperation, observed through the contributions in the Public Good
Game.
In the first chapter, I survey the literature on heterogeneity in linear Public Good Games. I distinguish
two kinds of heterogeneity: heterogeneity in endowment and heterogeneity in return from the public
good (i.e. MPCR). Despite a normative conflict exacerbated, heterogeneous agents contribute as much as
homogeneous agents to the public good. Are they able to use mechanisms to reach efficiency (i.e. a full
provision of the public good)? I find mixed evidence. Agents heterogeneous in endowment are able to
govern themselves and to reach efficiency while agents heterogeneous in MPCR do not perfectly overcome
the underprovision problem.
In the second chapter, co-written with Adam Zylbersztejn, we investigate the effects of environmental risk
on cooperation. We call an environmental risk a situation in which the return of the public good is risky
at the time of the decision. We consider, in our experiment, two kinds of risk: an individual one (i.e. the
MPCR is determined independently for each group member) and a collective one (i.e. the MPCR is the
same for each group member). We find that risk does not affect cooperation: subjects do not contribute to
the public good differently when the MPCR is certain or when it is risky.
In the third chapter, I investigate the effects of a mechanism based on within-group competition to provide
public goods. In my experimental treatments, agents compete for a higher MPCR from the public good.
The rank in the competition - and therefore the MPCR - depends on how one’s contribution ranks within
the group. I find that competition improves public goods provision only when it does not generate too
large inequalities.
Keywords: Public good game; Heterogeneity; Risk; Other-regarding preferences ; Experimental Economics
Résumé
Cette thèse contient trois essais sur la coopération, mesurée à travers les contributions dans le jeu du bien
public.
Dans le premier chapitre, je propose une revue de la littérature sur l’hétérogénéité dans les jeux de bien
public linéaires. Je distingue deux types d’hétérogénéité : l’hétérogénéité en dotation et l’hétérogénéité
en rendement du bien public (c’est-à-dire en MPCR). Malgré un conflit normatif exacerbé, les agents
hétérogènes contribuent autant au bien public que des agents homogènes. Sont-ils en mesure d’utiliser
des mécanismes pour atteindre l’efficience (une provision complète du bien public) ? Mes résultats sont
nuancés. Les agents hétérogènes en dotation sont capables de "s’autogouverner" et d’atteindre l’efficience
tandis que les agents hétérogènes en MPCR ne parviennent pas parfaitement à surmonter le problème de
la sous-provision du bien public.
Dans le deuxième chapitre, co-écrit avec Adam Zylbersztejn, nous étudions les effets d’un risque envi-
ronnemental sur la coopération. Nous appelons risque environnemental une situation dans laquelle le
rendement du bien public est risqué au moment de la décision. Nous considérons, dans notre expérience,
deux types de risque : un risque individuel (le MPCR est déterminé indépendamment pour chaque
membre du groupe) et un risque collectif (le MPCR est le même pour chaque membre du groupe). Nous
constatons que le risque n’affecte pas la coopération : les sujets ne contribuent pas différemment au bien
public lorsque le MPCR est certain ou lorsqu’il est risqué.
Dans le troisième chapitre, j’examine les effets d’un mécanisme fondé sur la compétition intragroupe pour
financer des biens publics. Dans mon expérience, les agents sont en compétition pour obtenir un MPCR
plus élevé. Le rang dans la compétition - et donc le MPCR - dépend de la façon dont la contribution d’une
personne se classe au sein de son groupe. Je trouve que la compétition n’améliore la provision des biens
publics que lorsqu’elle ne génère pas d’inégalités trop importantes.
Mots Clés : Jeu de bien public ; Hétérogénéité ; Risque ; Préférences Sociales ; Economie Expérimentale
